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ABSTRACT
The thesis consists of a preliminary examination of the de­
velopment of Indian politics in the mid-1930s, especially 
their reaction to the Government of India Act, 1935* and the 
consequent provincial elections of 1937. The period has re­
cently been opened to research through the availability of 
official records and private and party papers in India and 
England. Newspapers and secondary sources have also been 
used.
Chapter 1 looks at the way in which British policy to­
wards the elections and electoral arrangements vrs formulated, 
and at whether there were specific attempts to influence their 
outcome. Working from an ideal type of a nationalist party 
as a bourgeois-led consensus movement, chapter 2 analyses the 
composition of the Indian National Congress and other parties, 
their relations to other political and social structures, 
their policies, their relations with each other, and the 
effect on them of contesting elections. Particular attention 
is paid to the relationship between Congress and communal 
groups. The themes of the previous chapter are developed in 
chapter 3 by focussing on the election campaign as a time when 
existing problems had to be resolved and new ones were created. 
Chapter ^ presents the results of a study of the socio-economic 
and political backgrounds of the successful candidates. This 
supplements the conclusions reached in the previous two chap­
ters. Chapter 3 attempts to present the election results as 
fully and as accurately as possible.
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INTRODUCTION
The development in India of a pluralist, multi-party system, 
and the dominance within it of the Indian National Congress, 
can be regarded either as limiting the possibility of radical 
social change or as an essential prerequisite of planned econo­
mic development. It is at all events in Contrast to the ex­
perience of most new states in Africa, where single-party 
systems predominate. The reasons for the contrast are partly 
specific to the Indian social system and cultural traditions.^
It is also widely recognized that the historical circumstances 
of the Indian independence movement played and continue to play
an important part in determining the shape of the Indian politi- 
2
cal system. This thesis examines the developments of the 
mid-1950s, particularly the provincial elections of 1937- Al­
though it makes no attempt to relate the political system of 
the time to that of today, it is based on the belief that the 
achievement of independence did not mark a complete break with 
the past and that political leaders in the 1930s had inevitably 
to be concerned with problems of the distribution of power and 
prestige as well as with their transfer from alien hands.
^The basic units of the caste system - the gotra and the .jati - 
are too small, and the larger castes too dispersed and divided 
to dominate the system completely, except at the local and 
occasionally the state levels. The combination of hierarchical 
and segmentaiy elements in the caste system permit a degree of 
mobility which is enhanced by the existence of a competitive 
democracy.
^For example, W.H.Morris-Jones, The Government and Politics of 
India (2nd ed. 1967), chapter 1, and Rajni Kothari, Politics 
in India (1970), pp. 77-85*
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The study of an election has advantages and disadvantages 
as a means of understanding political systems. One's attention 
is inevitably drawn to the manifestations of direct political 
activity, and the temptation to be misled by the forms of politi­
cal institutions is particularly strong. The political signi­
ficance of those who do not have the vote (in India in 1937 
some 60°/o of the adult male population were unenfranchised) 
is largely ignored. Except on an intuitive basis it is not 
possible to distinguish temporary from permanent features of the 
system. On the other hand, an election is a moment when differ­
ent issues and trends are drawn together, and the actors at the 
various levels of the system, although their expectations are 
very different, take part in a single event. Although the 
functions of elections vary in different systems, the general 
point remains valid.
What were the functions of the 1937 elections in India?
For the government the holding of the elections was a means to 
legitimize its position and to establish provincial autonomy on 
a base of popular support. Although successive reforms had been 
rejected by Congress, there was always the hope that the more 
moderate elements might be detached and induced to co-operate. 
Conversely, the elections provided Congress with an opportunity 
to deny legitimacy to the government and to its Indian opponents 
in terms that would be generally recognized.
Political organizers, whether or not they wished to parti­
cipate in the legislative process themselves, were able to use 
the election campaign as a way to recruit and mobilize mass 
support. The organizational structure and techniques employed
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in the campaign could be used, with slightly different emphases, 
to reach both the enfranchised and the unenfranchised* Alter­
natively, bargains could be struck with those who commanded 
mass support, in which the counters were derived from the 
elections.
Elections (and the subsequent exercise of power) provided 
new resources to the political system.^ As has been said, 
they could be means of attracting new recruits to the political 
parties. They could also be used to further traditional rival­
ries between castes or other sectional groupings. Although 
factionalism had existed previously within Congress, it appears 
to have increased as a result of the elections.
The elections made new demands on the existing system of 
party organization. In the past nationalists had stressed the 
need for co-operation between disparate groups to achieve a 
single aim, and Congress during the civil disobedience period 
had been a 'front* rather than a party. Collaborators with the 
British had operated largely as individual notables. Neither 
model could be used unaltered for the 1937 elections. The pri­
mary need for Congress was to integrate its disparate parts in­
to a single structure. In so far as there was co-operation with 
non-Congress groups, it had to be on the basis of a pact or an 
electoral agreement rather than a simple united front. It was 
also necessary to achieve a slightly greater degree of ideo­
logical consensus, although potentially divisive issues were
■^ The pattern of distribution within the system was changed 
simultaneously so that only some parties benefited.
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avoided as much as possible. The organizational structure that 
had sufficed for the civil disobedience period had to be re­
placed by one that could not only cope with the increased de­
mands of contesting elections but could also make self-interest 
as well as self-sacrifice a basis for party unity. Inevitably 
this meant that there were defections, although these were more 
than balanced by new recruits.
The elections have to be placed in the context of political 
developments in the 1930s. Recent independence movements have 
tended to gather momentum in one continuous process. In India, 
however, there were short periods of intense excitement separated 
by longer intervals in which sections of the population - the 
'middle classes* - were able to adapt their social and economic 
life to the colonial environment. Despite nationalist rhetoric, 
there was a degree of coexistence. High points were reached in 
the 1920s and from 1937-9. The intervening years, however, had 
seen a major shift in political power. The Britidi Government 
had introduced the Government of India Act, 1935>"L which, as 
well as laying down plans for an all-India federation which 
never materialized, also considerably increased the scope of 
responsible government in the provinces. Partly as a result of 
this and partly through the continuing operation of other 
factors, the degree of politicization at various levels rose. 
Although this was primarily to the advantage of Congress, other 
political groupings emerged. In more general terms, competition 
between sections of the elite was sharpened.
& 26 Geo. 5, c.*f2.
Three areas of political competition may be defined apart 
from the struggle with the alien government. First, there was 
conflict over the fundamental dispositions of the new polity - 
the nature and the extent of federal authority, political geo­
graphy, methods of election, etc. - which was an integral part 
of the process of attaining freedom. Secondly, the actions of 
the legislatures, although limited by British power, could 
nevertheless permanently affect social relations. Lastly, 
control of the nationalist movement immediately prior to inde­
pendence would be of vital consequence in later political con­
flicts. This applied equally to those who claimed that nationalt- 
ism was ideologically neutral and to those who wished to associate 
it with a specific programme of economic and social reform or 
with a particular cultural pattern.
This study takes the whole of India as its subject. At the 
present stage of Indian studies no country-wide survey can hope 
to be more than introductory and at times superficial. Local 
studies, however, sometimes neglect the importance of all-India 
structures and issues which transcend regional differences. The 
interaction of national and provincial levels of politics is 
itself worthy of attention.
The first chapter of the thesis outlines the constitutional 
structure within which electoral politics occurred and the atti­
tudes of the British jaovernment, and their effect on the develop­
ment of politics in India. In thesecond chapter the ideology 
and organization of Congress is analysed and briefer accounts 
are given of the other political parties of the period and of 
the situation in each province. Particular attention is paid
to the interrelation of political parties and communal groupings. 
The remainder of the thesis is concerned with the elections.
The third chapter deals with the election campaign, defined to 
include the process of candidate selection, as a means of re­
cruiting new elements into the party elites and mobilizing mass 
support, and as a moment at which latent conflicts come to the 
surface. In the next chapter a study is made of the socio­
economic backgrounds and previous political experience of the 
successful candidates. Finally, an attempt is made to put some 
order into the very defective statements of the election results, 
and to assess the effect of the results on the development of 
Indian politics.
The source material for the study has been drawn principally 
from the official records of the Government of India and the 
India Office, the All-India Congress Committee (AICC) papers, 
and newspapers. These have been supplemented by the private 
papers of certain Indian leaders and the usual secondary sources. 
The official records, particularly the regular provincial re­
ports, betray wishful thinking; the AICC papers do not include 
any detailed minutes of Working Committee meetings. The news­
papers fill some of the gaps but many important meetings went 
unreported and for others only news agency reports were used.
The thesis makes use of terms derived from functional 
theories of political analysis, for example political system, 
political structure, environment, role, arena. They have not, 
however, been used to define conceptual frameworks in any very 
precise way.'*' In the discussion of party ideology the paired
1
See, for example, F.G.Bailey, Stratagems and Spoils (1969), 
chapter 1, for definitions of these terms.
terms 'social' and 'economic' frequently occur. The use is not 
intended to indicate a dichotomy but simply the multi-faceted 
nature of most ideological issues. 'Party' is defined as any 
organized associational group with avowedly political aims; 
the term is not meant to carry any connotations from competitive 
systems in independent states.
Chapter One
THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ELECTIONS
The proposition that a state's political system is affected by 
its electoral regime . is as valid in colonial as in independent 
countries. In India in the 1930s it was not only the electoral 
regime but the whole machinery of alien control which provided 
the structure within and against which parties developed. In 
considering the influence of British rule an immediate distinction 
must be drawn between planned manipulation and unconscious con­
ditioning of the system. A second, value-laden, logically 
difficult, but important distinction exists between measures 
designed simply to operate the electoral regime and measures 
intended to load it against the national movement. In a sense, 
anything which facilitated the working of the 1933 Act was a 
blow against the independence movement, although many Congress­
men went further and claimed that even within the confines of 
the Act and its consequent regulations there was institutional­
ized discrimination against their party. In this chapter 
various aspects of official involvement with the elections are 
examined.. After an account of the official decision-making 
structure, the processes whereby franchise levels, distribu­
tion of seats, and methods of voting were determined, and the 
detailed administration of the poll, will be analysed.'*'
"*Tor studies of the problem of ensuring that the machinery of 
election organization does not inhibit democratic development, 
see W.J.M.Mackenzie, Free Elections (1938). and T.E.Smith, 
Elections in Developing Countries (I960),
The Decision-Making Structure
The Montagu Declaration of 1917 had marked a major change in the 
official British attitude towards India, and the Government of 
India Act, 1919, based on the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, was 
the first faltering step towards the goal of responsible govern­
ment.'** The Act divided executive authority between ministers, 
who were primarily responsible to the legislatures, and officials. 
After the appointment of the Simon Commission in 1927, plans 
began to be drawn up for provincial autonomy, and a federal 
framework to encompass the princely states. The 1935 Act em­
bodied the results of eight years of conferences, inquiries, 
and parliamentary debate, as well as the Communal Award of 1932, 
which had been imposed to break the deadlock that had developed 
at the Round Table Conferences over the protection of minority 
rights.
Apart from its official sponsors, the 1935 Act found few 
active supporters when it was being formulated. In India, it 
was supposed to protect minority interests, but few politically 
articulate Indians agreed that this should be done by preserving 
the authority of the British ra.j. which could be used for the 
protection of other interests than those of minorities. In 
Britain, the Act was a patched-up compromise typical of the 
National Government era, which gained the whole-hearted support 
of no one. As Baldwin himself wrote, ’The fulness of time
**Tor the significance of the Montagu Declaration, see S.R.
Mehrotra, ’The Politics behind the Montagu Declaration of
1917* in C.H,Philips (ed.), Politics and Society in India
(1963), pp. 95-6.
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means now to India and never to certain die-hards1.'*' By 19^0, 
the federal part of the Act was acknowledged on all sides to 
have been overtaken by events, and in the majority of provinces 
the remainder of the Act had also been suspended.
Neither the isolation of the India Office ministers nor 
the rapid supersession of the Act should, however, obscure the 
fact that at the time it was expected to provide a permanent 
framework for the Indian constitution. This was in contrast to 
its predecessor which had provided for a statutory review after 
ten years. If by the time the provincial part of the Act was 
inaugurated on 1 April 1937 rumours of war could be heard, all 
had been peaceful when the long process of formulation had 
begun in 1927. From the time of the first Hound Table Con­
ference to the lorig days in committee in the spring of 1935 
the problems of India received more attention in England than 
ever before or after.
Most of the politicians* attention was devoted to the 
details of the federal structure and to safeguards, which had 
to be maximized in England and minimized in India. The prin­
ciple of provincial autonomy as such was not questioned. 
Officials in India and London, however, had also to consider 
the minutiae of the elections which determined who was to 
vote and how. The Simon Commission itself had made recommenda­
tions on franchise levels, the distribution of seats, and 
methods of voting, but they were reconsidered at the Round 
Table Conferences. The Franchise sub-Committee of the first
"^ Quoted in G.M.Young, Stanley Baldwin (1952), p.18^.
conference suggested that an expert commission be set up to 
work within the broad limits it had laid down."*" In pursuance 
of this, the Indian Franchise Committee, with Lord Lothian as 
chairman, was set up after the second conference, and reported 
in May 1932. The report was primarily concerned with franchise 
levels but other matters vere dealt with in appendices. These 
latter were again discussed by the Indian Delimitation Committee 
of 1936, which was chaired by Sir Laurie Hammond. Franchise 
levels were laid down in a schedule to the 1933 Act; other 
matters were settled by subsequent orders-in-council and 
governors* rules.
The Reforms Department of the India Office was chiefly
responsible for translating these reports, and subsequent modi-
2
fications of them, into their final statutoiy forms. In 
this period it was headed by Sir Vernon Dawson, assisted pri­
marily by J.G. (now Sir Gilbert) Laithwaite. Although all 
important decisions were referred to the Secretary of State 
(until June 1935 Sir Samuel Hoare, thereafter Lord Zetland), 
the minister most concerned was R.A. (now Lord) Butler. In 
addition to interpreting the wishes of the British Government, 
the department also worked in collaboration with the Reforms 
Office of the Government of India and with the reforms officers 
of the various provinces. Orders-in-council and schedules 
to the Act were actually drafted by the Parliamentary Draftsmen,
^Proceedings of the Indian Round Table Conference, 12th November, 
1950 - 19th January. 1931. Cmd. 377b. ( i m )  p.386.
2
The White Paper of March 1933 (Proposals for Indian Constitu­
tional Reform, Cmd. k268 (1933)5was an intermediate stage.
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while governors’ rules were prepared for each province by its 
reforms officer. The administration of the elections was carried 
out by the provincial reforms officers, under the general guid­
ance of the Government of India Reforms Office.
The ultimate responsibility for each decision was thus 
clearly defined but it is equally important to analyse the pro­
cess of policy formation. Sources of policy may be divided 
into three: - Indian, English, and official. The principal 
vehicles for Indian opinion that came to the notice of the 
British Government were the three Round Tahle Conferences and 
the various provincial committees set up as counterparts to 
the official inquiries, first to the Simon Commission and then 
to the Lothian and Hammond Committees. At the Round Table 
Conferences Indians were in a majority, but, although they 
were not subject to official control and were representative 
of some parts of the population, the interests represented 
were chosen by the British. Also, the conference table was 
not a place where plans could be worked out from the begin­
ning, and to a large extent the conferences were overawed by 
the recommendations of the Simon Commission and by the tradi­
tions of the British system of government. This is not to say 
that more radical points of view were not heard. Gandhi him­
self attended the second conference, but his vision of himself 
as a plenipotentiary delegate of India clashed with that of 
the British, who merely saw him as completing the circle of 
those who had a right to be heard. At the first conference, 
radical positions were upheld by men such as Dr. B.R.Ambedkar 
and N.M.Joshi, but their views found little concrete expression
18.
in its results. The provincial counterpart committees and con­
ferences were chosen from the provincial legislatures and other 
established bodies and organizations. Because Congress had 
boycotted the provincial elections of 1930, they were mostly 
representative of the more conservative groups who were pre­
pared to work the 1919 reforms properly. In addition, the 
committees and local governments put forward separate schemes 
for the consideration of the official committees, rather than 
trying to reach a compromise in which Indian opinion would have 
had a substantial place. Nevertheless, the British Government 
believed that the Indians it consulted were broadly representa­
tive of India as a whole. Coy references were made to ’an 
important Indian party' which had declined to appear, but 
little real notice was taken of Congress views in absentia. A 
typical instance of this can be seen in the report of the Joint 
Select Committee. Referring to the government's proposals for 
the franchise, it claimed that they had general support from 
Indian opinion, largely because they had been approved by the 
third Round Table Conference.^" The Central Legislative Assembly, 
in which Congress and its allies generally formed a majority 
after the elections of 193^ j provided a platform for numerous 
allegations of government interference, but it appears to have 
had very little effect on official action.
English opinion may be divided into two, independent and 
government. The former was itself split. On the one hand were 
those who supported the cause of Indian self-government and
Report of the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform, 
H.C.5(iPart I) of 193V, PP- 69-70.
took an active interest in it. Such men as R.W.Sorensen and 
Morgan Jones were in touch with Indian nationalist leaders and 
were prominent in asking questions in the House of Commons. On 
the other side were the 'die-hards1 whose contacts were more with 
retired civil servants and military officers and business in­
terests but who, under Churchill and Lord Rankeillour, were an 
equally formidable force in Parliament. There were also groups 
and individuals who had particular causes to promote; for in­
stance, Eleanor Rathbone was anxious to see Indian women fairly 
treated, and the Proportional Representation Society saw India 
as another field for its constitutional experiments. Although 
none of these groups was able to outvote the government, they 
had minority representation on most official committees, in 
and out of Parliament, and in addition some could bring personal 
influence to bear on ministers. The government itself was not 
a totally independent source of opinion. Its policy, even be­
fore its detailed formulation, was, like every government's, 
tempered by the views of officials. At this stage, it had a 
secure majority for its view that India could safely be given 
a large degree of home rule, provided essential British interests 
were not affected. As well as its parliamentary majority, it 
had the advantage of being able to appoint the chairmen of 
committees.^
■^Although Lord Lothian was an under-seeretaiy at the India Office 
when appointed chairman of the Franchise Commission, he cannot 
be entirely regarded as a government man. His speeches while 
still chairman, which provoked questions in Parliament, his 
correspondence with Jawaharlal Nehru (in Nehru, A Bunch of Old 
Letters (1st British ed. i960), pp. 128-5*0, and his later 
intervention in the office acceptance controversy show him to
Finally, there were the opinions of the Indian Civil 
Servants, who had for a century controlled the government of 
India, and considered that they knew best what was practicable, 
and what was best suited to Indian conditions. They were in 
fact given every opportunity to express their views. First, 
they submitted memoranda to the several committees, which 
covered every aspect of the question under discussion, secondly 
they were represented on the counterpart committees, and 
thirdly, once the recommendations had been made, they were 
consulted at every stage by the India Office during the prepara­
tion of the final proposals. Thus, although the Indian* officials 
were civil servants, they had a great deal of influence in the 
framing of the new Indian constitution. A distinction might 
possibly be made between the Government of India and the local 
governments. The local governments' reforms officers were con­
cerned with the actual implementation of the provincial part 
ofthe Act, whereas the Government of India could afford to 
concern itself with the legal and political aspects of questions.
These three sources of opinion met in the two policy- 
forming bodies, Parliament and the India Office. The position 
of Parliament is clear. It was the place where the British 
Government was able to gain approval for broad linos of policy 
which had earlier emerged as a compromise between moderate 
Indian and English opinion. The India Office was more con­
cerned with mediating between the politically inspired compro­
mises of Parliament and committees, and the views of the 
Government of India and local governments. In one sense, the
have been following an independent line. In the 1930s he still 
represented the traditions of Lionel Curtis and the Round Table: 
see J.R.M.Butler, Lord Lothian (i960).
India Office wag simply an outpost of official opinion within 
Whitehall, but it was also and much more a place where men who 
saw themselves as civil servants in the English style rather 
than as semi-independent rulers, strove to accommodate political 
and administrative imperatives.^ Before a final decision was 
made, all important matters and many which now seem trivial 
were referred to the India Office and fully discussed. At the 
same time, provided the broad lines of policy laid down at par­
liamentary level were observed, officials in India were able to 
have many aspects of the new reforms adjusted to suit admini­
strative convenience. Uniformity and the development of poli­
tical consciousness among the masses were low priorities.
The Franchise
Franchise levels can be based on the principle of uniformity, 
where the whole population is treated as a single unit, or on 
the principle of interest representation, in which the distri­
bution of seats is as important as the actual franchise qualifi­
cations. When members of the legislative councils were first 
elected in 1892, the interests principle was predominant. 
According to a government despatch of 26 October 1892, 'each 
important class shall have the opportunity of making its views
known in council by the mouth of some member specially acquainted 
2
with them'. The 1919 Act gave a considerable number of seats
^Sir Vernon Dawson had in fact begun his career in the Indian 
Civil Service and had transferred to the India Office after 
some years. On many issues, however, he was more bureaucrati­
cally minded than his colleagues.
Quoted in Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, vol. i, 
Cmd. 3568(1930), p.183.
to large landlords, universities, and commerce and industry, 
taking corporate bodies as units wherever possible, but the 
franchise was also given to a part of the general population.
As this was done solely on a property basis, however, there 
remained a large element of interest representation. In 
particular, the towns were heavily overrepresented.
It was agreed on all sides that the electorate would have 
to be enlarged for the 1935 reforms. The Simon Commission 
recommended that 10°/o of the total population be enfranchised 
and the Franchise sub-Committee of the first Round Table Con­
ference suggested that the figure be between 10 and 2_5°/o.^
No definite proposals were made, however, as to how the new 
electorate was to be distributed. The Lothian Committee^ 
first action was to make the interests more representative of 
the overall population, in that it cut down the proportion of 
seats allocated to landlords, commerce and industry, and uni­
versities, and introduced industrial labour as an additional 
interest. Then, while extending the general franchise, it 
removed it from a simple property basis by introducing an 
educational qualification, by manipulating the property 
qualification so as to give more equal percentages of voters 
in each community and in urban and rural areas, and by intro­
ducing differential qualifications for the Scheduled Castes 
2
and women. The principle of interest representation remained
~*Tbid., vol. ii, Cmd. 3569(1930)» PP* 91*-2; Proceedings, p.386 
The Franchise sub-Committee also laid down very general guide­
lines for the Lothian Committee to follow: ibid., pp. 386-7.
2
Report of the Indian Franchise Committee 1932, Cmd. 4086(1932)
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but the Lothian Committee moved away from merely recognizing 
the socially and economically dominant to trying to include a 
representative of everyone in the country down to the poorest 
landless labourer.
Although the Lothian Committee decided against its immediate
introduction, considerable attention was given at this time to
the possibilities of some form of adult franchise. Gandhi and
Congress were, of course, in favour of universal franchise;**" but
while Nehru and the other young radicals wanted direct universal
franchise, Gandhi himself recognized the administrative problems
involved and was prepared to accept either universal franchise on
2
application by the voter or a system of indirect election.
This latter, by itself, was unacceptable to most shades of 
Indian opinion (although the Bengal Provincial Franchise Committee 
suggested it also), but considerable interest was shown in a 
combination of direct and indirect election. In the form pro­
posed at the first R<bund Table Conference, all non-enfranchised
3
adults were to choose voters at the rate of 1 per 20. The
(ICR). The Scheduled Castes had previously been called the 
Untouchable or Backward Castes; the new term was first used 
in the 1935 Act to describe those castes for whom special con­
stitutional provisions were made. The great majority of them 
were landless labourers or village menials.
***As were other nationalist leaders: All Parties Conference,
Report of the Committee Appointed by the Conference to Determine 
the Principles of the Constitution for India (1926). A group, 
led by Dr. Ambedkar and N.M.Joshi, pressed for it at the first 
Round Table Conference: Proceedings, p.386.
^RD 22.7^/2277* Reforms Despatch No. 13 of 1932, and D.G.Ten­
dulkar, Mahatma, vol. iii (1952), p.1^9.
•^Proceedings, loc.cit.
2k.
matter was also investigated by the Joint Select Committee.^
The Lothian Committee, however, rejected both direct and in­
direct schemes for universal franchise. Although Ceylon, under 
the Donoughmore Constitution, already had universal franchise 
on application, a direct scheme was rejected because of the
administrative difficulties involved, the high degree of il-
2literacy, and the absence of a proper parliamentaiy system.
Despite its superficial attractions, the indirect scheme was
rejected for broadly similar reasons. In particular, the
3
possibility of factirn disputes worried the committee. Thus, 
although it spent a great deal of time analysing the various 
forms of universal franchise, the Lothian Committee came back 
in the end to the Round Table recommendation that between 10 
and 25°/o of the total population be enfranchised. This in 
turn reflected the Simon Commission proposal of 10°/o, which 
was based on what official opinion thought was administratively 
practicable. It could be argued that the supposed absence of 
a party structure in fact concealed a fear that a wide franchise
if
would favour Congress. Although the Lothian Committee cer­
tainly recognized that it would lead to the end of the old 





When discussing the party system, the Lothian Committee stated 
that there was a great deal of activity at election times, but 
very little in between. Congress was dismissed as being mainly 
interested in gaining independence rather than in ’normal’ 
issues: ibid.. p.20.
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results.^ Moderates as well as extremists might have bene­
fited from the extension of the franchise to the majority of 
the tenants and cultivators.
The Lothian Committee thus preferred the way of caution 
to that of radical experiment. Indeed, no one would have been 
more surprised than Nehru if direct universal franchise had 
been recommended. It remains to be seen how closely-the com­
mittee1 s proposals for the actual franchise coincided with 
the known views of local governments, whose opinions had fixed 
the base figure of 10°/o. This can be ascertained first from 
the schemes initially put forward by local governments and 
summarized in the committee’s report, and secondly from the 
subsequent correspondence between the India Office and the 
Government of India. From the report, it appears that every
province's proposed figure for the total electorate was in-
2
creased by the committee, although in U.P., C.P., Assam, 
and Madras the discrepancy was largely because of the question 
of women's franchise, and in the other provinces the first re­
duction suggested by local governments was always in the 
number of women voters. A second candidate for economy was 
often the educational qualification. Both these points will 
be considered separately. In certain provinces, however, 
there was disagreement with the general basis of the franchise.
^Ibid., pp. 136-7.
p
^Provincial schemes and the committee's proposals are in 
ibid., pp. ^8-80.
^RD 1930/2167, 'Views of the Local Governments on the Re­
commendations Made by the Indian Franchise Committee on the 
Basis of the Franchise for Governors' Provinces' (July 1932).
\
In Bengal, the original provincial proposal, simply on admini­
strative grounds, was for an electorate of 7^/2°/o, but the 
Lothian Committee was not satisfied and increased it to l6°/o.
It considered that even on the figures given by the local 
government a much larger electorate would be possible, as it 
was totally unrealistic to assume that the whole electorate 
would actually vote. When asked to comment on the Lothian pro­
posals, the Bengal Government accepted them, but unenthusiastically. 
In Bombay, the government scheme provided for on electorate 
of 13.25°/o, but the committee considered that this contained 
too small a rural element and increased the total to 17.1°/o.
In its comments the government said that it would prefer to
2
stand by the initial proposals, but once the committee's
qualifications had been formally proposed in the White Paper
of March 19331 they were accepted. The Punjab's initial
proposal was for an electorate of 2.28 million or 10°/o. The
committee criticized this as being too low, and as being
three-quarters composed of 'agricultural tribes'. It was
worried not so much about urban interests, as about non-
agricultural, largely Hindu interests in rural areas. .The
local government continued, for administrative reasons, to
oppose any increase, and denied that only 23°/o of the elector-
4
ate would be non-agricultural. The India Office, however,
1Ibid.
2Ibid.




thought that there was some justice in Hindu objections to 
the Punjab proposals, in that non-agricultural elements formed 
50°/o of the population, and raised the matter again in 
October 1932.^ The Punjab Government’s reply was that, in­
cluding those qualified by education and the Scheduled Caste 
voters, the percentage of non^agriculturists was *f0°/o, and 
that in rural areas, agriculturists spoke for the unenfranchised. 
This was a dangerous doctrine, but the India Office seemed dis­
posed to favour it on the grounds of ’the special political im- 
portance of the so-called Agricultural Tribes’. Shortly before 
the White Paper proposals were formulated, the Punjab Government 
made a further concession by including all the payers of 
haisiyat (profession tax)with this the matter was allowed 
to rest, despite continuing pressure from Hindu leaders in 
the Punjab, notably Pandit Nanak Chand and Raja Narendra Nath, 
whose influence, the Punjab Government assured the India Office,
5
was not as great as they made out. The Punjab Government 
continued, however, to object to the global figure, on the 
grounds that the province, with its three major communities, 
was uniquely complex.^ The India Office considered that it was 
over-estimating the problems involved, in particular the number
1RD 227b/227b% telegram S of S to G of I, 17AO/32.
^RD 22?k/ P u n j a b  Government to G of I, 7/11/32.
^RD 227V27^8, note by Laithwaite, 17/2/33.
L
RD 227^/27^8, telegram G of I to S of S, 7/2/33.
^RD 227k/2933j minute by Laithwaite, 10/*f/33.
RD 3^15/3839, summary by Laithwaite, 12/10/33*
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who would actually vote; the final decision, therefore, was
that the local government must be overruled, and the White
Paper proposals adhered to.'*'
2Bihar and Orissa presented a similar problem, although 
it was more one of administrative backwardness than of political 
complexity. Compared to the 2-3°/o electorate achieved in 
other provinces under the old system, Bihar and Orissa had 
had an electorate of only. l°/o. In addition to being back­
ward the province was permanently settled, and there was 
therefore a very small official infrastructure. Police were
in short supply, and there had actually been rioting at the
3previous council elections. An unusual feature was that, m
contrast to every other counterpart committee, the provincial
committee was firmly behind the local government in resisting
a large extension of the franchise. This was because the
provincial council.was dominated by the landlords who, after
L
the 1930 elections, held 29 out of 33 seats. The Bihar and
Orissa Government therefore proposed to the Lothian Committee
a maximum electorate of 7.6°/o, with a preference for ^-3°/o#
The special circumstances were noted, but even so the committee
recommended a figure of 9»3°/o. At the time the local govern-
5
ment accepted it, with considerable apprehension, but when
1RD 3^15/^072, telegram G of I to S of S, 12/12/33, and note 
by Laithwaite.
2
At this stage one province, although by the time the Act was 
inaugurated, it had been divided,
^RD 3^13/3839, loc.cit.
L
RD 3^15/3587, note by Sir John Kerr, 16/10/33.
5RD 1930/2167, loc.cit.
the question of practicability was again raised during the 
Joint Select Committee hearings, the Bihar and Orissa Govern­
ment reverted to the question of raising the general franchise 
qualifications. Although the India Office was prepared to stand 
by the Lothian Committee proposal for a qualification of the 
payment of 6 annas chaukidari tax, the Joint Select Committee 
was more sympathetic, partly because of the Bihar earthquake 
of 193 ,^ and raised the level permanently to 9 annas, and for 
the first two elections to 12 annas.■*"
Bihar and Orissa was the only province where the recommenda­
tions of the Lothian Committee, which were often considerably 
higher than the initial proposals by provincial governments, 
were substantially altered. This reflected the willingness of 
the British Government and the India Office to expand the 
electorate despite local official protests. Why the initial 
official proposals were lower is difficult to say. When India 
became independent and held her first elections, it proved 
possible to poll the whole adult population. Three suggestions 
may be made. First, an election was seen as an extraordinary 
disruption of normal administrative routine, rather than as 
an integral part of it. Even under the 1919 system election
days had had to be public holidays, and the Lothian Committee
2recognized this as a check upon franchise extension. Officials 
also did not take into account the simplification of polling 




See below, pp. 71-6.
30.
of the complicated system used in previous elections. Lastly, 
there was the indefinable factor of official caution; pro­
vinces such as Bengal and Punjab felt they had to work on 
absurdly high figures of expected turnout. Table 1.1 sets 
out the effect of the various proposals on the size of the 
electorate.'*"
^The final franchise qualifications are set out in the Fifth 
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Source: LCR, pp. *f2-80; Return Showing the Results of
Elections in India, 1937, Cmd. 55§9 (1937).
The Educational Franchise
The dialogue between the officials and the Lothian Committee 
over the general franchise qualifications was carried on within 
narrow limits in that both sides recognized that properly, as 
evidenced by the payment of tax or rent, would continue to be 
the main qualification, that those with the necessary qualifi­
cations would be enfranchised automatically, and that there 
was no possibility of achieving uniformity over the whole of 
India. This was not so with the educational qualification.
The Lothian Committee considered that such a qualification was 
desirable for two reasons. It would draw in a number of liter­
ates who, because of poverty or their position in a Hindu joint 
family, did not possess the necessaiy property qualifications, 
for example government employees and schoolmasters, and it 
provided an automatic means whereby the franchise would be 
extended. Although educational facilities were concentrated in 
urban areas, the recommended level of the upper primary stan­
dard only involved some four to five years attendance. The 
committee also suggested that a special examination could be 
held, and that corresponding standards in traditional methods 
of education could also be accepted. It further considered 
that the upper primary standard should be uniform throughout
55*
India, and that where evidence existed in authoritative records, 
registration on the electoral roll should be automatic.
All these principles were attacked'by local governments.
The simplest to criticize was automatic registration. All 
claimed that the administrative work entailed would be much 
greater than the committee had imagined, even if it were 
possible, given the state of most primary education records; 
as the work involved in the fourfold expansion.of the elector­
ate would stretch their resources to the limit, registration
2
should be by application only. This view was supported by
3 4the Government of India, and approved by the India Office.
Registration by application was embodied in governors’ rules 
despite opposition in England and India. In the Central Legis­
lative Assembly there were demands for better registration 
5
procedures, and in the House of Commons Sorensen asked why 
application should be necessary at all. He was told that it 
was for administrative reasons,^ and no action was taken.
The principle of uniformity was also attacked. When the
committee’s proposals were first considered, the upper primary
............................... . 7......................
level was accepted by all the provinces, but when the White
XLCR, pp. 40-1.
2RD 2274/2748, note dated 17/2/33.
5RD 2274/2277, loc.cit.
L
RD 2274/2274, note by Laithwaite, 7/10/32.
c
Central Legislative Assembly Debates (CLAD), 1936, vol. iv,
p. 2816., 18/3/36.




Paper was being formulated, a variety of different levels were 
suggested. Although the Government of India agreed with the 
committee on the desirability of uniformity, the India Office 
considered that the administrative grounds on which local govern­
ments claimed freedom of action were adequate, and overruled 
the Government of India.'*' The result was that while U.P., the 
Punjab, Assam and N.W.F.P. used the upper primary standard, 
Bombay, Bengal, Bihar and Orissa and C.P. used matriculation, 
which was much easier to.administer, Madras, which had a very 
good record of education, preferred its initial proposal for 
simple literacy. The use of the matriculation standard was 
attacked in the Joint Select Committee by Lord Eustace Percy,
who considered that its use as a qualification would lower the
2
status of vernacular schools. He was supported by Sir George 
Anderson, Educational Commissioner to the Government of India,^ 
They did not necessarily want a return to the upper primary 
level.but simply a recognition of vernacular school qualifica­
tions, as the Lothian Committee had suggested. The local 
governments refused, for the usual administrative reasons, to
contemplate it, and they were supported by the Government of 
Zf
India. As a result R.A.Butler had to inform Percy that the
"lED 2274/2748, loc.cit.
2
Report of the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform, 
vol. ii C, Minutes of Evidence. H.C. 112 (II C) of 1954, 
p. 1774.
■^ RD 4163/4230, note by Anderson, 3/2/34.
^RD 4163/4211, 4216, 4237.
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White Paper qualifications had to stand.1
Running through both of these sniping actions at the Loth­
ian Committee recommendations was a deep dissatisfaction with 
the whole principle of an educational franchise. Despite the
couple of provinces included an educational qualification in 
their initial proposals. In the initial discussion after the
provinces was enthusiastic, and as time went on opposition
mounted. By February 1933 T the Government of India claimed
that there was a large body of official opinion against it and
if
recommended that it be dropped altogether. This, of course, 
went against definite British government policy, and although 
the Government of India quoted a Cabinet directive that there 
were to be no unrealistic proposals, it was overruled. The 
reason for the protest was said to be administrative, but poli­
tical motives could be imputed. The only two provinces which 
gave non-administrative reasons for their objections were 
Bengal and Bombay. The Bengal Government objected to matricu­
lation as the qualification because 'it would enfranchise an
£
unruly and unstable fraction of the population'. Bombay's
This was a view shared by the India Office: see RD 227**/27**8, 
loc.cit.
2
recommendations of the first Round Table Conference, only a
Lothian report only Bombay openly opposed it,3 but none of the
RD ^163/^250, Butler to Percy, 27/6/3**. 
^Proceedings, p.3^ 7.
3RD 1930/2167, loc.cit.
RD 227^/2315» telegram Bengal Government to G of I, 27/LO/32
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objection to the educational franchise was that it would over­
weight the voting strength of the urban areas.X As they were 
not allowed to omit an educational qualification, both provinces 
chose the matriculation rather than the upper primary level of 
education, partly at least because it was easier to administer.
The history of the educational franchise shows the power 
that officials were able to wield. Faced with a large in­
crease in the electorate through changes in the general quali­
fications, which they could do little to alter, they concen­
trated their criticisms on the novel, and also more trouble­
some, educational qualification. Although they were unable to 
have it abolished, it was very substantially altered, with 
remarkably little protest.
The Scheduled Castes Franchise
The differential qualifications introduced for the Scheduled 
Castes formed part of a wider strategy to give them an assured 
place in the political order. Although proportionate repre­
sentation was not possible within the electorate, efforts 
were made to alter the balance dictated by the general quali­
fications. The Lothian Committee was not asked to make final 
recommendations but simply to ascertain the facts and to make 
suggestions. The first problem was to determine which castes 
were to be included. This was a technical question of anthro­
pology which had taxed Census Commissioners for many years, 
but it also had major political implications. The committee 
was not able to come to any final conclusions (the matter was
XRD 227V2706, loc.cit.
eventually the subject of a separate order-in-council) but in 
general, although it claimed that it had taken ritual untouch- 
ability rather than economic backwardness as its criterion, 
where there was dispute it did not accept the more extreme 
definitions made by caste Hindus.X
The committee then decided to work on the basis of en­
franchising 10°/o of the Scheduled Castes. As possible means 
it suggested a simple literacy qualification, enfranchisement 
of village servants, of wives of Scheduled Caste voters, or 
of heads of households, a lowering of the property qualifica­
tion, or a system whereby all Scheduled Caste voters were 
given an extra vote in a special Scheduled Caste constituency. 
None of these was totally satisfactory, for administrative 
reasons, because they would not produce many extra voters, or 
because they concentrated voting power within one section of
the community, but the committee preferred the simple literacy
2
qualification as a starting point. From provinces' initial 
comments, it seems that Madras, whose idea it had been, ac­
cepted the two-vote system, that Bengal and Bihar and Orissa 
were, if necessary, prepared to accept simple literacy, and 
Bombay to accept a lower property qualification, but that offi­
cial opinion was very definitely opposed to the whole idea of
XLCR, pp. 112-23. The two provinces where the question of 
definition was most acute were Bengal and U.P. In Bengal, the 
government's estimate of the numbers of the Scheduled Castes 
was 11.2 million, the provincial counterpart committee's 0.07 
million. In U.P., the government estimate was 6.8 million, 
the committee's 0.6 million. The committees were dominated by 
caste Hindus.
2LCR, pp. 126-7 and 130,
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differential qualifications.'*'
The situation was then changed by the publication of the
Communal Award, which provided for a two-vote system. The
Government of India officials concerned heaved a sigh of re-
2lief and recommended that nothing more need be done. Their 
complacency was short-lived, for even while the despatch was 
being written the Poona Pact was emerging from the hurried con­
sultations at Gandhi’s bedside. The pact stated that the franch­
ise was to be as laid down in the Lothian Committee report.
This meant achieving the 10°/o target, and the India Office 
3
accepted it. The Government of India also took the point,
and proposed the adoption of a simple literacy test, while
making a further protest against differential qualifications
2+
as being likely to lead to administrative breakdown. The
Lothian Committee had already pointed out that literacy would
only enfranchise a few extra from the Scheduled Castes, and the
India Office reiterated this, at the same time making clear
the absolute necessity of achieving a 10°/o Scheduled Caste
electorate, in view of the British Government’s acceptance of 
5
the Poona Pact. At this point, the Government of India gave
g
in, and accepted the India Office position. The actual
1RD 1930/2167, loc.cit.
2RD 2274/2277, loc.cit.
•^ RD 2274/2274, note by Laithwaite, 7/10/32.
if
Ibid., telegram G of I to S of S, 10/10/32.
^Ibid., telegram S of S to G of I, 17/10/32.
6RD 2274/2297, telegram G of I to S of S, 24/10/32.
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qualifications were not laid down till later. The only trouble­
some province was Madras whose local government fought for its 
initial two-vote system, on the grounds that any other system 
would introduce a mass of poor and unintelligent voters into 
the electorate."*" There can be no doubt that other provinces 
concurred, but as the Poona Pact was a modification of the
Communal Award mutually agreed to by the parties concerned,
2
it had to be accepted.
Other Franchises
Although the Indian women's case for special, franchise quali­
fications resembled that of the Scheduled Castes, the debate 
was carried on in rather different terms. The general official 
view, held most strongly by the Government of India, was that
special qualifications were undesirable on administrative 
3
grounds. It received support from Indian women's organizations,
primarily the Congress-inclined All-India Women's Conference,
whose objections were based on a dislike of any form of special
k
treatment for women; representatives of the poorer sections
of the population expressed the fear at the first Round Table
Conference that any increase in the number of enfranchised
3
women would be at their expense. In favour of preferential
1RD 227^ /27^ +8, loc.cit.






treatment for women, however, was an influential section of
British unofficial and government opinion, which was partly-
inspired by the only recently concluded struggle for women's
franchise in the United Kingdom. The co-ordinator of British
pressure was Eleanor Rathbone who in April 1933 organized the
British Committee for Indian Women's Franchise.^ Although she
was in touch with leaders of the All-India Women's Federation,
2
her specific proposals did not have their support. The result 
of this curious line-up of forces was that to begin with the 
Government of India was able to whittle away the Lothian Com­
mittee proposals to give the vote to all female literates and 
to wives and widows of all voters who would have been qualified 
under the property franchise of the 1919 Act.^ In the White 
Paper the educational qualification was omitted and the 'wives 
and widows' qualification was to be available on application
if
only. At this point, however, the question became open to 
public discussion in Britain, and Eleanor Rathbone and her 
allies were able to put pressure on the government. The re­
sult was that the differential qualifications were again expanded
in some provinces the literacy qualification was reintroduced
5
and in others the application condition was dropped. R.A. 
Butler admitted that he had been impressed by Eleanor Rathbone's
■*"Mary Stocks, Eleanor Rathbone (19^ +9)» PP- 162-5.
^Ibid., pp. 169-71.
^LCR, p.86. For the role of the Government of India, 
see RD 227V2297, loc.cit.
Zf
Proposals for Indian Constitutional Reform,. p.9*+.
Report of the Joint Committee, p.73.
*fl.
1campaign.
Besides the qualifications for the franchise in provincial 
territorial constituencies, there were many other franchises 
to be worked out, for the upper house, where these existed, 
for the Council of State, and for the special seats in the 
provincial legislatures. Most of these latter followed lines al­
ready laid down under thel919 Act and t&e Lothian Committee 
made no comment upon them, beyond fixing the number of seats 
to be allotted to each interest, but a number of minor prob­
lems remained for the consideration of the Hammond Committee.
The most important concerned the landlords' seats. The Simon
2Commission had in fact recommended their abolition, but the 
Lothian Committee had bowed to pressure from local governments 
and had proposed that the number of seats be kept at their 
existing levels.^ In all provinces but one, election was 
by landlords directly, and this v/as approved by the Hammond 
Committee, but in the Oudh part of U.P. election had been 
through the landlords' association, and the U.P. Qovernment 
proposed that this form of election be extended to the Agra 
divisions. This was accepted by the committee, but at the same 
time it considered that small landlords who belonged to the 
associations should be barred from voting, and therefore fixed
1RD 3^15/3713, S of S to G of I, 12/8/33.
2
Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, vol. ii, p.78. 
5LCR, p.137.
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a qualifying limit of the payment of Rs 10,000 land revenue.^ 
After the committee's report was published, this was challenged 
by the U.P. Government, which considered that the limit would 
'jeopardize the very existence of ^ Ehe/ Talukdari body'.
It had powerful support from Sir Harcourt Butler who, in addition
3
to being an ex-governor of U.P., and a noted amir-parwar,
if
was also R. A.Butler's uncle, and from the Government of India. 
Despite this impressive array of forces, the India Office 
rather surprisingly decided not to accept the alternative 
limit of Rs 3,000 land revenue, which would have excluded very 
few landlords who belonged to the associations. Similar issues 
were also at stake in the division of seats between the two 
parts of the province. The British India Association wanted 
four out of the six seats, which it had had under the 1919 
arrangement, while the Agra Zamindars Association wanted an 
equal division. A vigorous campaign was waged by the Oudh 
taluqdars which made the U.P. Government change its initial 
pro-Agra stance. This time, the Hammond Committee accepted the
5
local government point of view.
A minor problem arose over the franchise for the uni­
versities' seats. The Lothian Committee had not been unanimous,
^Report of the Indian Delimitation Committee, vol. i, Cmd. 
5099(1936), (HCE), pp. 145-9.
2
RD 6307/6489, telegram U.P. Government t6 S of S, 12/3/36.
When the initial allotment of seats under the Communal Award 
was being discussed the U.P. Government had pressed for an in­
crease from six to twelve.
3
Philip Woodruff, The Men Who Ruled India, vol. ii (1954), p.289.
4 ----------------------
RD 6307/6489, Sir Harcourt Butler to R.A.Butler, 8/3/36;
RD 6307/6355, telegram G o f l t o S o f S ,  20/3/36.
5HCB, pp. 195-9.
3^.
but the majority accepted the claims of the whole graduate body,
rather than the senate, to be the electorate.^ The Hammond
Committee decided that registered graduates of at least seven
2
years' standing should receive the vote* This was challenged
by Madras and C.P., who wanted the electorate confined to
senates, to ensure the election of true representatives of
3
learning rather than politicians. The committee had con­
sidered their proposal but had rejected it because of the need
2f
for uniformity, and the India Office took the same view. There 
were also questions connected with the labour franchise, but 
these were more concerned with the method of election.
Qualifications for the candidates were broadly the same 
as for the franchise. With a few minor exceptions, nothing 
more was necessary than to be over 25, an Indian subject, and 
an elector in a constituency of the same class as the consti­
tuency in which one stood. Imprisonment for more than two 
years in the five years preceding the elections was a disquali­
fication, although it could be lifted at the discretion of 
the provincial governor. The question of a residential quali­
fication, which under the 1919 Act had been in force in Bombay,
the Punjab, and C.P., was again considered, but was rejected
5
as unsuitable and unnecessarily restrictive.
1LCR, pp. 157-8.
2HCR, p.1^1.
^Ibid., p.1^0,and RD 6307, note dated 20/2/36. The senates them­
selves were in fact as 'political.' as the general body of graduates.
L
RD 6307/6^09, telegram S of S to G of I, 5/3/36. The view of the 
Congress majority in the Central Legislative Assembly was that 
all graduates of five years’ standing should have the vote: CLAD 
1936, vol. iv, p.2818, 18/3/36.
^RD ^71^/5092, minutes of reforms officers' conference, 5-7/3/33-
Tne Distribution of Seats
Although the distribution of seats did not raise the same 
problems of administrative practicability as the franchise 
qualifications had, it was perhaps of greater significance 
in the development of the Indian political system. The struggle 
over the proportion of political representation given to each 
religious community and the debate over the theory that re­
ligious differences formed overriding lines of cleavage were, 
however, part of the continuing communal problem. This was 
recognized when the British Prime Minister after the second 
Round Table Conference issued the Communal Award, alterable 
only by mutual agreement among Indian leaders.^ Table 1.2 
expresses the award and related information in percentage 
terms; the actual distribution of seats is given in chapter 5*
The award was based on existing practice with somewhat increased 
representation for Muslims, especially in the Punjab and Bengal.
The government could claim general support for its policy in 
the Lucknow Pact, made between Congress and the Muslim League in
1916.2
The motives of the British Government in making the Com­
munal Award were, of course, open to question. The British 
position in tjie ’communal triangle1 was, however, as old as 
the problem itself, and there seems little evidence that the 
award was more especially inspired by anti-nationalist feeling 
than any other aspect of British policy. It was said later
■^ The Communal Award (Communal Decision, Cmd. klk? (1932)) was 
of course a major theme of politics m  this period, but its 
terms effectively excluded it from challenge at the official 
level. The Marquess of Zetland greatly disliked it (Zetland, 
’Essayez1 (1956), p.121) but even he was unable to have it altered.
Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, vol. i, p.138.
Table 1.2
Comparative Position of Muslims in the Population 
and in the Legislaturesa
Population Lucknow' Pact 
proposals
1919 Act 1933 Ai
Assam 36.2 - 36A *fl.3





Bombay 9.3 (and Sind) 33-3 (and
Sind) 37.0 20.0
C.P. k A 15.0 17.1 13.9
Madras 7.8 15.0 16.7 16.0
N.W.F.P. 92.3 - - 75.0
Orissa 1.6 - - 6.7
Punjab 38.6 30.0 50.0 53-**
Sind 73.6 - - 6**.2
U.P. l*f.9 30.0 32.6 31A
The figures in all cases are percentages of the total Hindu, 
Muslim and Sikh populations, and of the territorial seats 
(including women's seats) allotted to them. The population 
figures are those used by the Hammond Committee in 1936 and 
differ slightly from the 1931 Census figures.
Source: HCR p.xiii (population); Report of the Indian
Statutory Commission, vol. iv, Memoranda Submitted by 
the Government of India and the India Office (1930). 
p. 13o (Lucknow Pact proposals); Report of the Com- 
mittee Appointed ... to Enquire into ... the Franchise 
(Lord Southborough1s Committee), Cmd. Al(1919)j 
pp. 19-79 (1919 Act): Return Showing the Results of
Elections in India, 1937 (1933 Act).
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that the award, by promising the Muslims a percentage point 
or so more than they were being offered directly by the 
Hindus, sabotaged the Allahabad unity talks of August 1932.^ 
Such a view assumes, however, that the Muslim leaders at the 
talks could have persuaded the rest of the Muslim middle 
classes to accept the terms offered.
The distribution of seats within communal groups was 
made by the Hammond Committee, which was appointed after the 
1933 Act itself had been passed. Unlike those of the Lothian 
Committee, its recommendations were not meant to be the basis 
of subsequent discussion, but were to be incorporated, more 
or less unchanged, into orders-in-council. There were innumer­
able protests against the demarcation of individual constitu­
encies, but these were rarely based on legitimate grievances 
and were overruled. No attempt was made to secure constitu­
encies of equal size. Once the overall allotment of seats 
had been made, by the Communal Award or by the local govern­
ments, the committee used existing administrative units,
2
the district, tahsil, or municipality, wherever possible.
This was virtually essential, but it produced wide variations 
in the size of constituencies. To take two random examples, 
the population per seat in Madras General Rural constituencies 
ranged from 131,763 (the Nilgiris), to 436,858 (Musiri), and 
in U.P. Muhammadan Urban constituencies from 47,472 (Ghazipur 
cum Jaunpur cum Gorakhpur cities), to 114,936 (Meerut cum
■ I^ndian Annual Register (IAR) 1933 II, p.306: proceedings of
the All-India Hindu Mahasabha annual session.
2HCR, p.24.
Bulandshahr cum Khurja cum Nagina cities).
The only major problem to be settled by the Hammond Com­
mittee was the distribution of seats between urban and rural 
areas. Under the 1919 Act seats had been allotted partly 
according to population, and partly to voting strength, which 
had quite deliberately been worked out to favour urban areas.^ 
The rosult was that urban areas were given very substantial 
weightage. The declared aim of the Lothian Committee was to 
remedy this. It used as a dividing line between towns and 
villages a population level of 5,000; this was successful to
the point that the relative percentage of rural voters in some
2
areas was actually higher. When the Hammond Committee began 
work, however, the dividing line in most provinces was much 
higher; as only true cultural and mercantile centres were in­
cluded under most provinces’ definitions, the percentage of 
voters in them was naturally much higher, and also the claims 
of such towns to special treatment, on grounds of their special 
position, was greater. In the circumstances, the population 
criterion of the Lothian Committee was not enough, and the 
1919 principle of a mean between voting and population strength 
had to be used again. The Hammond Committee laid down as a 
principle that urban areas should receive 'the full representa­
tion to which they were entitled’, including weightage if nec­
essary, but that any weightage should not be greater than was 
3
appropriate. Unfortunately, no comprehensive figures are 
available in official reports, but table 1.3 is an attempt




to show the degree of weightage given to urban areas under the 
1919 sind 1935 Acts. These figures must remain extremely 
approximate, as they have been calculated from figures which 
were not designed to yield the information given, and which 
were compiled before electoral rolls were drawn up. They show 
clearly, however, that in actual practice a very large measure 
of weightage was given to urban areas. This applies equally 
to those provinces not mentioned in the table.
A closely related problem was that of defining a town.
As has been seen, it had a bearing on the percentage of voters 
in urban areas; it also controlled directly the percentage 
of urban seats in the legislature, and indirectly the nature 
of both urban and rural constituencies. Provinces had already 
had to define a town for the purposes of the 1919 Act, and 
their existing practice was continued. This varied widely: 
in Madras even some towns of over 50,000 population were in­
cluded in rural constituencies, while in Bengal any area which 
was a municipality was counted as urban, so that settlements 
of only 2-3,000 were abstracted from their rural surroundings. 
In both these cases, however, the practice was in accord with 
widely felt divisions within the province, and the Hammond 
Committee acquiesced, although it had some doubts.^ The only 
local disagreement was in the Punjab. Under the 1919 Act, 
much the same policy had been followed as in Bengal, and small 
market towns of over 10,000 population had been classed as 
urban. This had been done with the object of removing urban 
influence over the 'simple1 peasantry and thus isolating the
■^ HCR, pp. 30 and 42.
*0 .
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The eight Sikh seats were not formally divided into rural and 
urban; as the great majority of Sikhs lived in rural areas, 
such seats have been regarded as rural.
Source: Calculated from Report of Lord Southborough*s Committee,
and Indian Delimitation Committee, vol. ii, Proposals 
for the Delimitation of Constituencies, Cmd.5100(1936).
’agricultural tribes1.'1' The policy was objected to by many
Hindus, who would have preferred to have had some influence
on elections in the rural constituencies within which the towns
lay and from which they derived their livelihoods, rather than
2
to be yoked to other small towns many miles away. Neverthe­
less, the Hammond Committee agreed with the Punjab Government
The Views of the Government of India on the Southborough 
Committee Report, Cmd.176(1919)« PP« 11-12. This interpreted 
the low dividing line as an attempt to remove from urban areas 
the weight of rural backwardness, but the initial idea was 
that of the local government, whose other actions at this time 
leave no doubt as to its motives.
2HCR, p.£6.
that a divergence of interests existed which should be recog­
nized, and it in fact lowered the dividing line to 7t500 
population.^- The net result was that rural areas were left 
with their ’natural leaders’, although the removal of the 
residence qualification meant that urban candidates were 
able to contest rural seats. This marked divergence in de­
finitions may perhaps explain the equally marked divergence 
in relative weightage between provinces. From table 1.3 
Madras is seen to have had the highest degree of weightage, 
and Punjab the lowest. Madras had one of the highest, and 
Punjab one of the lowest, definitions of urban areas. The 
smaller the percentage of urban areas, the greater became 
the demand for weightage.
A parallel may perhaps be drawn between the provisions 
of the 1935 Act and developments in the Congress constitution 
at this time. As part of his Bombay package in October 193^> 
Gandhi had insisted that rural areas be brought into the 
Congress structure on a more equal footing, and in a modi­
fied form this was agreed to. According to article VIII of 
the Nagpur constitution of 1920, the Provincial Congress 
Committees (PCCs) were given charge of the election of 
delegates, subject only to the provision that the number 
should not exceed one per 5O1OOO of the population. In the 
Bombay constitution, it was laid down in article VI that, of 
a maximum of 2,000 delegates, 511 should come from urban, 
and 1,^89 from rural areas, that this ratio should apply 
to each province individually, and that the dividing line
^Ibid., pp. 60-61.
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between town and country should be 10,000 population.^" Even
so, considerable weightage was given to urban areas, for the
population in towns over 10,000 would have been ^ ss than 10°/o,
and there was no residence qualification. It was, however,
a recognition of the integral role of the peasantry, and the
definition of a town was low, so that the villagers were left
to themselves. Both the British and Congress had decided to
bring forward the peasantry, although they had different ex-
2
pectations of its behaviour.
The Method of Election
The question of the manner in which votes are counted and 
seats allotted to constituencies essentially concerns minori­
ties, of which India has many. Fortunately for the consti­
tutional historian, if not for Indian development, the main 
problem of religious minorities was solved by the Communal 
Award, but there were other minorities who did not have 
separate electorates but did have reserved seats, and others 
again who had neither but were a force to be reckoned with.
Some of them were accommodated in the General (i.e. Hindu) 
constituencies; others had to have special constituencies 
formed for them.
Certain constituencies had to be allotted more than one
^"M.V.Ramana Rao, Development of the Congress Constitution (195®), 
pp. 37 and
2
This did not prevent the Congress group in the Central 
Legislative Assembly from describing the Hammond Committee 
report as unfair to U.P.urban interests: CLAD 1936, vol. iv,
p.2813, 18/3/36. N.V.Gadgil's attack on the Bombay proposals 
(ibid.. p.3^32, 28/3/36) is a classic example of the misunder­
standing of statistics.
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seat so as to accommodate reserved seats,^ but it was also sug­
gested that a number of open seats be allotted to each constitu­
ency both in the general and in the special classes. Broadly, 
the argument in favour of multi-member constituencies is that 
they permit some form of proportional representation to be 
practised, and in favour of single-member constituencies 
that they are more manageable for the administration, the can­
didate, and the voter alike, particularly where each community 
has to have its own constituency. Until 1937 multi-member 
constituencies were used in Madras and Bombay, and single­
member ones elsewhere.
The first question was whether multi-member constituencies 
should be extended to other provinces. It was briefly men­
tioned by the Lothian Committee but not properly considered 
until the Hammond Committee report. In view of the over­
whelming political and public support for their retention, 
and indeed of their own terms of reference, the committee 
decided to recommend that single-member constituencies be 
retained. Because the majority of the electorate would be 
voting for the first time, it was felt that methods of voting
should be as simple as possible, and also that multi-member
2
constituencies would cover too large an area. These problems 
were certainly not insuperable. The first could have been over­
come by the use of the single non-transferable vote, and the 
second by increasing the number of seats, which had already
^The current Indian practice of reserving whole constituencies 
for specified groups was not adopted.
2HCR, pp. 13-13.
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been largely increased from the 1919 levels.^ There was, how­
ever, no compelling reason to adopt a new system, and so nothing 
was done.
The two provinces which most obviously needed a pro­
portional system to cater for minorities without separate 
electorates already had multi-member constituencies under the 
1919 Act. Bombay had to provide for Parsis, Jews, Jains, and 
non-Brahman castes, principally the Marathas, and provincial
opinion was very firmly in favour of continuing the existing 
2
system. As the local government supported this, the committee 
exempted it from its general preference for simple constituencies.
Madras had had multi-member constituencies so that seats 
could be reserved for non-Brahmans. This reservation was abo­
lished in the Communal Award, as the Madras non-Brahmans had 
established their position, but the division of the province 
into sharply divided caste groups, particularly into Brahman 
and non-Brahman, remained. The majority of the Provincial De­
limitation Committee, which was dominated by the non-Brahman 
Justice Party, which had disproportionate representation in 
the legislature, recommended a reversal to single-member 
constituencies, ostensibly for simplicity but more probably
”^Tn Bengal, for example, the provincial legislature was in­
creased from ll*f seats to 2^0, and in U.P. from 100 to 228.
^HCR, p.15. Single-member constituencies were advocated for 
Bombay by a Bombay Congressman in the Central Legislative 
Assembly (CLAD 1936, vol. iv, p.3^33} 28/3/36) on the grounds 
that multi-member ones were a means to let in government sup­
porters, but this was not necessarily the opinion of all Con­
gressmen in Bombay, some of whom belonged to the minorities.
34.
because it gave the party its best chance of continuing to 
dominate. The Madras Government backed the proposal, which 
was indeed adminstratively simpler, but as Sir Laurie Hammond 
later pointed out, the Indian members of the government were 
all drawn from the Justice Party, which he described as 
’corrupt and unscrupulous1 Against this, there was a large 
minority on the committee which favoured multi-member con­
stituencies and, in the opinion of the Hammond Committee,
the general sense of public feeling was also in favour of 
2
them. It therefore recommended that multi-member constituencies
be adopted, despite the united front of government and pro- 
3
vincial committee.
The Madras Government quickly retaliated. It was able to
If
gain the support of the Government of India, and the India 
Office also favoured single-member constituencies, partly 
on the grounds that the Hammond Committee’s terras of reference 
only allowed for multi-member constituencies in special
^RD 6307, note with no number or date, but written in February 
1936, and filed in front of 64-09.
2HCR, p.17.
Z
Ibid., p.18. It cannot be assumed that the division in public 
opinion coincided entirely with the non-Brahman-division.
Other caste rivalries as well as political ideals were in­
volved. For instance, the minority on the provincial committee 
recommended the distributive voting system, instead of the 
cumulative, which might have been preferred if the only issue 
had been straightforward protection of caste interests. Con­
gressmen were definitely concerned to eliminate inter-caste 
rivalries: see Madras Legislative Council Debates, March 1936,
pp. 49-30, 11/3/36.
A
RD 6307/6409, telegram G of I to S of S, 26/2/36.
circumstances and, preferring uniformity, it did not consider 
that Madras constituted a valid exception. It also thought 
that the proposed system would give minorities an unfair ad­
vantage, although this argument would only have fully applied
in the improbable circumstances of a minority being distributed
1
evenly in all constituencies, and voting completely as a bloc. 
However, to achieve the semblance of popular consultation, 
the India Office postponed its decision until after the de­
bate of the Madras Legislative Council on the Hammond Committee 
report. As the council was dominated by the Justice Party the 
result was a foregone conclusion, despite a Congress-sponsored
amendment, and the India Office then decided in favour of
2
single-member constituencies for the majority of seats. In 
other words, established opinions had been preferred to those 
of the public at laige, which had been identified by the Ham­
mond Committee, but which could not be pinned down in council 
debates. If the committee had been keeping strictly to British 
government policy, the Madras Government would have had to be 
overruled, but it was a matter on which the terms of reference 
of the committee were very vague, talking only of special cases 
so that the India Office was in a position to overrule a 
government-appointed body.
Once the type of constituency had been fixed, the method
h ®  6307, note dated 28/2/36, no number.
2RD 6307/6^09, telegram S of S to G of I, 13/3/36.
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of voting had to be decided.'*' Unlike most non-Anglo-Saxon
countries, England had always used the simplest forms of
voting in its parliamentary elections - the 'first past the
post1 system in a single-member and the distributive system
in multi-member constituencies. Because of this, and because
of the technical problems of voting in an underdeveloped country,
it was natural for policy-makers to prefer uncomplicated systems
at the expense of accuracy. On the other hand, the minorities
problem in India was more acute, and there was pressure for
some form of proportional representation, both in England and 
2
in India. For single-member constituencies the Lothian Com­
mittee had examined the possibility of the alternative vote, 
but dismissed it because of its administrative difficulties 
and because it would lead to a proliferation of parties and
For a general survey of voting methods, see Enid Lakeman and 
James D. Lambert, Voting in Democracies: A Study of Majority
and Proportional Electoral Systems (2nd ed. 1959).
2
Sir John Simon himself was a vice-president of the Proportional 
Representation Society, and co-author of one of its pamphlets 
on the subject (P.R. Pamphlet 52). There was probably more 
interest in the subject then than now. The unsuccessful Re­
presentation of the People Bill (1931) (No. 2) had provided 
for the alternative vote system: D.E.Butler, The Electoral
System in Britain since 1918 (2nd ed. 1963), pp. 66-72. Con­
gress in its 193^ constitution adopted the single transfer­
able vote system for the election of delegates to the annual 
session and of AICC members: Ramana Rao, op.cit., p.36.
Difficulties were encountered, however, and at the Lucknow 
session proportional representation was abandoned in the 
election of delegates: Indian National Congress, Report of
the A9th Session (1936), p.109. There were continuing 
criticisms of its use in AICC elections: ibid., p.113;
Statesman, 29/12/36,and Leader, 23/2/38.
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groups, which it considered particularly undesirable in Indian 
conditions.X The only alternative was the English system, 
which was adopted. Multi-member constituencies existed in every 
province for the Scheduled Castes: these will be considered
later. There were also to be such constituencies, according 
to the Hammond Committee, in Madras and Bombay. The single trans­
ferable vote was recognised by all to be unsuitable in a largely 
illiterate society, but three possible systems remained. The 
distributive vote system is similar to the first past the post 
system. Where rigid parties exist, as in England, it is vir­
tually indistinguishable, but under Indian conditions at the 
time it did allow some cross-party and cross-caste voting to 
take place. The cumulative vote system provides some additional 
protection for minorities, but unless the minorities are well 
organized and not too thinly spread out, the protection given 
them is not commensurate with their numerical strength. The 
single non-transferable vote system takes the cumulative 
system to its logical conclusion, but the effect is to dis­
courage cross-voting, unless a dominant party is very well 
organized, and wishes to secure the election of a pliant member 
of the minority. It is also the simplest method. In conjunction 
with reservation of seats it was suggested by the Proportional
Representation Society as the panacea for the Indian minorities 
2
problem, although it did not solve the problem already men­
tioned, nor did it provide for communities whose representation 
in a constituency was smaller than the total number of voters
XLCR, pp. 1^2-3.
2RD 36M+/36^f, P.R.Society to S of S, 25/7/33*
divided by the number of seats to be filled.^
In Bombay there was no problem. The cumulative system 
had been used under the 1919 Act, and there was general agree­
ment that it should be continued. In Madras the situation was 
more complicated. Under the earlier constitutional arrange­
ments the distributive system had been in force, and it was 
this that the minority report of the provincial committee had
4
had in mind when it recommended multi-member constituencies.
The Hammond Committee, on the other hand, claimed to detect
a general feeling in favour of the cumulative system, and duly
2
suggested its adoption. The Madras Government complicated
the matter further by being in favour, on administrative grounds,
3
of the single non-transferable vote. This time, however, it
if
did not have the support of the Government of India, and 
the India Office decided against it and in favour of the cumu-
5
lative system. Thus, on what appeared to be similar requests 
from a local government, the India Office took different lines. 
The variable factors seem to have been, first, uniformity- 
single-member constituencies were the preferred pattern, while 
the single non-transferable vote was a deviant system - and 
secondly, the attitude of the Government of India, which sup­
ported Madras on the one issue and opposed it on the other.
1The single non-transferable vote system remained nevertheless, 
apart from separate electorates, the most suitable solution, 




KD 6307/&K)9, telegram G of I to S of S, 26/2/36.
^Ibid., telegram S of S to G of I, 3/3/36.
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On the general question of voting methods it should also 
be mentioned that the single transferable vote system was re­
commended for all elections by the provincial assembhasB (i.e. 
of part <f the upper houses in Bengal and Bihar, and of the 
lower house of the federal legislature). This sprang initially 
from a suggestion by the Simon Commission,^ was eady to im­
plement, and, at that level, solved the question of minorities 
within the Hindu fold.
There was, therefore, fairly general agreement on
electoral methods in ordinary constituencies in all provinces
except Madras, but there were similar problems in connection
with other types of constituency. The most important of these
was the Scheduled Caste problem, which became that of the
interpretation of the Poona Pact. Under the Communal Award
of August 1932 the Scheduled Castes had been allotted 71
seats. The essence of the Poona Pact, made the next month,
was that this number was substantially increased to 151 in
return for a joint electorate with reserved seats in certain
constituencies, with the proviso that for ten years there
would be a primary election in which Scheduled Caste voters
in those provinces would choose a panel of four candidates
2
for the actual election. The principle was that each part 
of the Hindu community would be able to have a share in the 
election of all the community's representatives. Table 1.4 
shows the effect of the Poona Pact.
^Report of the Indian Statutory Commission, vol. ii, p.ll8.
p
For the text of the Poona Pact, see RD 3644, copy of tele­
gram from Government of Bombay, 24/9/32.
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Table 1.4
Comparative Position of the Scheduled Castes 
in the Hindu Population and in the Legislatures
Population Communal Award 1935 Act
(Poona Pact)
Assam 11.8 8.3 14.6




Bombay 10.7 8.3 12.5
C.P. 19.8 11.5 23.0
Madras 17.8 11.8 19.7
Orissa 12.5 - 13.3
Punjab 22.8 0 18.6
U.P. 30.8 8.3 13.9
aThe figures in all cases are percentages of the total Hindu 
population, and of the territorial seats (including women's 
seats) allotted to them. The population figures are those 
used by the Hammond Committee in 193& differ slightly 
from the 1931 Census figures.
The Assam women's seat is included in the calculation, although 
it was non-communal, as Hindus formed the majority of the 
electorate.
Source: HCR, p.xidi (population); Communal Decision; Return
Showing the Results of Elections in India. 1937 
(1935 Act).
The problems of interpretation were first to decide the 
exact procedure for the primaries, and secondly to decide the 
method of voting at the actual election. The answers to these 
questions vitally affected the prospects of the Scheduled 
Castes. The procedure in primary elections was a matter for 
governors' rules, and was first raised by the Bengal Government
6<L#.
in July 1933.1 The points at issue were whether it was essential
for there to be at least four candidates at the primaries, whether
withdrawals from the panel were to be permitted, whether
Scheduled Caste members could compete for unreserved seats
without going through the primary procedure, and whether, if
they headed the poll, panel candidates could be eligible for
unreserved seats. On none of these was the Poona Pact clear.
The initial India Office view was that all Scheduled Caste
candidates would have to go through the panel, although they
would then be eligible for unreserved seats, that it would be
preferable to have a minimum of four candidates at primaries,
2
and that something would have to be done about withdrawals.
The matter then lay dormant until an informal meeting of pro­
vincial reforms officers held at Delhi in March 1935. On each 
point, their opinion was opposed to the India Office position.
The only exception was in Bengal, where it was felt that all 
Scheduled Caste candidates must go through the panel, because 
the ScheduleJ Castes were actually in a majority in certain 
areas of Bengal. Otherwise, it was felt that it would be
easier to take the line of least resistance, which incidentally
3
favoured the Scheduled Castes. These views were supported by 
the Government of India, which thought that there would be 
difficulty in some cases in finding four candidates, by the
—  P. ! ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■■■ I M l ■■!■■■■■■         ■■■ ■ »— ■ I.— ... .
^RD 36^/3768, Bengal Government to G of I, VV/33.
2RD 36zfV2*179, I 0 to G of I, 20/2/3**.
^RD 3W*/5206, minutes of conference.
L
RD 36W5282, telegram. G of I to S of S, 2*t/V35.
a I.
1 2 local governments, and by Gandhi himself. The official
attitude in India was partly determined by administrative 
considerations, and also by a belief that it was in accord 
with the true intentions of the Poona Pact. In face of this, 
the India Office began to incline to the Indian view. In a 
note written in September 1935j Laithwaite proposed the whole­
sale adoption of the local governments' views, and acknow­
ledged Gandhi's opinion as a major factor in his change of 
mind. He considered that to permit withdrawals was an in­
fringement of the pact, but that they should be allowed for 
practical reasons. He thought it unlikely that the Scheduled 
Castes would be sufficiently organized to permit collusive 
withdrawals and that caste Hindus could always put up their 
own Scheduled Caste candidates. Butler agreed with this 
general position."’
All seemed set for the views of both Gandhi and the 
officials to prevail, but there then came a personal inter­
vention by the Secretary of State, Lord Zetland, who insisted 
on a rigid observance of his interpretation of the pact,
which to him meant a minimum of four candidates and no with- 
k
drawals. His private secretary explained that Gandhi's 
interpretation of the pact was 'palpable nonsense1, and that
1RD 3644/5791, telegram G of I to S of S, 5/9/35.
2
Ibid., report of press interview with Gandhi, 10/8/35-
3
Ibid., note by Laithwaite, 9/9/35, and note by Butler, 
l8/9/35, and RD 6307, note dated 28/2/36, no number.
2i
ED 36^/5791, note by Zetland, 12/9/35-
65.
Bengal Hindus (with whom Zetland strongly sympathized) had
let their case at Poona go by default.'*' Although organized
evasion of the spirit of the pact by the Scheduled Castes
was unlikely, there must be no possibility of adverse criti-
2
cism from caste Hindus. In a rather desperate attempt to
save its position the Government of India proposed a refer-
3
ence to the Hammond Committee, Unexpectedly, Hammond 
himself welcomed the addition to his work, and Zetland 
grudgingly gave his consent, with the admonition that the
k
committee should keep to the 'plain meaning1 of the pact. 
Unfortunately for the Secretary of State, the committee ac­
cepted the Scheduled Caste paint of view, making an exception
5
only in the case of Bengal for the unreserved seats problem. 
There was a small postscript to the matter in December 1936, 
when Ambedkar tried to use his acquaintance with Butler to
get Bombay to change a rule it had made forbidding with-
6 7drawals. Butler sympathized, and telegrams were sent to
Bombay, but the government there refused on the grounds
that there had been no objections from Scheduled Caste leaders
.......... g
in Bombay itself (Ambedkar being in London at the time).
Ibid., note by Croft, 19/9/35.
^Ibid., telegram. S of S to G of I, 26/9/35*
•^ RD 36^^/5899, telegram G of I to S of S, end of September
1935.
if
Ibid., telegram, S of S to Viceroy.
^HCR, pp. 103-6.
^As the procedure at primaries was a matter for governors' 
rules, it was open to Bombay to ignore the Hammond Committee 
report.
7RD 36^/7787, note by Butler, b/12/36.
g
Ibid., telegram Bombay Government to S of S, 7/12/36.
6*k
Zetland approved of the Bombay stand, and only regretted that 
Bengal had not acted likewise.^
The whole affair is a good exanple of the complexity of 
decision-making. It extended over three years, all 'types of 
official opinion as well as Indian non-official and British 
government opinion were involved, and the matter was twice 
almost settled in the opposite way to the final decision. The 
first point of interest is that, although Gandhi's views were 
noted, no attempt was made to reconvene the makers of the pact. 
This was in fact very sensible, as without the threat of 
Gandhi's death there would have been not the slightest hope 
of an agreed solution between the Bengal Hindus and Ambedkar, 
but it did mean that officials eventually acted autocratically. 
Although they were determined to interpret the pact cor­
rectly, they did so from their own preconceptions. Although 
the wording of the pact was, of course, far from clear, it is 
probably true that Zetland's interpretation was more cor­
rect, but officials in India were also very aware of what 
would be possible to administer. All the officials concerned
thoroughly disliked being involved with something they had
2
not themselves formulated. In addition to the fundamental 
problem caused by the vagueness of its wording, both caste 
Hindus and Scheduled Castes could, if they wanted, evade 
the spirit of the pact by collusion,and it was impossible to
^Ibid., note by Zetland, 9/12/36.
^RD 36^-/57971 note by Laithwaite, 9/9/35*
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frame rules which took care of both contingencies.^- The 
second point is the interplay of power. Broadly, the com­
bination of Gandhi and local governments was stronger than 
the India Office; a Secretary of State could play the ace 
of his personal intervention; this could be trumped by the 
quasi-independent weight of an official committee. Also, 
the examples of Bengal and Bombay show that an obstinate 
local government could often get its own way.
The question of voting methods was equally important to 
the Scheduled Castes, but was much simpler in its evolution, 
as it was agreed -that it should be referred to the Hammond 
Committee and there were no Deljphic provisions in the pact 
concerning it. Voting in the primaries was, according to 
the pact, to be by single non-transferable vote, but nothing 
was said about the actual election. Theoretically, the cumu­
lative system favoured the Scheduled Castes, in that there 
was less chance of caste Hindus giving votes for Scheduled 
Caste candidates, although equally it diminished Scheduled 
Caste influence on the election of caste Hindu candidates.
In February 193*N the India Office inquired from M.R.Jaya- 
kar and Ambedkar whether the question had ever been raised 
at the time of the Poona discussions. Both said that it had
not, although Ambedkar added that he had had the Bombay
' 2 
(cumulative) system in mind. The reforms officers* conference
in March 1935* on the other hand, favoured the distributive
■^ The main emphasis was, in fact, on the Scheduled Castes 
evading the pact, but over the Bombay issue Ambedkar per­
suaded Butler that the caste Hindus would use the disputed 
rule against the Scheduled Castes.
2RD 36¥t/Iil79, I 0 to G of I, 20/2/3^.
system.^ -Nothing more was done until"the Hammond Committee
was at work. In its report, in which it generally accepted
the Scheduled Castes' point of view, the committee said that
it had found their leaders to be in favour of the cumulative
system, and although the Madras and U.P. Governnents wanted
the single non-transferable vote system for administrative
reasons, and the C.P. and Punjab Governments a distributive
system, it preferred a uniform cumulative system, and re- 
2
commended it. The provinces which advocated the single
non-transferable vote had powerful support from the proportional
representation lobby, including Lord Lothian, but the system
was strongly denounced by Gandhi and caste Hindus as going
against the whole spirit of the Poona Pact, in that it
would effectively prevent any cross-voting."^ The cumulative
system was also denounced by caste Hindus, with official
k
Congress support, for the same reasons. It is clear from 
their subsequent comments, that the C.P. and Punjab Govern­
ments were also worried about the political implications of
the cumulative system, in that the Scheduled Castes might
....................  5   . . .
win unreserved seats, but the India Office felt that the
danger of caste Hindu dominance was the more real, and that
the framers of the pact had probably had the Bombay system
^RD 36^ / 5206, minutes of conference.
p
HCR, pp. 21 and 106, and RD 6307, note dated 20/2/36, no 
number.
^RD 63071 note dated 28/2/36, no number.
\jLAD 1936, vol. iv, p.2813, l8/3/36,and p.3^09, 28/3/36.
c
RD 6307, note by Sir Laurie Hammond, February 1936, no 
number.
w.
in mind.'*' The recommendations of the Hammond Committee there­
fore stood, despite the very strong support from Congress for
2
the distributive system.
To some extent all this discussion took place in a vacuum,
in that predictions of Scheduled Caste behaviour had to be
theoretical. Although it had been assumed that they wanted
the cumulative system, the Scheduled Castes in Madras provided
an exception. In September 1937, after the first elections,
the Scheduled Caste leader, M.C.Rajah, proposed in the Madras
Legislative Assembly the substitution for the cumulative system
of the distributive system, as had earlier been suggested in
the minority scheme of the Provincial Delimitation Committee.^
This was passed by the Congress majority, and accepted by
4
the India Office, despite a protest by Ambedkar. The argu­
ments put forward by M,C.Rajah read as though they were be­
ing put forward by a caste Hindu. The reason for this was 
that in Madras most Scheduled Caste Members of the Legisla’r 
tive Assembly (MLAs) were supporters of the Brahman-dominated 
Congress party against the Justice Party. Congress having 
won the elections, it was in their aiterests to support dis­
tributive voting, which worked against the Justice Party. 
Although M.C.Rajah himself had always supported the Madras
■^ RD 63©7, note dated 28/2/36, no number.
p
CLAD 1936, vol. iv, loci cit.
•^ Madras Legislative Assembly Debates, September 1937, pp. 1046-7, 
29/9/37.
Ll
RD 6392, Part 11/8177 and 8847.
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Congress view, the other Madras Scheduled Caste leaders 
had supported the cumulative system at the time of the Ham­
mond Committee investigations.'*' The India Office was pre­
pared to accept the views of an official body, even where 
it meant disturbing existing practice, although it had not 
accepted the same views when they had been put forward by 
non-officials. It is by no means certain, however, that if 
the pre-1937 Council had come out in favour of the distributive 
vote its view would have been accepted, as after the intro­
duction of the 1935 Act the opinions of provincial legis­
latures acquired a new weight. Overall, the India Office 
thus achieved what it considered to be a reasonable inter­
pretation of the Poona Pact. Its leanings, and those of 
local governments, towards the Scheduled Castes can be ex­
plained more in terms of administrative convenience than 
political sympathy, although the latter did play some part. 
Officials did not believe that the Scheduled Castes would 
be able to muster sufficient organization to take advantage 
of the loopholes which practical considerations left open.
A less controversial but important problem arose over the 
seats that were allotted to women. Unlike the case of the 
Scheduled Castes the intention was not to have women fully 
represented as an interest group, but simply to give a boost 
to the development of political activity among them. The 
question was to decide the most suitable form of constituency. 
The Lothian Committee was the first body to consider the
~*~Indian Delimitation Committee« vol. iii, Selections, fro.m 
Evidence (193&), PP. ^7-59.
the matter and, having fixed the percentage of seats at from
2-3°/o, it proposed four possible types,^ of which the one
most generally approved by the provinces was reserved seats
2
in territorial constituencies. The problem was then taken 
up by a reforms officers1 conference. Bombay, Bihar and 
Orissa, and C.P, were prepared to reserve seats in ordinary 
constituencies, while the remaining provinces wanted to 
create special territorial constituencies as the size of these 
could be restricted, thus making it easier for women can­
didates to canvass. Voting was to be by men and women jointly,
3
except m  Bengal and Bihar Muslim seats. The Hammond Com­
mittee decided that in all cases special constituencies should 
be formed. It was obviously easier for candidates if these 
were formed in urban areas, but there were also political 
reasons for forming them in rural areas, and the committee 
allowed the Madras and U.P. Governments to do so. It de­
cided against a similar proposal from the Punjab, presumably 
because it considered rural conditions in the Punjab more 
difficult than elsewhere. The local government protested, 
but to no avail. Some provinces had also suggested to the 
committee that women's seats should rotate from area to 
area, but it was considered that, although there were advant­




•^ RD 471^/3092, minutes of conference, 3-7/3/35*
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member-constituency link.*^  The only remaining question was
which areas were to have voting by women only. Voting in
Bengal and Bihar Muslim reserved seats had been confined to
women in the 1935 Act itself, and after the Hammond Committee
reported the India Office decided, with local government approval,
that in Punjab and Sind also voting in the special constituencies
2
should be by women alone.
A anall but illuminating point arose over the Assam and
Orissa . women’s seats. Organized women’s opinion had been
strongly in favour of decommunalizing women’s seats, and in
Assam and Orissa the local governments were prepared to agree.
The matter was raised at the reforms officers’ conference,
but the Government of India was firmly opposed to it on the
3
grounds that it would contravene the Communal Award. The
India Office, however, placed less emphasis on the need to
appease the women's menfolk, and decided that the seats should,
k
nevertheless, be decommunalized. Although the India Office 
was as legally-minded as the Government of India, it did have 
more awareness of the progressiveness of politics.
The Hammond Committee had also to make a decision on the 
form that labour constituencies should take. The choice lay 
between constituencies specially formed in industrial areas 
and election through trade unions. Trade unions had been
"SiCR, pp. 122-7 and RD 6307/6481.
2RD 6307/6409, telegram S of S to G of I, 5/3/36.
^RD 4714/5118, telegram G of I to S of S, 25/3/35.
L
Ibid., telegram S of S to G of I, 12/4/55, and RD 4714/5257,
telegram G of I to S of S, 16/4/55.
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recommended by the Rpyal Commission on Labour in India in 1931 
but they varied very much in efficiency and representative­
ness from area to area. Although the Lothian Committee re­
cognized that using them for electoral purposes would help 
their development, it was unwilling to place the whole of 
labour representation on such a basis. A dual system was
therefore recommended,^ and this was confirmed by the Joint
2
Select- Committee, as several provinces had grave doubts 
about trade unions, particularly Bombay which was worried 
about communist elements.^ The Hammond Committee showed 
again, however, that policy-making bodies were often more 
dynamic in outlook than ordinary official opinion, and re­
commended that trade unions be used unless there were special 
if
circumstances. In pursuance of this, it insisted that some
of the labour seats in Madras, Bihar, and C.P. be allotted to
trade unions, ailthough the local governments had wanted all
5
seats to be allotted to special constituencies.
The Conduct of the Poll
Under the 1919 Act the procedure from the nomination stage 
to the casting of votes had been complicated and time-consuming 
because, as it was based on English models,elaborate methods
1.LCR, p.101.





had had to be devi sed for a largely in iterate c*>ciety. It
was essential for the procedure to be modified if a large
electorate was to be p-olled; it was, indeed, a prerequisite
of the enlarged electorate proposed by the Lothian Committee
that simpler voting methods be used.^ Local governments
2raised no objection to the principle involved, and by adopt­
ing new methods India was able to move in the direction of 
popular politics. Procedures could either be embodied in 
orders-in-council or in governors' rules and the India Office 
decided that it would be better to leave them to the latter, 
so as to avoid the long delays and uninformed criticism that 
would result from having to have orders-in-council approved 
by Parliament.^ This meant that there was less scope for uni­
formity and that on procedural points the Hammond Committee was
if
more of an advisory than a policy-making body. The first
step was to simplify nomination procedure in order to prevent
the challenging of elections on minor technicalities as had
previously happened. This was done by having the scrutiny of
nomination papers held on the same day as nomination, rather
than allowing a week to elapse in which factitious objections
could be prepared, and by making an unsuccessful petitioner
5
against an election pay part or all of the Costs. The re­
commendation of the Hammond Committee that Returning Officers
^LCR, P-59.
2RD 1930/2167, loc.cit.
^RD 6138/6379, telegram S of S to G of I, 1/4/36.
L
RD 6434 Part I/6908, telegram G of I to 10, 4/8/36.
5 HCR, pp. 238-60.
should have discretion to correct mistakes in the electoral
roll was,however, Considered by local governments to allow an
unwise degree of discretion, and was not implemented.^
The second step was to make withdrawals more difficult.
According to the Hammond Committee collusive withdrawals had
been common, and it suggested that they be made more difficult
2
to prevent the buying off of rival candidates. This was 
done by making withdrawals possible for only one day after 
nomination, except in U.P. where the period allowed was three 
days.^ The third and major step was to devise a suitably 
simple method of casting votes. Three systems had been in 
use under the 1919 Act: the coloured box, where voters merely
put a token in the appropriate box, the symbol, where voters 
placed marks against symbols, and the ordinary ballot paper, 
which in practice meant that the Presiding Officer or a 
polling clerk had to mark the ballot paper on behalf of the 
majority of voters. The objection to the symbol system was 
that it appeared that many illiterate voters were unable to
4identify the symbols correctly. The coloured box system, 
although it gave the greatest degree of secrecy, was con­
sidered by the Hammond Committee to provide opportuhiiiesffcr
■^RD 6434,Part 1/6908, loc.cit.
^HCR, pp. 263-4.
^RD 6434 Part III, copies of Conduct of Elections Rules.
1f
HCR, p.269* This objection was in fact only based on the evi­
dence of one province, Madras. The symbol system has been used, 
with candidates having separate boxes as in the coloured box 
system, in post-independence India.
7*-
palming votes for later sale.'*' The questions at issue were 
whether a uniform system should be adopted, and what improve­
ments could be made within the systems. The Lothian Committee
recommended the uniform adoption of the coloured box system,
2
with its emphasis on trusting the voter, but the Hammond
Committee was prepared to allow local governments to choose.
The result was that Bengal and Assam chose the symbol system,
Bombay, Sind, N.W.F.P. and the Punjab continued to have
ballot papers marked, Bihar, Orissa and C.P. continued with
the coloured box system and Madras changed over to it, while
U.P. retained its old marking system for rural areas but
adopted the coloured box system for urban areas.^ The committee
did, however, propose an improvement in the marking system.
Previously the Polling Officer had marked the ballot papers
of illiterates in the presence of candidates1 agents, which
effectively destroyed the secrecy of the ballot. The committee
proposed that the paper be shown to a person named by the
voter, who would normally be the agent of the candidate he 
if
had voted for. The new procedure was adopted by U.P., the 
Punjab continued with the old system, while the other pro­
vinces concerned included a clause in their rules leaving it
5
to the discretion of the Polling Officer.
~*~Ibid., p.266.
2LCR, p.273.
^RD Part III, loci cit.
4
HCR, p.265. This proposal was a little naive, as the main 
problem was to prevent harassment by agents, who would know 
if they were not asked to check the ballot paper.
^RD Part III, loci cit.
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The Hammond Committee wai? thus pixrpared to leave the de­
cision to local governments, whose views were in this instance 
dictated by quasi-administrative considerations, but the matter 
had a direct political significance. The coloured box system 
gave the greatest degree of secrecy, and because of this was 
demanded by Congress, who had most to fear from landlord inter­
ference, for the whole of India.^ This was refused, but a 
rearguard action was fought on behalf of the rural areas of 
U.P. which, in addition, to containing areas of strong Con­
gress influence, also had a relatively vigorous landlords'
2
party which specifically counted on personal influence.
Nehru circulated a note to selected MPs late in 1936, calling 
for the coloured box system and saying that the local govern­
ments' scheme was designed to give every advantage to the
3
big zamindars. The U.P.Government defended its policy on 
the grounds that, with many voters voting for the first time, 
it was best to keep to tried methods. As the pressure had 
come entirely from non-official sources, nothing was done.
Although governments' own justifications are hardly an in­
fallible guide, it seems probable that the U.P.Government's 
reasons were as stated.
Another part of the voting procedure was the identifica­
tion of the voter, and here the Lothian Committee had
1CLAD 1936, vol. v, pp. 4407-9, 22/4/36.
2
P.D.Reeves, 'Landlords and Party Politics in the United Prov­
inces, 193^-37*, in D.A.Low (ed.), £pdv^ i'kqs i-h (Wan. SnokL Qs>a/h 
History (1968), pp. 274-5.
6434 Part 1/7294.
Ibid., telegram U.P. Government to S of S, 13/12/36.
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recommended a substantial simplification of existing practi-
ices.^ Governors' rules variedj but under the new system
the most a voter had to do was to sign or make a mark on the
2
counterfoil of his ballot paper#
The final step was to control such disputes as arose
after the elections were over. There was of course no desire
to control genuine election petitions, but they were costly
and time-consuming. The Hammond Committee therefore recommended
that a deposit be made by the petitioner and that, as already
mentioned, the unsuccessful parties be made to pay part or 
3
all of the cost. Some provinces fixed a definite sum as a 
deposit, while others left it to the discretion of the
/f
commission appointed to try the petition* The order-in- 
council which dealt with general procedure for election 
petitions included another recommendation made by Hammond 
personally for the same purpose. This was that no one could 
secure a seat by a petition unless the result of the petition 
meant that he had in fact secured a majority of votes cast,
or would have done but for the corrupt practices that had
.......... 5 ..............
been proved. The committee also recommended that a deposit
be made each time a vote was challenged, but this was not ac­
cepted by local governments, which did not feel that there had
■hxR, p.275.
2RD 6**34 Part III, loci cit.
3HCR, pp. 260-1.
**RD 6434 Part III, loci cit.
^RD 6138/6663, telegram S of S to G of I, 14/5/36, and the 
Government of India (Provincial Elections) (Corrupt Practices 
and Election Petitions) Order, 1936: RD 6138/6837.
been any great abu^e of the procedure. The system of deposits 
by candidates, to be forfeited if they did not secure 12^/2°/o 
of votes cast (or the equivalent in multi-member constituencies) 
was continued as before. The deposit, which was normally 
Rs 250, was lowered to Rs 50 for Scheduled Caste candidates 
and for manual workers in labour seats to encourage their can­
didature.^
In addition to simplifying and tightening up electoral 
procedure, the new constitution made other modifications in 
existing practice. On the questions of 'treating' and the 
hire of conveyances, which were dealt with by order-in- 
council, Indian rules had followed the English pattern.
Both were regarded under the 1919 Act as corrupt practices.
With regard to the second the Hammond Committee recommended 
the lifting of the ban altogether, since polling stations
were often much further apart than in England and private
3
cars were much less frequent. The question of 'treating' 
was more complex. The committee thought that the provision 
of refreshments to voters could be regarded as part of the 
Indian tradition of hospitality and patronage and not as an 
attempt to influence the voting, and proposed that some 
'treating' be allowed. The first draft of the order, possibly 
because of an instinctive preference for British models,.
^CR, pp. 267-8 and RD 64^4 Part I/6908
?$*
nevertheless made all 'treating1 impermissible,^ Several
2
provinces, however, protested, and the second draft of the
3
order permitted it. This in turn was criticized by Ham-
J
mond and Butler, who thought that too much latitude was given.
As a result of this double criticism, Dawson evolved a for-
5
mula which referred to 'customary hospitality'. The re­
sponsibility for deciding what was customary was placed with
6
the commissioners who tried cases arising from it.
Closely connected to the problem of 'treating' was the
question of whether or not to impose a general limit on
election expenses. No limit had been imposed under the 1919
Act and most official opinion agreed that it was impossible
to do so, in view of the difficulty of obtaining definite
data and accurate returns of expenses. The Government of India
7officially supported a laissez-faire policy. There was, how­
ever, pressure from British opinion to have a limit imposed. 
Both the Lothian Committee and the Joint Select Committee
g
considered one necessary. The India Office therefore evolved 
a compromise by which provinces would have to bring in a
1RD 6138/6609.
2
3RD 6138, note dated 1/2/36, no number. Bihar at an earlier 
stage had pointed out tliat if an effective ban on 'treating' 
was made, 'the result would be tliat elections would be de­
cided by a microscopic proportion of the voters' (ED 3762/ 
3833, 'Views of Local Governments...').
•^ RD 6138/6609.
L
RD 6138/6663, notes for a meeting on, 13/5/36.
^Ibid., note dated lb/5/3&.
^RD 6138/6837, Corrupt Practices and Election Petitions Order.
7RD 3762/38^6, G of I to S of S, 29/9/33, and RD 3762/3853,
'Views of Local Governments...'.
g
LCR, p.280 ; Report, p.76.
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limit on expenses by the time of the second general election
under the new Act. This meant that legislatures were free to
decide on limits for their ovanprovinces.^ In the event, U.P.
and Madras introduced a limit for the first elections by
governors’ rule, while in other provinces a return of election
2
expenses was supposed to be made by candidates.
The Date of the Elections
The elections could not be held until the details of procedure 
had been settled, but the pace of the preliminary work was to 
some extent determined by the date of the elections. Lord 
Lothian had hoped in 1932 that the elections could be held 
in 1933.^ This was wildly inaccurate, but in 193** the pri­
vate opinion of the India Office was that elections could be 
held in 1936. Sir Vernon Dawson thought that the exigencies 
of the Parliamentary timetable would mean that they could not
Zf
be held until the end of that year, while R.A.Butler thought 
that 'India will regard the postponement of the Elections to 
Autumn 1936 as a serious matter1.^ A memorandum sent to the 
Viceroy in October 193** proposed the first months of 1936 
as most suitable and suggested that the provinces could begin 
to prepare provisional electoral rolls.^ This was circulated
1HD 3762/390**, note by Laithwaite, 19AO/33, and 
RD 3762/6005, note by Dawson, 15/11/35•
2RD 6**3** Part III, loci cit.
^RD 5930A999, speech made in India, 10/5/32.
4
RD 39**3/**3&**, note by Laithwaite, 26/6/3**, and marginal note 
on it by Dawson, 6/7/3**.
5
Ibid., note by Dawson, 26/7/3**, and marginal note on it by 
Butler, same date.
c
RD **317/**38**, memorandum dated 10/8/3**.
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to the provinces but, with one exception, logal governments 
considered that it would be impossible to hold elections 
before the autumn of 1936.^ The India Office also realized 
that unless the Delimitation Committee was to be appointed 
before the final reading of the Bill, which was politically 
unwise, there would be little hope of folding elections early 
in 1936. At the end of 193** all seemed set for elections 
in the autumn of 1936, with the introduction of provincial 
autonomy on 1 January 1937. In the middle of 1935, however, 
the question was raised of budgetary arrangements for the 
transition to responsible government, and there were further 
difficulties in squeezing all the necessary preparation into 
the limited time that would be available. Some provinces 
would not even have finished their elections before January 
1937.^ For both reasons it was decided to postpone the 
elections for a few further months. It would have been feasible, 
although less easy, to have held some elections earlier and to 
have separated financial and executive autonomy, but it was 
tidier and gave provinces more room to manoeuvre to bring 
all elections back into 1937. The introduction of the new 
constitution was thus delayed for a year, despite the politi­
cal reasons that had been advanced for holding the elections 
in early 1936. It was a fitting end to a decade of constitution
*^RD 39**3/****98, 'Analysis of Views of Provincial Governors...'
2
Ibid., note by Butler, 31/10/3**.
^RD 39**3/5371, telegram G of I to S of S, 17/3/33, RD 5639/
5659, Dunnett to Carter, 22/7/33, and RD 5659/63**l, circular 
letter G of I to local governments, 4/11/35.
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making which had been dominated by the need to reconcile 
the local governments to the new era.
The Administration of the Elections
So far, the focus of attention has been the interplay between 
New Delhi and Westminster. Once the full array of orders 
and rules had been drawn up the Home Department and the Re­
forms Office of the Government of India, and the local govern­
ments, regained control over the elections* Administrative 
convenience no longer had to be tempered with concern for the 
reactions of Parliament or the Round Table Conferences. 
Congress claimed that as a result the goveipment was able to 
discriminate against it more readily. Before the specific 
charges of government interference are ©xamined, a compre­
hensive outline will be given of the administration of 
the elections.
Although the approximate date of the elections was 
known in the middle of 1935* exact dates were nob determined 
until the latter part of 193& after the reforms officers* 
conference in June. The matter was left entirely to the 
local governments, who could thus take into account factors 
such as religious festivals and court sittings.^ The 
elections took place from 18 January to 20 February 1937* 
as shown in table 1.5* Even within the same province it 
was not possible to hold all the elections simultaneously. 
Simply to poll the constituencies of one class could take 
three or four days; in some areas the polling in each
■^ RD 36/7/36-Fj notes by V.P.Menon and W.H.Lewis, 13/10/36.
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constituency had to be spread over several days and the elector­
ate was formed into ’daily polling units’. There were often 
intervals of several days between polling dates in the dif­
ferent classes of constituency.
Table 1*5


































Source: RD 14/36-F and R0 20/III/1936-F.
The protracted period of the elections opened two 
possibilities. First, a 'snowball' effect: this could not
occur within provinces to any great extent as it took some 
days for most constituency results to be declared, and it is 
unlikely that Muslim results would have had much effect 
on Hindu constituencies and vice versa. It was, however, 
possible for news of Congress (or conceivably League) successes
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in one province to influence the results in another. Secondly, 
election workers could move about between constituencies and 
provinces. Both possibilities were considered within the Home 
Department, but no action was considered necessary.'*'
There had been a Reforms Office within the Government 
of India since 1933 and aa the election preparations began 
reforms officers were appointed in each province. The district 
work was carried out by the district officer or a deputy.
During the polling period itself all government officials, 
whether in central or provincial departments, were made avail­
able to serve as presiding and polling officers or as polling 
2
clerks. Even so, non-officials, frequently teachers, had to
be employed as well* In Madras 38,088 people were employed
If
to administer the poll. Policing was also difficult. In 
U.P.t where each polling station had an average of four con­
stables in attendance, nearly 60°/o of the police force was
5
used, supplemented by almost 13,000 village chaukidars.
^HPU 1/32/36, Emerson to Craik, 14/9/36, and notes by Hallett, 
15/9/36 and 16/9/36. An additional consideration was that 
Congress members of the Central Legislative Assembly did not 
want any pf the elections to overlap the Assembly session: 
ibid., note by Thorne,16/7/36. See also below, p.222.
p
RO 3O/36-F, passim.
^RO 20/III/I936-F, 'Report on the First Elections to the U.P. 
Legislature', (hereafter U.P.Report); 'Report on the General 
Elections in Bihar, January 1937', (hereafter Bihar Report).
Zf
Ibid., Madras G.O. No. 396 Public (Elections), 29/3/37j 'Review 




The number of polling stations used varied substantially 
according to the geographical size of the province and the ad­
ministrative resources available. In Bihar, where the revenue 
system needed relatively few local officials, there were if 37 
polling stations for the 70 general constituencies, and in 
Madras, 3,2C& for 111. In U.P. the ideal was that no elector 
should be more than five or six miles from a polling station, 
but in the most remote and sparsely populated areas this may 
not have been achieved,^ The relative scarcity of polling
stations meant that access to transport was an important
2
factor in some areas. Local boards were expected to make
schools and offices available and police stations were used,
but in some rural areas tents were erected as makeshift
stations.^ It was general^ reckoned that each set of polling
staff could cope with about a thousand electors. In U.P.,
where both methods were in use, it was reported that one or
two hundred more electors could be handled by the coloured box
if
system than by the ballot system. There was often, of
course, more than one set of officials per polling station.
In certain urban areas separate' facilities were provided for 
5
women voters,
^Bihar Report; Madras Report; U.P.Report.
2
Bihar Report; RO D683/37-,Fed., Hammond to Laithwaite,
17/6/37.Hammond quoted the Governor of U.P. as saying 
that Congress’s use of hired transport (newly legitimized 
under governor’s rules) was a factor in its success.
RO 3O/36-F; Bihar Report; U.P.Report.
If
Bihar Report; U.P. Report.
^Ibid., RO 20/III/1936-F, ’Report on the General Elections 
in North-West Frontier Province February 1937’» (hereafter 
N.W.F.P. Report).
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Three local governments reported the cost of the elections. 
In N.W.F.P. the cost was given to the last pice - Rs 74-, 507-13-5* 
In Bihar, it was given as Rs 225,520, excluding the cost of 
printing at the government press and the pay and allowances of 
government officials on election duty. In U.P. the estimated 
cost was about Rs 850,000, excluding the ordinary pay of offi­
cials. In each case, the major expense was the printing of the 
electoral rolls. A certain amount was recovered in the form 
of forfeited deposits and receipts from the public sale of 
copies of the electoral rolls. In Bihar Rs 28,4-00 were received 
from these sources. Deposits forfeited in U.P. amounted to 
Ks 33,250.1
Although the official polling dates were not announced 
till quite late, preparation of the electoral rolls had been 
going on for years. In some provinces it had begun even be­
fore the 1935 Act had been passed. In Bihar, for instance, 
instructions had been issued as early as May 1933 for the 
preparation of lists of those who would be qualified by 
property or by education to matriculation standard. Such lists 
were in fact the basis on which the constituencies were de­
limited. When the time came to prepare the actual register 
these lists were revised, usually by local revenue officials 
and village officers, and applications invited from those 
who were not entitled to automatic registration. This took 
place in the early part of 1936 and the draft rolls were
^N.W.F.P. Report; Bihar Report; U.P.Report.
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published in June or July.'*'
After publication of the draft rolls a period of two or 
three weeks was allowed for claims and objections, which were 
heard by magistrates. In U.P. 36,^62 claims and 3,859 ob­
jections were allowed. In Bihar 7,003 out of 16,801 claims 
for inclusion were allowed. The reforms officer in Bihar com­
mented that the level of claims was surprisingly low, and 
attributed this in part to a lack of interest among potential
electors. He though that a large number of women who were
2eligible had certainly not been included. After claims had 
been heard, the final rolls were prepared and published in 
October or November. These usually consisted of copies of 
the draft rolls together with addenda and corrigenda. The 
process of choosing the Scheduled Caste panel occupied part 
of November and December. Closing dates for nominations 
usually fell in the same period. Thus at least six weeks 
elapsed between the closing of the nomination list and poll­
ing. After the list had closed, only a very short period, 
usually a day, was allowed for withdrawals. This was intended 
as a measure against 'collusion', but was criticized for
causing hardship to those who wanted to retire for other 
3reasons.
^Bihar Report. The timetable in other provinces was broadly 
similar.
2
U.P.Report; Bihar Report. Claims were supposed to refer 
only to inaccuracies in the roll, but in some provinces 
de novo applications were allowed. This may have been the 
case in U.P. RO I/I/36-F & K.W., 'Proceedings of Con­
ference of Reforms Officers at New Delhi, l6th June 1936*.
3
U.P.Report
Seemingly to the sui^ prise of many officials, the first 
experiment in conducting elections among a largely illiterate 
electorate passed off almost without incident. One or two 
polling stations had to be closed for short periods owing to 
disturbances, but nothing in the nature of a riot took place.
In some places Congress workers organized processions to the 
polling stations, which inevitably involved a certain amount 
of noise.^ During the weeks before the poll there had in 
some areas been lively campaigning. Numerous charges and 
counter-charges were made of speakers having been scouted 
down but, with the exception of aonuptkeof murders that were 
alleged to have had a political motive, nothing serious 
occurred.^
The actual mechanics of casting votes worked well. The 
method of placing tokens in variously coloured boxes was re­
garded as a success in the provinces where it was used, but 
it was pointed out from some quarters that the necessity of 
having an official present while the vote was cast destroyed 
the secrecy of the ballot. Some candidates helped by pro­
viding their supporters with slips of the appropriate colour
3
to remind them which box to use.
^Bihar Report; U.P.Report.
^HPO 4/9/37, passim; FR Punjab, January 193& !•
3
U.P.Report. It was necessary for the casting of the vote to 
be witnessed, for it would have been possible for a voter to 
'palm1 his token and give or sell it to one of the candidate's 
agents. In Madras an ingenious system was evolved whereby a 
'watcher' looked through a slit in the wall that was so de­
signed that he could only see the voter's hand. The complaint 
was made, however, that some watchers whispered candidates' 
names through the wall; Madras Report.
$su.
One criticism of the voting methods used was that in
multi-member constituencies where cumulative voting was allowed,
many people had ’plumped1 their votes for a single candidate.
This applied particularly to constituencies in which a seat
was reserved for a member of the Scheduled Castes, It was
observed that while Scheduled Caste electors had often given
all their votes to candidates for the undeserved seat, the
opposite had not occurred. Congress objections to the cumu**
lative system of voting thus turned out to have been, justified. ^
There were inevitably a certain number of election
petitions. In U.P. 27 were filed, of which nine were against
2
independent Muslims and six against Congressmen. Even so, 
the number of irregularities seems to have been low. In part 
this was due to liberalization of the rules. The hiring of 
conveyances to take electors to the poll and ’customary hospi­
tality1 were now both allowed; only Madras and U.P. placed 
any limit on expenditure. Rules for nominations had also been
simplified to avoid the sort of technical dispute that had 
3
arisen earlier. The detected level of fraudulent persona­
tion was veiy low, although there was some personation of 
Zf
close relatives. The main difficulty appears to have been 
with the system of postal voting in certain special con-
5
stituencies, in which widespread abuses were reported.







N.W.F.P. Report; Bihar Report.
99.
Charges of Government Interference
During the campaign there were a number of allegations, both 
general and specific, of government interference,"^ The general 
attitude of the government to the elections must first be 
considered* Some measure of ministerial responsibility had 
already been introduced by the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms and 
even the Simon Commission had recommended full provincial auto­
nomy. Many members of the ICS were prepared to work the 1935
2Act in the spirit of the Montagu Declaration. Even those 
officials who regretted the passing of the age of autocracy 
had to recognize that there could be no going back. In any 
case, the legislatures were a useful means of legitimizing 
the ra.j to certain sections of the Indian popiLation and, 
more importantly, to Parliament. Nevertheless, the thought 
of Congress contesting the elections produced ambivalent re­
actions. Congress was recognized to be the largest organized 
political body in the country but at the same time it stood 
for the overthrow of the system. During the elections offi­
cials were principally concerned with four aspects of this 
classic dilemma of democratic theory. First, it was thought 
that Congress might, under cover of electioneering, preach or 
even practise subversion. This fear was especially strong in 
those parts of the country where civil disobedience had been
■^ These were in addition to the charges of institutional bias
discussed above.
2
Philip Woodruff, The Men Who ruled India, vol. ii (195*0»
P.2^5.
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mingled with violence, as in N.W.F.P. and Bengal.^- Secondly,
it was felt that Congress might try to win unfairly by making
wild promises to the villagers concerning remission of land 
2revenue and rent. Thirdly, it was realized that Congress had 
the only organization worth the name, and that this, while 
not exactly ’unfair1, distorted the natural balance of re-
3
presentation of views and interests within the electorate.
Finally, some officials put forward a general view that many
electors did not possess the necessary normative orientations
towards a democratic system of responsible government. In a
situation where the prevailing values were hierarchical, if
the government was seen to abstain from an election the
ordinary elector would regard Congress as being about to re-
4
jilace the British, and would hasten to vote accordingly. As
Nehru put it, there were only two parties in the country,
5
the government and Congress. The government, although not 
willing to allow its own power to be an issue, had to accept 
that the elections were to some extent regarded as a battle
^HPO 40/1/36, memorandum by the N.W.F.P. Government, 11/7/36. 
2PR Bihar, 9/2/37; PR C.P., 10/2/37; PR Madras, 1/3/37.
•^ PR Bihar, 9/2/37; PR C.P., February 1937 II.
HPO 111/37, 'Memorandum ... on the Results of the Elections 
•..'. The author stated further that Congress deliberately 
exploited the situation by threatening subordinate officials 
and by holding meetings in the vicinity of government offices 
and police stations. See also HPO 4/13/37, Bengal Government 
to Home Department, 27/1/37.
^ Leader, 3/1/37.
92,
between itself and the national movement.
First, therefore, the government monitored the progress 
of the campaign very carefully. This was done through well- 
established intelligence channels. Most large meetings had 
a police officer present to take notes and the mail of certain 
individuals and organizations was regularly intercepted. 
Secondly, many officials must have felt tempted to intervene, 
as they saw it, to keep the scales even. In a circular to 
district officers, the U.P. Government told them that they 
need not feel debarred from expressing views on the Congress’ 
policy of wrecking the new constitution or from helping in­
formally to settle nomination disputes. It reminded them that 
the elections were not to interfere with maintenance of law
and order. They were not, however, to express support for
2
any particular party. The basic attitude was that Congress 
was free to contest the elections provided it obeyed the 
ground rules laid down by the government and behaved like any 
other political party.
Government interference could be directly against 
Congress or in support of pro-government groups. Under 
section 69(1)(e) of the 1935 Act, anyone imprisoned for more 
than two years within the five years prior to the election
*4rhese points are well illustrated by a discussion within the 
Home Department as to whether All-India Radio should carry 
election speeches. Sir Henry Craik noted first that All-India 
Radio had not in the past carried political material, which 
had been a self-denying ordinance to the government; 
secondly, that Congress would take the oppprtunity to attack 
the government itself; thirdly, that the existence of a well- 
organized pro-government party would have altered the 
situation. HPO 52/10/36, passim.
2
HPO 2A/13/36, circular enclosed with letter from U.P. Govern­
ment to Home Department, 27/8/36.
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was ineligible to stand as a candidate unless he applied for 
special permission from the provincial government. Although 
the clause was designed to cope primarily witji non-political 
offences, a certain number of civil disobedience prisoners 
had been sentenced for terms of over two years. The policy 
adopted by the government was that disqualifications should not 
be lifted in cases where the offence had involved violence or 
the advocacy of communism. In the event, only a handful 
of prospective candidates were affected. In Madras and Bom­
bay all applications were accepted, but in Bengal, where there 
was a constant fear of terrorism, only two out of eleven 
were.^ Congress organizers were aware of the problem and
a circular was issued to PCCs reminding them to take neces- 
2
sary action. They seem never to have raised the matter in 
public, perhaps because no major candidate was debarred. A 
question arose at one point of whether a retired government 
servant should be allowed to stand as a Congress candidate.
He was allowed to do so, although it was noted that at some 
future date he might be placed in a compromising position by 
Congress actions.^
Several charges were made in the Central Legislative 
Assembly of action against Congress activities in N.W.F.P. 
and Bengal. A procession in Peshawar in connection with a 
speech by Dr. Khan Sahib was banned and several Congressmen 
prosecuted for seditious speeches. The N.W.F.P. Government
■SiPU 39/10/36, passim; RO 20/II/36-F, passim.
2
AICC El(a)/l936, Congress Parliamentary Committee (CPC) 
circular 7, 3/11/36.
9 ^
justified its actions on the grounds that if it relaxed con­
trol too far, the Red Shirt movement would revive. It 
claimed that in attempting to take out election processions 
the Congress leaders were actually finding out how far the 
government would let them go.^ In Bengal a number of alle­
gations were made about the actions of the government in 
Midnapore district, which had been the scene of some of the 
most notorious terrorist incidents* It was said that the 
houses of Congress workers had been searched, that there had 
been military activity in the area, that chaukidars had been 
scaring people away from Congress meetings, and that there 
had been government-sponsored meetings at which Congress had 
been attacked. The Bengal Government admitted all the charges 
except the third, but insisted that the actions had been
aimed against terrorism and not Congress's legitimate activi- 
2
ties. Another matter that was raised in the Assembly was 
the suspension of some patwaris and peons in 
Aligarh district, U.P., who had attended one of Nehru's 
meetings. The official view was that they had been punished 
not for attending the meeting but for doing so in work hours.^
Much more significant than these isolated instances of 
direct action against Corgress were the activities of the 
government in support of certain other parties. The relation­
ship of successive governors of U.P. and the landlord parties of the
^HPO 40/1/36, memorandum by N.W.F.P. Government, 11/7/36,
See also HPO 24/11/36, passim.
^HPO 4/13/37, Bengal Government to Home Department, 27/1/37.
■^ HPU 41/4/36, district officer, Aligarh,to Home Department,
13/10/36.
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prpvince is well known, but there were other provinces where 
the government was instrumental in bringing pro-British, 
usually landlord, parties into existence, or in helping the 
development of such parties.^* A particularly striking ex­
ample occurred in Sind where the governor attempted to per­
suade all the Muslim MLAs to join the United Muslim Party, 
which had been founded shortly before the elections by Shah
■ 2
Nawaz Bhutto who had been a minister under the old dispensation.
It was also said, probably with some justification, that the 
United Party in Bihar and the United Muslim Party in Bengal 
had been formed with official encouragement if not active 
support.^ Such activity was not necessarily aimed against 
Congress. In Sind there was hardly any pessibility of a 
Congress majority or of many rural seats going to non-land­
holders. On the other hand responsible government would have 
been virtually impossible without some sort og legislative 
groupings. In Bengal likewise, separate electorates meant 
that the Hindu-dominated Congress was not affected directly 
by the existence of a conservative Muslim party, although 
there were radical Muslims to whom the government might well 
have wished to set a counterpoise. In U.P.itself, where the 
National Agriculturist Parties (NAPs) were supported by most 
leading zamindars and taluqdars, it was admitted that some 
district magistrates had helped to settle differences among
^P.D.Reeves, ’Landlords and Party Politics in the United Pro­
vinces, 193^-7\ in D.A.Low (ed.), Soundings in Modern South 
Asian History (1968), pp. 261-282. In some cases it was sug­
gested to landlords that they exercise restraint in dealing 
with their tenants: FR Bihar, June 1936 II.
2GR Sind, 19/V37.
^HPO 22/21/36, extract from CLAD, 8/IO/36, speeches by Satya 
Narayan Sinha and A.K.Fazlul Huq.
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rival groups so as to produce a single candidate.^ Although 
the U.P.'s Government's policy was not to support any parti­
cular party, such candidates would almost inevitably have 
stood on the NAP ticket.
There were occasions when Congressmen considered that 
officials had openly canvassed support for pro-government 
candidates. The Midnapore meetings have already been mentioned.
In U.P, it was alleged that 'village uplift' meetings, which 
were officially organized, were at the same time NAP meet­
ings, or that an NAP meeting was held immediately before or 
after. It was said that on public occasions local officials 
urged the people to vote for those who believed in 'consti­
tutional activities' - code for anti-Congress. These charges 
were not denied by the U.P.Government, which did not regard 
them sis unfair practice. Local board employees were also 
charged with partiality; the government did not, however,
have the powers to control their political activities. Alle-
•5
gations were made both by and against Congress. Many 
candidates held office in local boards, and it would have 
been surprising if some had not encouraged employees to work 
for them.
Nehru himself took up the issue of what was known as 
the 'Court of Wards Circular'. The Court of Wards was an official 
body charged with the management of those taluqdari estates
"4lP0 2V13/36, circular from Rafi Ahmad Kidwai to MLAs (Central) 




Ibid., letter from U.P. Government, D.O. no. 967-CX; Bihar 
Report. The matter had in fact been raised during the formu­
lation of the order-in-council relating to corrupt practices, 
but no action was taken: RD 6138/6358, telegram G of I to
S of S, 1V2/36.
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whose owners were unable to look after them; its local agents 
were the district magistrates. The circular to which ob­
jection was taken asked district magistrates to recommend 
the names of suitable candidates who would defend landlord 
interests. The resources of the estates under the court's 
control were then thrown behind these candidates. The govern­
ment's defence of this was that the court was intended to 
protect the interests of the landlord class. It was also said 
that if estate officials were not given guidance, the local 
Congress would induce them to place the power of the estate 
behind Congress candidates.^ In some circumstances neutrality 
was thus impossible.
In assessing the various charges of government inter­
ference it must be remembered that as well as the inter-party 
contest at the polls, a long-term struggle was in progress 
between the government and the national movement as a whole. 
The Central Legislative Assembly, which remained in being 
throughout the campaign, was a major arena of this conflict. 
Non-Congress nationalists such as Fazlul Huq joined hands 
with the Congress members to attack the executive. Charges 
of interference in the elections were useful weapons. The 
government on its side was prepared to retaliate in kind.
A Home Department file was opened with the title: 'Collection 
of Material from Newspapers and Official Reports Dealing 
with Instances of Congress Disturbances, Intimidation, and 
lying Propaganda in Connection with the Elections Preceding
^HPO 2^/13/36, l©tter from U.P. Government, D.O. no. 967-CX.
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the Introduction of Provincial Autonomy1.'*' In the Assembly 
government apologists such as Sir Muhammad Yamin Khan made use 
of the tu quoque (et major) argument. In addition, the alle­
gations that were made tended to come from only a few areas, 
in particular Bengal, U.P., and N.W.F.P., where the national­
ist movement had in the past been very sharply opposed to the
2
whole system of government. There was also some corre­
lation with the existence of strong landlord interests. In 
August 1936 the Home Department circularized local govern­
ments to find out what allegations had been made up till then: 
on£y Bengal, Bihar, and U.P. reported that there had been any.
Direct anti-Congress action was limited to cases where 
it could at least be argued that there was a threat to the 
maintenance of law and order and efficient administration.
It was in any case of peripheral importance. The effect of 
government action in support of non-Congress parties was of 
greater significance. There was, of course, disagreement over 
what constituted unwarranted disagreement* What was said at 
anti-terrorist propaganda meetings could easily be construed 
as advice to the villagers to avoid Congress and all its works. 
To Congress, any government action weighted the scales against 
it; to the government, its actions were merely a means of 
keeping them even so as to facilitate the introduction of 
Westminster-style democracy. It was, however, an impossible
1HPO V 9/37.
2
Personal disputes could also trigger allegations. In Bilas- 
pur in C.P., numerous charges were made against E.Raghavendra 
Rao, who had been a leading Congressman but had apostasized:
PR C.P., V2/37, and HPO 2?/13/36, telegrams Bilaspur District 
Congress Committee (DCC) to G of I, February 1937*
■3
HPO 2^/13/36, Bengal Government to Home Department, 29/8/36, 
Bihar Government to Home Department, 21/8/36, and U.P. 
Government to Home Department, 27/8/36.
task. Well-organized parties were a prerequisite, but no uni­
fied opposition to Congress could develop so long as the 
colonial situation remained. Nevertheless, the attempt had 
to be made, if only to prevent too great an erosion of govern­
ment prestige. The government’s intention was not necessarily 
to prevent Congress’s success. A defender of the current poli­
tical system in India wrote of the 1967 elections: ’If offi­
cial interference were not the exception but the rule, such 
Congress Party stalwarts as Kumaraswami Kamaraj, S.K.Patil,
Atulya Ghosh and the Chief Ministers of several states would 
not have been allowed to lose their seats in the legislatures.*'*' 
The same test may, by and large, be applied in 1937.
A sidelight on the whole question of the government's 
attitude to the elections is provided by the official estimates 
of how many seats Congress would hold in the various legislatures. 
Table 1.6 gives the estimates made by the governors for six 
provinces compared to the actual results. In no case did they 
approach the actual figures. It was in the light of these 
underestimates that many officials complained of Congress’s 
wild promises, misuse of Gandhi's name, creation of disturb­
ances, etc. It is possible that if official estimates of 
Congress strength had been more accurate, there would have
been more strenuous efforts
^Krishan Bhatia, 'India Adrift', Foreign Affairs, vol. xlv 
no. (July 1967), p.633.
1Q0.
to influence the course of the campaign.
Table 1.6 
Governors’ Estimates of Seats 
That Would Be Won by Congress.









The Intelligence Bureau of the Government of India would also 
have made estimates. These are still not available. It is 
possible, however, that its estimates would have been more 
accurate. Occasional extracts from its reports in other 
official files reveal an altogether more gloony view of the 
situation.
Chapter Two
THE POLITICAL PARTIES 
I
THE ALL - INDIA SITUATION
Over 30 parties contested the 1937 elections, but almost all 
of them were confined to limited area. Even Congress 
functioned for many purposes as a federation of provincial 
parties. Eachjrovince has therefore to be examined individually, 
but an all-India analysis is necessary to establish heuristic 
categories of political action and to define the limits within 
which local politicians worked. The analysis in this chap­
ter provides a means of classifying the parties within a 
static framework; it also takes account of the factors which 
led to change and development. These included both the con­
stitutional changes that have already been examined and 
politicians' attitudes following the collapse of civil dis­
obedience after 1932.
No single dimension is used as a means of classifying 
parties. In the political rhetoric of western democracy 
parties are placed at points along a continuum, but this im­
plies not only that parties possess coherent and integrated 
policies but also that the parties interact directly with 
each other. In India in 1937, however, separate electorates 
and the fact that only provincial elections were being held 
meant that parties existed which in terms of policy, and to 
some extent of social composition, were parallel. Each party
(or, at the all-India level, type of party) has therefore to 
be located within a multi-dimensional space defined by policy, 
social and communal bases, and organizational coherence. Each 
dimension could be further defined in terras of particular 
variables, but the resulting framework of classification would 
be far more precise than the evidence that is actually avail­
able.
Within the policy dimension attitudes towards independence 
are in themselves of little use. Just as most post-independ- 
ence parties in Asian countries are 'socialist1,^  so most 
parties and candidates in 1937 were in favour of self-govern­
ment, although there was a division between those who insisted 
on total severance of the British connection and those who 
would have been content with dominion status. There were, 
however, differences over the metaphysics of independence.
Some saw it as initiating a new social contract; others in­
sisted that the lines of a future constitution had to be 
settled in advance. There were also those who felt that struc­
tural change in society should be an integral part of the pro­
cess of independence.
More revealing than attitudes to independence were views 
on the role of elections and legislative action. Positions 
on economic and social issues - the basis of most party classi­
fications - are of only limited use. The range of short-term 
policies that could be advocated was limited by the specific 
restraints of the 1933 Act and by the implicit knowledge
hi.R.Tinker, Ballot Box and Bayonet (196*0, pp. 76-7*
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that the government would never alow a far-reaching social 
revolution. Long-term proposals were usually vague. As only 
a few of the parties had contested legislative elections be­
fore 1937, it is not possible to test proposals againdt actual 
behaviour. Most parties presented themselves as more radical 
than they subsequently were. This was partly due to a failure 
to work out the consequences of policies in terms of group 
conflict and partly to the fact that radical statements were 
not based directly on class interest. The issue is further 
complicated in that while policy was often defined in terms 
of horizontal cleavages, vertical divisions within society 
were just as important.
To describe the parties in terms of the social bases of 
their support is only possible at a high level of generality. 
Chapter k provides data on the social origins of some of the 
successful candidates, but in 1937, even more than now, the 
leaders of the various parties were drawn from a limited sec­
tion of society. The evidence for the nature of the mass sup­
port of each party and for the grounds on which parties ob­
tained it must remain impressionistic. Although caste rank­
ings to some extent corresponded with economic and social 
classes, the degree of correlation between party and caste 
at the local level was the result of a number of factors. 
Because of the existence of separate electorates the relation­
ship between party and religious community was always evidentt 
but the degree to which parties emphasized or denied their 
communal bases naturally varied. Also significant were the 
particular aspects of a community’s position that an overtly 
communal party chose to concentrate on.
1(A,
Assumed correlations with policy positions provide an 
additional means of approaching the problem of the social 
bases of politics. There is an obvious, although in India 
complex,connection between a party's economic policies and its 
class make-up; it is also possible that those who most 
favoured constitutional agitation for independence did so 
because prolonged direct action might lead to an unwelcome 
politicization of the urban and rural masses. It was an 
essential part of the thinking of many radicals at the time 
that communal policies indicated a party that represented 
vested economic and social interests. This theory - strongly 
held, for example,by Nehru - will be examined in this chapter. 
All parties were of course 'bourgeois' in that the initiative 
within them came entirely from the middle and upper classes, 
but it is nevertheless important to analyse as far as possible 
the internal stresses within these classes and the means 
whereby they securedmass backing.
Organizational coherence forms a third dimension. There 
was a crucial division between those parties that selected 
candidates and those that did not. Also important was the 
willingness of the parties to enter into pacts or alliances 
with Congress. This is not simply a measure of how far a 
party was from Congress on either of the other dimensions but 
also reflects the circumstances in which it came into exist­
ence.
Congress
Although less dramatic than the immediately precediigyears, 
193^-7 was a period of vital consequence in the development
105*
of Congress. At the risk of a certain amount of repetition the 
treatment of Congress here will consist, first, of a brief sum­
mary of events and an account of its organizational structure, 
secondly, of an analysis of the various groups within it, and 
thirdly, of an analysis of its policy and organization.
After the failure of the second Round Table Confeience 
at the beginning of 1932, civil disobedience had been renewed 
with increased vigour, and for a time a state of open war had 
existed between Congress and government. Except for the AICC 
all Congress organizations had been banned; there was a re­
crudescence of terrorism and no-rent campaigns; people from all 
levels of society went to prison repeatedly. After a temporary 
suspension in 1933 civil disobedience was finally abandoned in 
April 193** but it had in fact ceased to be an effective means 
of agitation some time before.”1.
Apart from its effect on Congress-government relations, 
the civil disobedience period had eJen important changes within 
Congress. On one side, a number of Congressmen who had been 
active in the 1920s disapproved of law-breaking and left the
party. Prominent among them were M. R. Jayakar in Bombay,
2E. Raghavendra Rao m  C.P., and N. R. Sarkar in Bengal. Al­
though no longer in Congress such men continued to be import­
ant as foci for dissident groups within it. On .the other side, 
new elements were recruited into Congress or moved from the
^For Gandhi's statement of 7 April 193** suspending civil dis­
obedience, see D.G.Tendulkar, Mahatma, vol. iii (1952), pp. 317-20.
2
Some of them had virtually left Congress before 1930- The Re­
sponsive Co-operation Party in Bombay and the Nationalist 
Party in the Punjab were breakaways from the Swaraj Party.
Loose Congress discipline, however, meant that the moment of 
truth did not come until a resolutioncf the Lahore Congress in 
December 1929 called on all Congress MLCs to resign.
fringe into more central roles. As in the non-co-operation 
movement there was an influx of students and other young in­
tellectuals. Younger members of communities that had pre­
viously co-operated in working the Montford reforms began to 
take a more active part in Congress affairs.
Although Congress had boycotted the process of consulta­
tion, it was affected by the reforms scheme. The Communal 
Award and the prospect of Muslim domination in certain pro­
vinces aroused latent fears in many of its members. The ad­
vent of provincial autonomy and the failure of civil disobedi­
ence to achieve swara.j added new dimensions to the conflicts 
of the 1920s between 'changers' and 'no-changers'. There was 
no hope that the government would grant anything more than was 
contained in the White Paper of March 1933* Secure in the posi­
tion granted them by the Communal Award, the Muslims were less 
likely than ever to join in the sort of totally united national 
movement that could, in theory, have swept the British out of 
India.
The first task in 193** was to re-establish the committee 
structure of Congress. This was done at the first regular 
working Committee meeting. Leading Congressmen were given 
powers to reorganize the varimsPCCs, and the machinery was 
set in motion for the election of delegates to the next Con­
gress session.^ " At the next meeting the 'constructive pro­
gramme' of khaddar work, abolition of untouchability, etc.
Indian National Congress, The Indian National Congress. 1930-3** 
(INC I), (n.d.), pp. 178-9*5 Congress Working Committee (CWC) 
proceedings, 18-20/5/3*** $he Working Committee remained offi­
cially banned until 6 June 193** but no obstacles were placed 
in the way of this first meeting.
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which had already been proposed by Gandhi.,, was made official 
policy.'1'
Groups within Congress also began to organize themselves.
After holding a preliminary meeting at Delhi in March 1932*
and having obtained Gandhi's assent, M„ M. Malaviya, ML A.
Ansari, and B. C. Roy summoned a conference at Ranchi of those
p
interested in reviving the Swaraj Party of the 1920s. Approval
was given by the Working Committee and AICC to the establishment
•2
of the Congress Parliamentary Board (CPB). The CPB, probably 
at Malaviya1s instigation, then requested that the Working Com­
mittee establish a Congress policy *towards the Communal Award.
This was expressed in the formula that Congress could 'neither 
accept nor reject* the award. An immediate consequence was 
that Malaviya and his lieutenant from western India, M.S.Aney, 
established the Congress Nationalist Party (CNP) at a meeting
c
in Calcutta on 18 and 19 August 193^. They hoped that, as 
they merely objected to one aspect of policy, they would be al­
lowed to remain fully within Congress. After long discussions 
with them, however, the Working Committee effectively forced the
^INC 1, p*l80: CWC proceedings, 12-AL 3/6/3^*
2
The Delhi meeting was held on 31 March 193^: B. Pattabhi
Sitaramayya, The History of The Indian National Congress, vol. i 
(19^6 ed*), p.3^7; Gandhi's assent was conveyed in a letter 
to Ansari of 3 April 193^: ibid.f p.368; the Ranchi conference 
was held on 2 and 3 May 193^; ibid., p.370. Gandhi was in 
Ranchi during the period of the conference: Tendulkar, op.cit.,
vol. iii, p.329.
^INC I, pp. 176-7: AICC proceedings, 18-19/3/3^» CWC proceedings,
18-20/3/3^• At this stage the immediate object was the Central 
Assembly, elections to which, under the 1919 Act, were due in 
November 193^.
L
Ibid., pp. 183-^ : CWC proceedings, 17-18/6/3^.
5
Sitaramayya, op.cit., vol. i, p.377*
CNP to operate independently by insisting that all candidates in
the Central Assembly elections had to accept Congress communal
policy.'*' In the elections Congress gained seats, the CNP
2
11, including a clean sweep in Bengal. Although in some places
there were Congress-CNP contests, no disciplinary action was
taken. It had earlier been agreed that no Congress candidates
would be put up against Malaviya and Aney.3
In May 193^ a group of newly released civil disobedience
prisoners founded the Congress Socialist Party (CSP) at a meet- 
k
ing at Patna. The Working Committee’s first reaction was to
insist that the Karachi Resolution of 1931 had not contemplated
class warfare or confiscation of property without compensation
but later it softened the blow by stating that it had not in-
5
tended to reflect on the CSP.
The first normal Congress session since 1931 was held in 
Bombay at the end of October 193^• U s  policy resolutions 
broke no new ground but it was notable for the introduction of a
■^ INC I, pp. 186 and 192-3: CWC proceedings, 27-30/7/3^ and
9 & 11/9/3**.
2
A statement of the results is contained in Return Showing the 
Results of the General Elections to the Legislative Assembly 
in India. 193^* Cmd. 4939 (1935)* Not all party affiliations 
sire given, however. See also AICC G9/193^, statement of 
election results.
3INC I, p.193: CWC proceedings, 9 & 11/9/3^.
h . .Hari Kishore Singh, A History of the Pra.ja Socialist Party 
(1939), p«l6. This meeting coincided with the first meeting 
of the AICC after the suspension of civil disobedience.
5
Indian National Congress, The Indian National Congress, 
193^-36 (INC II) (1936), pTzT: CWC proceedings, 17-W6/32*;
ibid., p.23: CWC proceedings, 27-30/7/3^• The Karachi Re­
solution was the first time that Congress committed itself 
to a general position on social and economic reform: INC I,
pp. 66-8: Karachi session proceedings, 29-31/3/31*
new constitution and for the retirement of Gandhi from Congress 
membership. He had for several months been uneasy at the de­
velopments in Congress. While he had no desire to hinder them - 
indeed he had encouraged Congressmen to fulfil their dharma - 
he did not wish to be personally associated with them. He 
therefore announced in September that he was going to cease to 
be even a four-anna member of Congress. Later on, the Sabar- 
mati ashram, from which the various satyagrahas had been planned 
was given over to hari.jan work and a new ashram established from 
which Gandhi carried out constructive work. The new constitu­
tion was his parting gift to Congress and was intended by him
to tie the leadership more closely to the masses and to the
1
constructive programme. It incidentally provided an oppor­
tunity to remedy defects in the 1920 constitution. The main 
innovations were: a reduction in the number of delegates to
Congress sessions to 2,000 and a fixed proportion between 
urban and rural delegates; more' stringent rules governing 
the amount of spinning or other manual work to be carried out 
by Congressmen; the formation of PCCs from a province's
delegates to Congress sessions; increased powers for the 
2
president. It should be noted that not all of Gandhi's 
proposals were accepted.
The next Congress session was not held until April 1936 
and the intervening eighteen months saw little activity by the 
central organs of Congress. Only two AICC meetings were held
■^ The text of Gandhi's statement is printed in Tendulkar, 
op.cit.t vol. iii, pp. 361-9*
2
M.V.Ramana Rao, Development of the Congress Constitution (1938)
pp. 32-61.
and Working Committee business was routine. The original CPB 
was dissolved and a new one elected directly by the AICC.^
Its personnel, however, remained largely unchanged. Some Con­
gress committees raised the question of whether the party 
should form ministries under the new constitution (office
acceptance) but it was decided that a substantive decision
2
would be premature. Gandhi and his followers were busy with
the establishment of the All-India Village Industries Association
and the new ashram near Wardha, and with relief work in the
3train of the Bihar earthquake. Other sections of the party, 
however, were active in building up their activities, especi­
ally at the local level.
Rajendra Prasad was president of Congress from October 
193^ to April 1936. A prominent follower of Gandhi and a 
satyagraha leader, he had initiated no new departures in Con­
gress policy or strategy. He was succeeded by Nehru who at 
this time was at the height of his radical phase. The decision 
to make him president had primarily been Gandhi*s. Equally, 
Gandhi had ensured that the composition of the Working Com­
mittee remained largely unchanged and only three members of
Zf
the CSP were appointed. Nehru’s presidential address at the 
Lucknow Congress session in April 1936 was, however, largely
'''INC II, pp. 2-3: AICC proceedings, 24-3/V53.
^INC II, p.6: AICC proceedings, 17-18/10/33; ibid., p.32:
CWC proceedings, 29/7/35-1/8/33*
3
Sitaramayya, op.cit., vol. i, pp. 671-2, and Tendulkar, op.cit., 
vol. iv (1952), p.l.
b
Michael Brecher, Nehru: a Political Biography (1939), pp.
213-4-• See also Jawalarlal Nehru, Eighteen Months in India 
(1938), pp. 6-8.
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a lecture on socialism.'1' Other similar statements of his be­
liefs so alarmed certain members of the Working Committee that
in June seven of them submitted their resignations and only
2
withdrew them after Gandhi had intervened.
Shortly after the Lucknow Congress the CPB was replaced
by the Congress Parliamentary Committee (CPC), which from June
onwards undertook the necessary organizational work for the
elections.^ An AICC meeting was held at Bombay in August at
which the election manifesto was adopted. Although there had
been continuing pressure from some PCCs for a definite decision
on office acceptance, the manifesto stated that no decision
4would be made until after the elections.
Before the Faizpur Congress session at the end of December
1936 Nehru was re-elected president, the first man to be
honoured with consecutive terms of office. Originally Vallabh-
bhai Patel, who was Nehru?s opposite both in policy and personality,
had been proposed, but he was persuaded by Gandhi to withdraw 
5
his candidature. As before, the Working Committee was domi­
nated by the established leadership.
Under the 1934 constitution the ruling body of Congress 
was the AICC, but in practice the Working Committee was
^For text, see Jawaharlal Nehru, India and the World (1936), 
pp. 64-107.
2
Jawaharlal Nehru, A Bunch of Old Letters (1st British ed.
I960), pp. 188-98.
■Z
Indian National Congress, Indian National Congress, 1936-37 
(INC III) (n.d.), p.24: CWC proceedings, 27-9/4/30* For the 
CPCfs work, see chapter 3*
L
INC III, pp. 2-8: AICC proceedings, 22-3/8/36. The proceed­
ings include the text of the manifesto.
5
Brecher, op.cit.. p.227*
dominant. The latter was given plenary powers between meet­
ings of the AICC, which only sat when required by the Working 
Committee on the requisition of at least fifteen members.
The Working Committee was nominated by the president, who was 
himself elected annually by the delegates to the Congress 
session. The annual session had no executive authority and 
generally rubber-stamped resolutions passed on to it by the 
AICC sitting as Subjects Committee. The delegates were elected 
by all Congress members who were additionally qualified by 
having been members for six months and having been regular 
wearers of khaddar and performers of approved manual work.
The delegates from a particular province formed its PCC and 
elected one-twelfth of their number to the AICC. A PCC had 
its own constitution and disciplinary powers, although it was 
subject to the overriding control of the Working Cbmraittee 
which had the power to suspend it.^
Two points must be made before analysing the political 
components of Congress. First, the groups to be discussed are 
not to be defined solely in terms of the institutional ex­
pressions of particular tendencies or of the avowed followers 
of individual leaders. Secondly, the groups were not differ­
entiated according to any one criterion. There was, there­
fore, considerable overlapping of membership and on many 
issues cross-group alliances existed. Nevertheless, the 
four categories that will be discussed - neo-swarajist, Hindu 
nationalist, Gandhian, and radical - appear to have been the
For the text of the 193^ constitution, see Ramana Rao, 
loc.cit.
most enduring and significant in the 1930s, although their re­
lative strength varied. All were seen at the time as forming 
distinct groups.
The neo-swarajists who formed the original CPB in 193^ 
were drawn both from the old Swaraj Party and from the ranks 
of the 'no-changers’, but all had a common interest in the 
complex policy matters that were discussed in the Central 
Legislative Assembly, and were able to appeal to a relatively 
small and sophisticated electorate. After the November 193^ + 
elections, as the political situation became generally more 
stable and the provincial elections drew closer, the original 
group of neo-swarajists attracted increasing support from 
other levels within Congress. The majority of PCCs took a 
direct interest in legislative elections within their areas.
At another level, many district leaders began to evaluate 
the possibilities opened up by the 1933 Act. Some of them in 
fact had earlier taken part in politics as individuals or 
through loosely knit local parties and had only joined Con­
gress recently as a means to further their legislative am­
bitions. The period after 193^ saw many local Congress com­
mittees contesting district or municipal elections and it is 
reasonable to assume that those who entered the morass of 
local politics would have been as willing to contest pro­
vincial elections.^ It was known very early that Congress 
would take part in the coming elections and there was there­
fore no need for any institutional expression of this grass-roots
^In U.P., for example, Congress more than doubled its repre­
sentation on local boards in 1933• HPO V5/36, statement of 
results.
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support for the neo-swarajists. The original CPB fulfilled 
the task of re-introducing electoral politics as a Congress 
activity; thereafter neo-swarajism was simply a prevalent 
feeling among the majority of local and provincial Congress 
leaders. What was significant, however, was the pressure 
that began to build up as early as mid-1935 for a firm decision 
in favour of accepting office.
The neo-swarajist belief that wrecking the 1933 4ct 
from within was the best strategy for independence in the mid- 
1930s did not have any necessary corollaries. Most neo- 
swarajists were conservative on matters affecting redistribu­
tion of wealth, but there was no uniformity of view on com­
munal questions. Notwithstanding Gandhi's personal dis­
sociation from electoral activity, it is no contradiction to 
say that many neo-swarajists regarded themselves as Gandhians. 
They shared his cautious, in some ways conservative view of 
social structure, and had often taken an active part in civil 
disobedience, although Patel managed the election campaign 
in 193^-7, he may be regarded more as the patron than the 
leader of the neo-swarajists. Although he was aware of the ad­
vantage to the cause of independence of electoral success, 
he was equally concerned to minimize the strains on party 
unity that such success might lead to.
The Hindu nationalists were united only by the need to 
defend what they regarded as the legitimate interests of the 
national majority. Usually, however, Hinduism was a surro­
gate for the interests of much narrower groups. Hindu national” 
ism was confined to the upper castes, and in many cases strong
regional feelings were involved. The general questions of 
whether communalism was simply a means of protecting vested 
interests will be considered below; here it need only be 
noted that Hindu nationalists could come from landowning, 
professional, or commercial backgrounds.
In this period, the communal question arose primarily 
within the provinces, where the hard issues of job-reservation 
education, and local grievances were handled. Provincial 
politics were also important in that the federal assembly was 
to be elected by the provincial assemblies. Whether or not a 
Hindu nationalist belonged to Congress was determined, there­
fore, by the local political situation rather than by any in­
trinsic attitude towards the party as an all-India phenomenon. 
The significant variables were the proportionate strength of 
the Hindu community in a particular province and the outlook 
of the local Congress unit. Only a few fanatics regarded Con­
gress as incorrigibly tainted by its association with Gandhi 
and its conciliatory attitude towards minorities. The CNP 
occupied an indistinct position. At the national level it 
functioned only to legitimate the actions of Malaviya in his 
negotiations with other leaders both in and out of Congress.
In the provinces it existed only where a ginger group was 
necessary for some reason or where one faction in a PCC re­
quired an institutional focus. For many purposes the Hindu 
nationalists within Congress were closely linked to the neo- 
swarajists. Malaviya played a leading role in the establish­
ment of the CPB. Their motivation was, however, slightly 
different in that the object was to prevent the Muslims as
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well as the British gaining control of the machinery of govern­
ment. In certain cases, notably Bengal, this led to a situ­
ation in which the Hindu nationalists were keen to contest 
the elections but opposed to Congress’ acceptance of office.
Virtually every Congressman accepted Gandhi’s leadership 
over the timing of agitational movements but, despite the 
'spinning franchise1 for active membership, only some had 
adopted the Gandhian way of life and the constructive pro­
gramme, Although it had economic implications, Gandhianism 
linked men of diverse views on economic policy and political 
strategy, for example Lai Bahadur Shastri, Achyut Patwardhan, 
and Jamnalal Bajaj. In so far as they devoted their energies 
to the constructive programme, most Gandhians played small 
roles in the Congress developments of these years, but Gand­
hianism had a wide influence. Members of all groups were af­
fected by it and Gandhians had a wholly disproportionate in­
fluence within the national leadership.
Compared to the rather amorphous groups described above, 
the radicals formed a more defined, although fragmented, 
group. Foremost among them were the socialists, especially 
the members of the CSP. Although there had been earlier 
socialist activity in Bengal, the Punjab,and Bombay, the CSP 
represented a new departure. Most of its leaders were young 
and had studied abroad or been active as youth leaders in 
the 1920s. They had taken part in civil disobedience and had 
been imprisoned together at Nasik, where they had conceived 
the idea of the CSP.^ " There were also a few older men such
*^ Singh, A Histoiy of the Praja Socialist Party, p.l6.
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as Narendra Deva and Sampurnanand - intellectuals who had 
undergone a later conversion to formal socialism.'1’ The ori­
ginal group was centred in Bombay, but branches were soon 
set up in other provinces. After 1936 the Communist Party of 
India, which had been active during the 1920s in trade 
union work, adopted the ’united front' policy of the seventh
Congress of the Comintern and began to infiltrate CSP branches,
2
especially in south India.
There were other groups apart from the CSP which pro­
fessed radical ideas. Although the Kisan Sabha movement con­
tained elements of peasant conservatism, its methods and de­
mands in the 1930s were radical. The All-India Kisan Sabha, 
founded in 1936, had no formal links with Congress, but 
individual leaders, such as N.G.Ranga in northern Madras and
3
Sahajanand Saraswati in Bihar, were members of Congress.
Local leaders were often simultaneously members of the CSP.
M.N.Roy was released from prison in 1936. He had already 
become a heterodox communist and in this period he devoted 
his energies to reforming Congress; its policy was to be 
radicalized and workers and peasants were to be given func­
tional representation, but specifically socialist demands were not
to be pressed and fractional organizations, especially the CSP, were 
A
to be dissolved. This self-denying version of a united
Ibid., p.22; Sampurnanand, Memories and Reflections (1962), 
pp. 39 and 72-3.
2
M.R.Masani, The Communist Party of India (195*0, pp. 56-75.
3
For the All-India Kisan Sabha, see N.G.Ranga, 'The All-India 
Kisan Movement' in IAR 1936 II, pp. 280-293» and Peasants 
and Congress (n.d.).
A
See M.N.Roy, On the Congress Constitution (1939). For Roy's 
brief honeymoon with the CSP and his break with it, see 
John Patrick Haithcox, Communism and Nationalism in India 
(1971), pp. 225-33 and 237-9.
118.
front policy was hardly practicable but such was Roy’s in­
fluence, particularly among certain trade unionists, that he 
retained a following. Although in 193*+ many terrorists were 
still under detention and Subhas Chandra Bose was abroad, 
considerable numbers of detenus were released in the period up 
to 1937# Some of them adopted radical stances, which were 
probably based as much on Bengali regional nationalism and 
Hindu revivalism as on western theories of socialism.^
There were, finally, a number of individuals who were 
not, whether out of loyalty to an ideal of Congress or for 
opportunistic reasons, identified with any particular group. 
Nehru was the most prominent; the inspiration he had received 
from his visit to Russia in 1927 had been reinforced by sub­
sequent study and contacts. When the CSP was founded, how­
ever, he would not himself join. The motives for his refusal
2
can be variously interpreted. Clearly important was his 
desire not to isolate himself from the dominant leadership 
group within Congress or become identified with impracticable 
short-term policies. Other individual radicals, such as Rafi 
Ahmad Kidwai and Sardul Singh Caveeshar, may be identified
3
by their membership of the Anti-Ministry Committee.
With so many groups among the radicals it is hardly 
surprising that there were wide variations in policy. On the 
strategy for independence, most were agreed on the necessity 
to wreck the working of the provincial assemblies from the
^For Bose’s views, see Bose, The Indian Struggle, 1920-*f2 
(196*0, pp. 312-4, and Chattar Singh Samra, ’Subhas Chandra 
Bose: an Indian National Hero', in Richard L, Park and Irene
Tinker (eds.), Leadership and Political Institutions in India 
(1939), pp. 77-SI
^Brecher, op.cit., pp.218-9.
•^ Sardul Singh Caveeshar, Acceptance of Offices under the New Con- 
stitution (n.d.). This names Caveeshar as president of the com­
mittee, and Kidwai and M.R.Masani as secretaries.
119.
very beginning, although it was accepted that the election 
campaign would provide a useful means of appealing to the 
masses. Functional representation of peasants and workers, 
on the pattern of trade union representation within the 
British Labour Party, was another issue on which there was 
wide agreement. On matters of economic and social policy 
there were several opposed models. Nehru's political think­
ing was a blend of Marxism and Fabianism; both schools of 
thought were more starkly represented within the CSP. There 
were wide differences over the role of industrialization and 
the importance of rural development. Specifically Indian 
theories of socialism were suggested by figures such as 
Sampurnanand. Nevertheless, most radicals subscribed to a 
number of proposals, for example expropriatory land reform, 
debt moratoria, control of industrial workihg conditions, 
and state-sponsored industrial development. It was con­
sidered that independence could most easily be achieved by 
making it clear to the masses that it would mean freedom 
from social and economic oppression.^- Ultimately the radi­
cals were differentiated by their attitude towards the 
unity of Congress but this was not always apparent at the 
time. It was Nehru who boldly proclaimed that Congress
2would be stronger for the loss of its reactionary elements, 
but his actions belied his words; it was only in 19^8 that 
CSP members had to make their final choice. To the Marxists
■*7. representative selection of radical views may be obtained
from:
a) Subhas Chandra Bose, The Indian Struggle 1920-19^2 (I96*f).
b) Narendra Deva, Socialism and the National Revolution (19^6).
c) Jaya Prakash Narayan. Towards Struggle (l9*+6).
d) J. Nehru, Eighteen Months in India 1936-1937 (1938).
e) N.G.Ranga, The Modern Indian Peasant (1936).
f) Sampurnanand, Indian Socialism (l96l).
^Leader, 5/6/36.
Congress was a joint front of proletarian and bourgeois ele­
ments, but except to the committed members of the Communist 
Party such an analysis had little practical relevance in the 
1930s
The strength of these groups within Congress lay at 
different levels. The neo-swarajists were especially prominent 
at the district and provincial level where power was not so 
intimately bound up with the struggle for national independence 
Their strength lay in the fact that they often had close links 
to other power structures within their area. The Hindu national 
ists likewise found their place in provincial bodies. In 
Bengal and Maharashtra they were able to exploit regional as 
well as communal feeling. The radicals, on the other hand, 
were stronger within the all-India organs of the party.
Often more articulate and more mobile then other groups, 
they were able to achieve a disproportionate membership 
of the AICC.1
The Gandhians1 main strength lay in their virtual 
control of the central leadership of the parfy Prasad,
Patel, C. Rajagopalachari, and Abul Kalam Azad formed a 
group known variously as the ’old guard’, the 'high command’, 
or the ’inner circle'. Behind them lay the authority of 
Gandhi. Although Nehru was also a member of this group 
he was not able to dominate it. When the seven members of 
his Working Committee threatened to resign they were acting 
from a position of strength. Subhas Bose was later tp 
discover that despite his nominal powers as Congress
^ee, fcr example. Times of India, 28/12/36.
121.
president he was helpless in the face of determined opposi­
tion from the inner circle. It is not suggested, however, 
that Congress leadership at this period was either monolithic 
or all-powerful. Apart from the obvious point that the all- 
India leadership lacked the organizational resources fully 
to control provincial and district activities, two major 
qualifications must be made. First, each member of the inner 
circle, in addition to his personal relationship with 
Gandhi and absolute commitment to the ideal of a Congress 
that united as many different groups in India as possible, 
had links with sectional elements within the party. These 
links were regional, communal, and ideological. At times the 
strains within the inner circle were as significant as its 
unity. Secondly, the inner circle was only able to preserve 
its authority by making some concessions both to the pro­
vincial leaders and to the new forces within Congress. The 
most striking example was the adoption of a veneer of 
socialism, but there were other instances. When adequate 
concessions were impossible, breakaways took place. Within 
the period before the elections the CNP and the Democratic 
Swaraj Party led separate existences. A couple of years after 
the elections Bose and a large section of the Bengal Congress 
broke away. Gandhi's authority, too, was not absolute. 
Although his power at moments of crisis was unquestioned, 
at other times his role was often confined to that of 
arbitrator. It was only by withdrawing from active parti­
cipation in Congress during this period that Gandhi was
able to preserve his authority for later use. Attempts to 
swing all Congressmen behind the constructive programme 
would only have revived the old controversy between ‘changers’ 
and 'no-changers' in a much more damaging form.
At the local level, internal Congress politics were 
often much more complicated than this analysis of sectional 
groups might suggest* Factionalism was already widespread 
within many District Congress Committees (DCCs) and, al­
though the rival groups often professed allegiance to parti­
cular ideologies, in practice a group's position was often 
defined by the principle of instant opposition. Two fre­
quently interrelated factors accounted for the presence of 
local factionalism within the nationalist movement. DCCs 
were often merely another arena in which traditional power 
struggles took place. These could either be between powerful 
families or between caste or communal groupings. Secondly, 
factionalism often originated from disputes over local board 
elections. Congress had contested these in the 1920s and 
again after 193 •^ The incidence of factionalism was thus 
directly correlated with the success of Congress in establish­
ing itself as an integral part of the local political system. 
Although the data do not exist, one might expect there to
have been a quantum increase in factionalism after the
2acceptance of office in 1937.
^He always remained in close touch with the Working Committee. 
Concerning the venue of a CWC meeting Nehru wrote 'ordinarily 
we would have chosen Wardha to suit the convenience of 
Gandhiji': Nehru Papers, File Indian National Congress
AICC 2(a), circular from Nehru to CWC members, 2^/11/37.
2
For references to Congress factionalism, see Leader, 9/6/36, 
17/6/36, and 2/7/36, Statesman, 31/3/36, AICC Ell/l936, state­
ment by U.C.S.Bhatt, S/l/37» and AICC P23/1937, reports from 
Kamatak and Tamilnad PCC for 1936.
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The wider issue of the social origins of Congress
leaders will be taken up in chapter 4, although no informal
tion has been collected doncerning the primary members of
the party. At this point only the size of the membership
will be considered. Membership.figures for each Congress
province are available for 1935, 1936, and 1938, and are
given in table 2,1. The overall figure for 1937 was 3,102,113.
There was thus an almost 300°/o increase in membership over
the period in which the elections occurred. This increase
was attributed by the General Secretary of Congress to the
1influx of people Who wished to share in Congress’s power.
oOf the twelve provinces that showed a more than 300 /o in­
crease all but the Punjab, Ajmer, and Sind were in Congress- 
ruled areas. There were, however, other such areas where 
Congress membership did not increase so dramatically. In 
theory Congress membership was open to anyone, but in 
practice, the membership figures were distorted by a number 
of factors. In some areas adequate Congress organization 
did not exist for the recruitment of members. Conversely, 
special recruiting drives were sometimes launched. The huge 
^ membership in U.P. after 1937 was presumably due to the 
mass contacts campaign that was carried out there. Member­
ship totals could also be a function of factional struggles. 
Recruits might be made solely to boost a person’s or group’s 
strength* It was reported that such recruits might have 
their membership fee paid for them. It could happen that
"^Indian National Congress, Report of the General Secretary, 
March 1938-February 1939 (1939?), pp. 36-7.
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Table 2.1
Congress Membership 1935-8: (i) number enrolled;
(ii) membership as percentage of population (1931).
1935 1936 1938
Congress province
(i) (ii) (i) (ii) (i) (ii)
Ajmer 282 0.02 1,769 0.10 13,151 0.75
Andhra 45,103 0.18 52,537 0.21 335,205 1.3*+
Assam 2,620 0.04 8,325 0.14 37,321 0.62
Bengal 60,775 0.11 85,128 0.16 485,158 0.89
Berar 7,058 0.21 11,692 0.54 78,596 2.28
Bihar 78,805 0.24 104,7*+3 0.33 565,269 1.74
Bombay (City) 17,262 1.52 29,015 2.56 61,936 5.46
Delhi 8,657 0.62 11,845 0.86 19,425 1.40
Gujarat 24,065 0.21 36,659 0.52 92,418 0,81
Karaatak 21,049 0.15 51,048 0.19 172,105 1.06
Kerala 4,062 0.04 6,990 0.07 55,051 0.54
MahakQshal 26,044 0.18 36,427 0.25 126,554 O.87
Maharashtra 28,258 0.16 4 5,7*+6 0.26 148,544 0.86
Nagpur 8,138 0.27 6,961 0.25 44,854 1.48
N.W.F.P. no figures available
Punjab 12,618 0.04 26,511 0.09 188,791 0.66
Sind 4,024 0.10 3,512 0.09 22,295 0.57
Tamil Nad 55,004 0,24 65,105 0.28 364,593 1.58
U.P. 62,705 0.15 65,733 0.15 1,472,456 2.97
Utkal 6,829 0.04 5,760 0.05 198,325 1.19
Total **75,336 0.15 635,504 0.20 4,479,844 1.40
Source: INC II, p.62,and HPO 4/12/36 (1935); Indian
National Congress, Report of the General Secretary, 
April-December 1936 (1937)» p. 22 (1936); Indian 
National Congress, Report of the General Secretary, 
March 1938 - February 1939 (1939). p.72 (1938).
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a dominant group might make it impossible, through sd.th- 
holding of receipt books, for members to be enrolled in a 
a particular area.'*'
The interaction of the various groups within Congress
was reflected not only in the balance of leadership but also
in the policy decisions and structural changes that took
place in response to the changing external environment.
By examining these areas of debate (and also the areas in
which there was little disagreement) and by assessing the
positions of the various groups, Congress can be defined
within the political system of the 1930s. Official policy
changed very little after 193**} but at the same time a
number of alternative ideological positions were articulated.
The Congress view on independence was that all links
with the British Empire, except any that might voluntarily
be established, should be renounced, and the constitution of
2
a free India should be framed by a constituent assembly. 
Although there were differences over the method of election 
of this assembly and potential differences over the treatment 
of British-owned assets in India, these issues were not 
seriously debated in this period. In a first flush of en­
thusiasm, the CSP had called for a boycott of the Central 
Assembly elections in 193** but no one in Congress thereafter
3
challenged the desirability of contesting the elections.
1Ibid.. pp. 3?-8.
2
INC II, p.77: Lucknow session proceedings, 12-1*f/**/36.
^Subhas Chandra Bose, The Indian Struggle, 1920-19**2 (196*0, 
p. 267. A call at the Lucknow session for a boycott of the 
elections received only two votes: Indian Review May 1936,
p. 298.
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To Gandhi constitutional activity was an alternative to con­
structive work; to the radicals it was a means *to combat 
/The Act/, ... so as to end it1.
The only major debate concerning techniques for gaining
2
independence was over whether or not to accept office. On 
the one side it was said, first, that the best way to expose 
the 1935 Act was to attempt to implement Congress policies 
in the face of official opposition and thus provoke a break­
down; secondly, that it was necessary to exclude reactionary 
elements from office; thirdly, that some limited ameliorative 
legislation might be possible, despite the safeguards built 
into the Act. On the other side the major argument was that 
it would be inpossible to touch pitch and remain undefiled. 
Many radicals feared that Congress might be induced to abandon 
its demand for a constituent assembly and negotiate a settle­
ment in which commercial and industrial interests might be 
given special protection. Before the elections, when it was 
not certain that Congress would gain an absolute majority 
in all the Hindu-dominated provinces, there was the additional 
fear that coalitions might be established with other parties. 
In Hindu-minority provinces, where there was no hope of pure 
Congress ministries, it was presumably thought that if Con­
gress accepted office elsewhere, Muslim ministries in these
1IMCni, p«9**: Faizpur session proceedings, 27-8/12/36.
2
It was of course argued by members of the CSP and others 
that the adoption by Congress of radical social and 
economic policies would, by raising the level of mass poli­
tical awareness, bring independence more quickly: Sampuma-
nand, op.cit., p.72.
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provinces would be legitimized; if Congress did not accept 
office there was a chance that such ministries might be 
brought down in the general confusion.
The question of office acceptance was repeatedly raised 
at AICC meetings and Congress sessions in 193&, usually by 
those who were opposed to it, but the resolutions passed al­
ways postponed the decision. Opposition to it united vir­
tually all the radicals and also included the Congress 
nationalists in Bengal, many Sikhs, and M.M.Malaviya himself, 
Those in favour were broadly the neo-swarajist group together 
with some of the Hindu nationalists. Although there were a 
substantial number of opponents of office acceptance within 
the AICC, only a few PCCs were opposed to it.
The Working Committee was able to take a detached view; 
of Nehru’s post-Faizpur committee only Pant was to become a 
minister and only Nehru, Sarat Bose, and the two CSP members 
had ideological objections to the principle of acceptance.^
The majority was prepared to allow the neo-swarajists to 
follow the logic of their position and accept office, but 
there were good reasons for postponing the decision. Although 
it is unlikely that a pre-election decision to accept office 
would lave led to any serious defections, there would have 
been a major row which might have led to Nehru actually re­
signing the presidency, as he several times threatened to do. 
It would also seriously have weakened Congress’s bargaining 
power in the argument over the governors’ use of their
Besides Pant, Narendra Dev and Sarat Bose were the only 
members to become MLAs.
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reserve powers* By postponing the final decision both Nehru 
and Gandhi, in their different ways, were able to emphasize 
to Congress as a whole and to the potential ministers that 
constitutional action was to remain a subordinate and 
strictly controlled part of the strategy for independence.
Another aspect of Congress' strategy is illustrated 
by the debate over one of Gandhi's proposed constitutional 
amendments in 193^ • He had suggested that the words 'legi­
timate and peaceful means' in the first article of the con­
stitution be replaced by the 'unequivocal' words 'truthful 
and non-violent means'.^ The amendment was, however, re­
jected by the Subjects Committee of the Bombay session. The 
radicals, including Nehru, were not prepared to accept the 
exclusion in all circumstances of violent action. By them­
selves they did not form a majority in the committee, so
that others too must have felt Gandhi's formula to be un- 
2
duly limiting.
The Karachi Resolution of March 1931 Had been regarded 
as a major advance - Congress for the first time accepted 
the need for direct legislative action to change the funda­
mental order of society. It had not, however, accepted any 
specifically socialist stance, as the idea was understood 
in the 1930s, nor had it committed itself to specific pro­
posals. These came only with the advent of the CSP and the 
Kisan Sabha.
Although to the Marxian socialists the radicals' pro­
posals on economic and social reform were only a minimum
"^Tendulkar, op.cit., vol.iii, p.36?. 
^Leader, 27/10/3*f.
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programme, the Gandhians and neo-swarajists were alarmed.
Until 1936 socialists could largely be ignored - although 
they were constantly gaining adherents - but with Nehru as 
president this was no longer possible. He immediately attempted 
to introduce socialist ideas into official Congress ; policy.
His first move was to produce a set of resolutions for the 
Lucknow Congress session. The Working Committee itself did 
not reject them but in the Subjects Committee they were so 
watered down as to be virtually meaningless.-*- The crucial 
proposals for agrarian reform were not accepted; instead,
2
the whole issue was referred to the PCCs for their suggestions.
The question of collective affiliationvas similarly referred 
3
to a committee. In his presidential address Nehru refrained 
from details, but his statement that socialism 'means the 
ending of private property, except in a restricted sense' was
Zf
hardly calculated to reassure many of his listeners. He fol­
lowed it up with a series of similar statements which were 
only checked by the action of members of the Working Committee 
already mentioned. By the time of the Faizpur session most 
PCCs had not reported; although an 'agrarian programme'
resolution was passed, it amounted to little more than terms
5 V-/
of reference for detailed inquiries. In U.P. and Maharashtra,
^Brecher, op.cit. , p.219 , HPO *f/l8/36, 'Appreciation of ^  - 
the ^9th Congress Session... ', and AICC Misc. 21/1936, 
minutes of Subjects Committee discussion, ll/k/36•
2INC II, pp. 79-80.
^Ibid., pp. 78-9.
Nehru, India and the World, p.83.
5INC III, pp. 96-7.
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however, inquiry committees had been set up which had made
specific proposals going some way beyond previous policy.'*'
^/The Hass Contacts Committee had also to be reappointed, al-
2
though some vague recommendations were made to PCCs. Other 
gains for the radicals were the resolutions on foreign policy 
at both the Lucknow and Faizpur sessions, which placed Congress 
on the side of the angels over Spain, Ethiopia, and the rise 
of fascism in Europe.^ These were small achievements: Con­
gress had not adopted any policies which would have led to 
\J any serious dislocation of the existing system. Yet at the 
same time the efforts of the radicals were not entirely with­
out consequence. The election manifesto of 1936 hardly went 
beyond the Karachi Resolution in its promises of social and 
economic advancement, but it meant that no Congress ministry 
would be able to ignore the need for reform. It is not, 
of course, being suggested that the Congress leadership 
was oblivious to agrarian conditions or that it would not 
have included a commitment to economic and social reform in 
the manifesto. The efforts of the radicals did, however, 
lead to a greater stress than there might have been on the 
need for structural changes in the rural areas.
■*For U.P., see U,P.Provincial Congress Committee, Congress 
Agrarian Enquiry Committee Report (1936). For Maharashtra, 
wsee AICC E23 (i;/1937j 1The Election Campaign in Maharashtra1. 
Reports were also produced in some other provinces, but no 
details of their recommendations are available: H.D.Mala- /
viya, Land Reforms in India (2nd ed. 1935)» P«63.
2INC III, pp. 91-2.
3INC II, pp. 76-7; INC III, pp. 85-6 and 88.
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The methods whereby the leadership ensured that the 
doctrine of social harmony was maintained were simple. Al­
though Nehru professed socialism he could in fact be relied 
on to put the preservation of Congress unity before sectional 
advantage. In a message to the CSP conference at Faizpur 
he wrote:
•that cause (socialism) today is best served by 
building up a powerful anti-imperialist joint 
front in the country. It is obvious that the 
National Congress is the-’only organization which 
can function as such a joint front1.! v
Although at times he talked of resigning the presidency,
Gandhi was always able to talk him out of it and thus to
preserve his unique position of link between generations
2
and between groups. Non-co-operation was a method used to 
water down the effects of particular resolutions. The personnel 
of the Mass Contacts Committee was dominated by Gandhians. v 
At the provincial level, many PCCs simply did not bother to 
submit reports on local agrarian conditions.
The discussions over Congress's communal policy had im­
plications for all sections of the movement. Only a certain 
group of Congressmen campaigned continuously for a commitment 
to the abolition of all communal safeguards, but the situation 
created by the Communal Award, especially in Bengal and the 
Punjab, was bound to concern all Hindus. To many radicals 
the danger was not so much of Muslim dominance as of vested 
interests in both communities using the communal question
, Eighteen Months in India, p.95* 
er, op.cit., p.225.
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as a cover. Nehru's hostility to Jinnah was the direct counter­
part to his efforts to reform Congress. In addition to the 
feelings of Hindu Congressmen the Congress leadership had also 
to consider the effects its policy might have on its Muslim 
support. Although the majority of Muslims had never supported 
Congress, and by.193^ virtually all the former Khilafatists 
had drifted away, there had always been a small Muslim element 
within it led by Azad and M. A. Ansari. This was reinforced 
in the.1930s by a few entirely secular radicals such as K. M. 
Ashraf, Sajjad Zaheer, and Yusuf Meherally. Of.more import­
ance, however, were those Muslims on the fringe, such as the
h
Momins and the Muslim Unity Board group.
Repeated attempts were made to alter the 'neither 
accept nor reject* formula of June 193^. Rebuffed in its 
initial attempt to have Congress MLAs allowed freedom of con­
science over the Communal Award, the CNP again approached the
Working Committee after its clean sweep in Bengal: but to no
2
avail. At its conference in April 1935 the Bengal PCC uni-
3
laterally adopted an anti-Award programme. The issue was 
raised again at the Lucknow session, at the AICC meeting at 
which the election manifesto was adopted, and at the Faizpur 
session. Despite this continuous agitation, no substantive 
changes were made in Congress policy, although the manifesto 
expressed the Congress position on the theoretical undesir­
ability of special electoral arrangements rather more robustly
ror the.Muslim Unity Board, see below, pp. 156-7. 
^INC II , pp. 33-A: CWC proceedings, 5-7/12/3^.
3IAR 1935 x, p.356.
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than: before. The Bengal PCC again produced its own programme, 
a modified version of which it was allowed to keep on record.^ 
Although this was significant in internal Bengal affairs and 
in the Bengal PCCs relations with the Working Committee, it 
had no effect on the general Congress position.
In refusing to give in to pressure the leadership was 
allowing room for possible co-operation with the Muslin League 
and with the Muslim community in general. It was perhaps sig-
Vv'"’
nificant that (with the partial exception of Azad) none of 
the inner circle of leaders came from a Muslim majority area. 
Conversely, the most vociferous opposition to Congress policy 
came from Bengal, which had for some time been under represented 
at the centre, and whose PCC was almost permanently in dispute 
with the Working Committee over organizational matters.
The most significant of the structural changes within 
Congress in this period was the transition from CPB to CPC. ^
The CPB was originally the personal fief of the neo-swarajist 
leaders. Malaviya and Ansari were given full powers to nominate 
the members of the board up to a maximum of 25 and it was
2
subject only to very loose control by the Working Committee.
The CPB was reconstituted at the first AICC meeting after
the 1934 elections, and its members were thereafter elected
3
directly by the AICC. After the eclipse of Malaviya and 
the death of Ansari, Bhulabhai Desai, Govind Ballabh Pant,
■^ See below, pp. 255-6.
^INC I, p.176: AICC proceedings, 18-19/5/34. 
^INC II, pp. 2-3: AICC proceedings, 24- -5/4/35*
13**.
S. Satyamurti, and Asaf Ali became the leading members. The 
only one of the inner circle of leaders to be a member was 
Rajagopalachari, who did not take an active part. Even so, 
the board assumed it would be allowed to control the pro­
vincial elections, and at a meeting in Simla in September 
1933 a committee was appointed, with Asaf Ali as convenor, 
to consider the methods to be used in conducting them.'*' An 
item on the agenda of the next meeting of the board in Feb­
ruary 1936 was 'to lay down Congress policy for Provincial 
Legislatures under the new constitution'. An explanatory
memorandum by Pant made it plain that such matters as alli-
2
ances with non-Congress groups would be discussed. At the
meeting it was agreed that PCCs should set up provincial
parliamentary boards but that the CPB would have the power to
nominate members to them and.to make the final selection of 
•5
candidates. In other words, the CPB hoped to be able to 
control the whole of Congress work in the constitutional 
field and, by implication, the part such work would play in 
overall strategy.
The CPB did, however, feel that it should have the Work­
ing Committee's approval for its empire-building and Pant
^AICC G9/193^j minutes of CPB meeting, l**/9/35* Shortly after 
the meeting Asaf Ali sent out a circular letter asking for 
suggestions on the question of setting up provincial parlia­
mentary boards: ibid., letter dated 8/10/35.
2
Ibid., agenda for CPB meeting, .8-9/2/36 and explanatory 
memorandum. See also ibid..letter from K.F.Nariman (member 
of CPB) to Pant, 27/1/36, which suggests that even the 
question of office acceptance was regarded as a matter for 
the CPB.
x
Ibid., minutes of CPB meeting, 8-9/2/36.
accordingly asked the Congress secretary to place before it
the rules that the CPB had made."*" It is not possible to tell
whether the members of the Working Committee had previously
considered the type of organizational structure that would be
needed for the elections before the CPB tried to force its
hand. The immediate response to the request for approval was
an instruction from J.B.Kripalani, the Congress secretary,
2
that the views of PCCs be obtained on the whole question.
The Lucknow session followed shortly and it was there decided 
that the CPB be abolished and the question of election organiza-
3
tion referred to the Working Committee. At its first meeting 
after Lucknow the Working Committee established a parlia­
mentary committee, the CPC, to which were transferred the 
functions previously fulfilled by the CPB. Although the 
members of the CPB had not presumably wanted it abolished, 
there is no evidence of any formal protest from them. They 
may have realized that it was unrealistic to expect a politi­
cal movement to delegate one of its most important functions.
The CPC consisted first of seven named individuals:
Prasad, Patel, Rajagopalachari, Azad, Narendra Deva, Bhulabhai
^Ibid., Pant to AICC secretary, 22/2/36.
2
Ibid., Kripalani to Pant,26/2/36.
3INC II, pp. 77-8.
L
INC III, p.2*f: CWC proceedings, 27-9/V36; see also
Statesman, 23/V36.
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Desai and Pant, who was also the convener. Four of them 
had been members of the CPB, but Azad and Rajagopalachari had 
not taken much part in its work. Desai and Pant, however, had 
been its mainstays after its reconstitution in 1933* Desai, 
in addition to being leader of the Congress bloc in the 
Central Legislative Assembly, had presided over the meetings 
at Simla and New Delhi when the CPB had discussed its 
election plans. Pant was the more important link in that 
he had been appointed secretary of the CPB in September 1933^ 
and served the CPC in the same capacity. Of the newcomers 
Narendra Deva was presumably appointed in deference to Nehru. 
Patel and Prasad were members of the old guard. Although they 
had stayed aloof from the CPB, which was too closely asso­
ciated with the old Swaraj Party, they were pragmatic in 
their approach to constitutional activity* The rest of the 
CPC was made up of the PCC presidents ex officio; many of 
them had been individual members of the CPB.
There was thus a considerable degree of continuity in 
personnel between the CPB and the CPC, but it would be wrong 
to suggest that there was no real difference between them.
The CPC was integrated into Congress in a way that the CPB 
had never been. Whereas the CPB had been appointed by the 
AICC and had been subject only to a general surveillance, 
the CPC was wholly a creature of the Working Committee. Its 
appointment was not even ratified by the AICC. Its leading 
members were at the same time part of the inner circle of
^iICC G9/1934, minutes of CPB meeting, 14/9/33-
137*
Congress leaders. This integration was necessary first be­
cause provincial elections under the 1933 Act demanded large 
resources of manpower, money, and authority; in this con­
text it was significant that PCC presidents belonged to the 
CPC ex officio. Secondly, the effects of constitutional action 
under the new conditions created by the 1933 Act were potenti­
ally extremely important. Even if the Act could not be wrecked 
at the provincial level, it was essential to control the pro­
vincial assemblies when they elected the members of the federal 
assembly. A vigorous election campaign was also a means of 
creating political awareness among the masses. Thirdly, the 
exercise of power under the Act would feed back new re­
sources into the party structure, especially at the provincial 
and district levels. Patel, although without any personal 
ambitions in the legislature, realized the importance of 
controlling the organization of Congress1 electoral activity 
so that he could regulate tteimpact on Congress of contest­
ing elections. Nehru, too, had an interest in seeing that 
Congress MLAs and their supporters were kept under strict 
control,
A side effect of the integration of constitutional 
action into the mainstream of Congress was that the hosti­
lity between the radicals within the Working Committee, led 
by Nehru, and the old guard, led by Patel, was sharpened.
The CPC provided Patel with an independent power base with­
in the central leadership. The institutionalization of this 
rivalry is strikingly illustrated by the geographical divi­
sion that occurred. The AICC office and specialist divisions
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were housed in Nehru’s former family home in Allahabad: the
CPC office was established on Patel’s home ground in the Con­
gress House in Bombay.
Despite the internal differences within the Working 
Committee, the general lesson of the transfer of authority 
for election organization was that henceforth there would only 
be one structure of power within Congress. In the 1920s, 
the Swaraj Party had been virtually independent, and Con­
gress members were able to set up other groups within the 
legislatures and even accept office while still remaining 
within the general orbit of Congress. The creation of the 
CPB subject to the overall control of the Working Committee, 
was a small step in the process of integration, its direct 
election by the AICC in 1933 another. The process was com­
pleted by the establishment of the CPC. In setting up the CNP 
Malaviya and Aney were looking to the past for their organi­
zational model. They too were told that in the conditions of 
the 1930s autonomous power centreain Congress were no longer 
allowed.
A further problem of contesting the elections directly 
was that of the attitude to be taken to other organizations. 
Non-militant groups hd been ignored during the agitational 
campaigns, but in some provinces their representatives formed 
important blocs in the legislatures. In some cases the 
question was the terms on which such groups were to be in­
corporated in Congress, in others, whether or not coalitions 
should be formed or election pacts made. The problem of 
coalitions was not considered as such before the elections
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but it became a major i ssue once the prior question of office 
acceptance had been settled* The terms on which alliances were 
to be formed will be discussed later. What must be stressed 
is that by even considering the possibility of alliances and 
pacts Congress was abdicating its role as an organization 
above competitive party politics. This earlier concept con­
tinued to be held by two of its sections. The radicals re­
garded it as a joint front of all anti-imperialist forces; 
the Hindu nationalists held that its name was the common 
property of the nation and that it was open to any self­
professed nationalist to use it.'*'
Parallel to the development of Congress as an electinn- 
fighting party, but autonomous in its origins, was the 
greater cohesion that was produced by the 193^ constitution. 
Previously there had been two sets of elections: the PCC
was elected by the various DCCs and in turn elected members 
to the AICC, while the 6,000 or so delegates to the annual 
session were elected separately by those Congress members
2
who complied with the khaddar clauses of the constitution.
The major innovation in 193^ was to amalgamate the two systems. 
A province’s delegates to the annual session formed its PCC 
ex officio, and a proportinn of them became members of the 
AICC.^ As had happened before 193^j the effective leaders 
of each PCC were usually chosen as AICC delegates. In addition,
^For the view of L.B.Bhopatkar, president of the DSP, see 
Leader, 22/1/37.
2
Ramana Rao, op.cit., pp. 3^-^l and 
*^ For details of the 193^ constitution, see above pp.111-12.
PCC presidents were very frequently members of the Working Com­
mittee. Nehru slightly reduced their number to make room 
for his socialist nominees, but this was more than offset by 
the role they played in the CPC. The members of the inner 
circle were not primarily provincial leaders but all of them 
(with the exception of Azad and Jamnalal Bajaj) had considerable 
authority within their home areas and kept in close touch with 
them.**" Although neither annual session nor AICC had any real 
authority, they served as means whereby the leadership could 
gauge members1 feelings. They were also means whereby Con­
gress ideals could be publicly reaffirmed and leadership de­
cisions legitimated. There were thus major structural and 
personal linkages between the various levels of Congress. 
Conflicts between the PCCs and the national leadership could 
and did arise but there was no generalized movement for 
'states rights'.
The 193^ constitution had been drawn up in response to 
Gandhi's suggestions that Congress keep more in touch with 
the masses. Whether it had the desired effect is doubtful, 
but a new constitution which generally tightened up the Con­
gress structure was necessary and no objections were raised 
except on points of detail. Two such points of detail became 
issues between the radicals and the rest of Congress. The 
first was the method of election to be employed. The radi­
cals, especially the CSP, realizing that they were in a 
minority everywhere, pressed for the use of proportional
^See above p.121.
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representation both in the election of delegates and in sub­
sequent elections of AICC members.'*' Provisions for this were 
incorporated in the constitution, but soon came under attack.
In October 1935 a subcommittee of the Working Committee was 
appointed to consider possible improvements to the constitution, 
and at the Lucknow session proportional representation was
abandoned in the election of delegates, although it was re-
2
tained for other elections.
The second constitutional question raised by the radi­
cals was whether there should be functional representation 
of workers and peasants. Leaving aside the dreams of a 
system of soviets, the most usual proposal was for a post- 
1918 British Labour Party model whereby the membership of 
the annual session and Congress committees would comprise # 
representatives of individual Congressmen and of trade unions 
and kisan sabhas. One of Nehru's resolutions for the Lucknow 
Congress embodied a proposal for the collective affiliation 
to Congress of such organizations but, like his proposals
for agrarian reform, it was rejected in favour of a com-
■ ■ 3 ..................................................................
mittee. The Mass Contacts Committee, however, was domi­
nated by Gandhians and failed to make any major recommenda­
tions before the Faizpur Congress. Nehru devoted part of 
his presidential address to the question, but the only result
Sampurnanand, op.cit., p.77.
2
See above, p. 55,
3INC II, pp. 78-9.
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was the reappointment of the committee.'1* Eventually, pressure 
produced the mass contacts campaign, but this aimed to re­
cruit peasants and workers as individual members. The only 
structural changes were in U.P., where a seat on the PCC was
allotted to the trade unions and attempts were made tc acti-
2
vate the primary Congress committees.
The final aspect of Congress organization to be con­
sidered is the growth of specialized Congress agencies in this 
period. Some of them were formally independent or enjoyed 
autonomous status within Congress. The All-India Village In­
dustries Association, established in 1934, was a means to 
facilitate the constructive programme. The Civil Liberties 
Union, which was independent., was an attempt by Nehru to
rally all educated elements in the country behind the emotive
3
issue of the release of political prisoners. It virtually
collapsed when the liberal establishment, headed by Tej
l\
Bahadur Sapru, refused to join. Within the AICC bureaucracy 
two new departments were set up after the Lucknow Congress.
The Foreign Affairs Department, under Bam Manohar Lohia, 
kept in touch with international developments and supplied 
information about Congress to sympathizers abroad; the Poli­
tical and Economic Department, under K.M.Ashraf, carried out
1INCIEI, pp. 91-2.
p
Hindustan Times, 3/9/36, in HPO 4/44/36. See also Leader,
10 & 11/6/36.
5IAR 1936 II, p.259, circular letter from Nehru, 23/4/36.
ij.
Statesman, 27/3/36; see also Paranjpye Papers, Chintamani 
to Paranjpye, 24/4/36, and Sastri Papers, Srinivasa Sastri 
to S. G. Vaze, IO/6/36.
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research on various topics and published a series of pamphlets 
presenting the results. Both were very much Nehru's creations: 
sanctioning them was part of the price the old guard had to 
pay for Nehru's taming. A Labour Committee was also set up 
by the Working Committee to maintain contact with the various 
trade union organizations that then existed. Although its 
creation was in line with Nehru's thinking, its members were 
almost all Gandhian moderates.^
The main theme of this account of Congress development 
in the mid-1930s has been increased ideological and organi­
zational differentiation in response tc changing external con­
ditions and the influx of new elements. Yet at the same time 
the various parts of Congress were better integrated then 
before; the centre of gravity within the party had not 
shifted markedly and there had been few defections. Although 
the exercise of constitutional power produced strains, the 
party's capacity for unity was able to deal with them. This 
capacity was the result of the outstanding charismatic power 
of Gandhi and the good sense of most Congressmen, who realized 
that independence could best be achieved through unity.
Those with sectional interests to pursue recognized that their 
best chance of achieving their ends lay in working within 
Congress and appealing to the people as part of it.
Hindu Communal Parties
After their initial reverses in 193**» the leaders of the CNP 
had to find other strategies. Alongside their direct efforts
^The Labour Committee was first appointed in August 1933•
INC II, p.30. It was reappointed in April 1936 with the
addition of M. R. Masani: INC III, p.23.
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to have official Congress policy altered they considered the 
possibility of establishing the CNP as a separate organi­
zation within the general orbit of Congress, as they had 
hoped to do in 1 9 3 ^ There were also moves to break away 
from Congress altogether and set up an independent parly or 
parties. In this case there were a number of other Hindu 
groups with whom alliance was possible. The origin and 
nature of these groups will be analysed, but it must be 
stressed that many of their leaders had links, either past or 
present, with Congress.
The CNP itself had been founded as a direct response 
to the 193^ election campaign. Once this was over, it 
lapsed into virtual inactivity until the approach of the 
1937 elections. At the all-India level, where the party had 
never been more than an insubstantial grouping of individual 
leaders, Malaviya and Aney pursued their other interests.
In the provinces only the Bengal CNP continued an active 
existence. Essentially, the CNP was a parasite on Congress; 
when Congress was in a trough, as in 1935» so was the CNP.
In Maharashtra, however, there existed a number of 
individuals who felt that attempts to form a party within 
Congress were fundamentally wrong. One of the most prominent, 
M. R. Jayakar, considered that Malaviya had been humiliated
^Under the CPB system the CNP could contest elections without 
coming into direct conflict with the inner circle of leaders 
or with Congress as such. Once control of electoral matters 
had been transferred to the CPC this was no longer the case. 
The CNP could only contest the elections separately by coming 
to a formal understanding with Congress at either the all- 
India or the provincial level. For the formation of the 
CNP, see above, pp. 107-8.
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over the formation of the CNP.'*' Jayakar had broken with the 
Swaraj Party in the mid-1920s to form the Responsive Co­
operation Party. By 193** be was convinced of the need for 
a new Hindu party which would take a modern view on
2 ^economic development and would include non-Congressmen.
Other former Responsivists inclined more towards the CNP 
model. At an ’All Maharashtra Political Conference1 in October 
1933 the Democratic Swaraj Party (DSP) was formed. Its 
president was N. C. Kelkar, a colleague of Jayakar from
3
the earliest days when theylnd both been followers of Tilak. 
The DSP wanted the establishment of 'a well-defined All- 
India Party, having the same ideal and objective as the Con-
^  . Zf
gress, but which will avoid /its/ rigidity’. Common to 
both groups was a belief that Congress was not only neg­
lecting the interests of the Hindu majority but was also 
relegating Maharashtra to a subordinate role in the national 
movement. Jayakar wrote of the ’Gujerati gang of Patel and 
^Bhulabhai/ Desai* ?
The third source of Hindu communalism at this time 
was the Hindu Mahasabha. As an organization it was formally 
outside politics and there was no bar to a Congressman being
■^JP **08, Jayakar to Sapru, 11/11/3**.
2
Ibid. Jayakar did not, however, totally rule out the possi­
bility of co-operation with the neo-swarajists: JP 207,
Jayakar to Moonje, 10/**/3**.
•^ JP 600, Mandlik to Jayakar, 7/1/3**•
IAR 1935 II, p.319.
"*JP 4o8, Jayakar to Sapru, 11/11/34.
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a member.^ It was, however, divided into pro- and anti-Congress 
groups. At the head of the former was Malaviya himself. The 
latter was headed by the two main organizers of the Maha- 
sabha, Ganpat Rai and Padamraj Jain. They were prepared to use 
the machinery of the Mahasabha to promote political acticn 
in defence of communal interests* There were Hindu Sabhas in v 
the provinces, which were constituent parts of the Mahasabha 
but were virtually autonomous. There was nothing to prevent 
a provincial Hindu Sabha from putting up its own candidates.
In the event effective political groups based on com­
munal identity were established only at the provincial level, 
but the efforts to achieve an all-India framework formed an 
essential background: their failure is itself highly sig­
nificant.
According to a later press report it was only at the 
insistence of the Bengali members that the CNP retained the 
word 'Congress*in its title in 193*+• Whether Malaviya was 
contemplating a separate Hindu party at this stage is not 
clear. The next initiative came from Jayakar who, when ap­
proached to join the DSP in May 1935j said he would, provided
the DSP became the nucleus of an all-India party in opposition ^ 
3
to Congress. At the same time, however, the DSP leaders 
were in touch with M. S. Aney, who favoured close links with
^Under article V section (c) of the 193*+ constitution >no 
Congressman could belong to designated communal organizations, 
but up to 1937 no organization was so proscribed.
^Leader, 22/*f/36.
3
JP 630, Jayakar to Mandlik, 31/3/35* The file also con­
tains a cutting from the Indian Liberal, 22/6/35> which 
refers to a meeting of Jayakar and C.P.Ramaswamy Iyer to 
discuss the possibility of a new party to oppose Congress.
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Congress. The result of these contacts was that Aney joined
the DSP at the beginning of August and immediately became
president.'1’ Jayakar later referred to Responsivists who
tried to achieve an 'effete attachment' with Congress, but
2
the fact was that he was politically isolated. Ganpat Rai 
attempted during July and August to persuade Jayakar to 
continue his efforts to establish an all-India Hindu party, 
but with no effect. Jayakar replied that a new parly could 
only be. formed if Malaviya were to take the initiative."^
A further move by the Mahasabha was made at its Poona session 
in December 1935 when it called on provincial Hindu Sabhas
if
to take steps to contest the elections 'wherever necessary'.
Malaviya had taken no initiatives in 1935? but in the 
first part of 1936, with the pending elections becoming in-v 
creasingly a part of the political scene, he attempted both 
to establish a new and definitive relationship with Congress 
and to widen the basis of the CNP. After Nehru's return from 
Europe in March 1936 a series of talks was held between him 
and Malaviya, The talks appear to have continued inter­
mittently until August and were probably held at Malaviya's 
instance, but it is not possible to be definite as no re­
cords were kept and the press printed little information v
1Times of India, 1/7/35 and 6/7/35; IAR 1935 II, pp. 20 
and 321.
^JP *f08, Jayakar to Sapru, 8/7/36.
5JP 630, Ganpat Rai to Jayakar, 15/7/35, 6/8/35, 2V8/35; 
Jayakar to Ganpat Rai, 18/7/35*
L
IAR 1935 II, p.36.
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about them.'*' Nothing came of them: Malaviya was unable to v
get freedom of conscience for CNP members who might be selected 
as candidates, whether individually or as part of an agree­
ment over nominations, or to have any substantive changes
made in official Congress policy. P. D. Tandon and Aney also
2
had talks with Nehru during this period, but to no avail.
Although Malaviya1s talks with Nehru were held with
the consent of the CNP executive, the pirty was simultaneously
considering independent action. On 16 April 1936 an important
meeting was held of CNP, Hindu Sabha, and Sikh leaders. It
took place at that point because the Lucknow Congress had
just concluded without modifying Congress communal policy.
The meeting changed the name of the CNP to the ’Nationalist
Party1 and agreed that it should run its own candidates, v
subject to alliances with other groups; this meant primarily
3
Congress but also included liberal and landlord parties. w
The meeting, however, set up no machinery to contest the 
elections, not even a co-ordinating committee. Implementa­
tion was left entirely to the provincial branches, some of 
which continued to call themselves 'Congress Nationalist'.
The Nationalist Party had little more than a self-proclaimed 
existence. The next sign of life was a meeting of the party's
^For dates of meetings see Statesman. 24/4/36, 11/7/36.
In June Nehru made a formal press statement on the occurrence 
of the talks: Times of India. 29/6/56. Malaviya had re­
ceived CNP permission to carry on the negotiations: Statesman,
22/5/36.
^Statesman, 11/7/36; Times of India, 24/8/36. 
^Statesman, 20/4/36; see also Times of India, 17/4/36.
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executive committee at Benares in August, At this the de­
cision to contest the elections was reaffirmed and the pro­
vincial branches given formal authority to make local pacts.**" 
The main reason for these meetings was probably to gather 
strength for the last ditch attempt that was made at the 
Bombay AICC meeting to change Congress communal policy. There­
after the Nationalist Party (or CNP) functioned only at the
provincial level, although Malaviya acted as negotiator for
2
the provincial branches in the Punjab and U.P,
The other two groups of communal leaders also made fur­
ther efforts to establish all-India structures. After the 
Bombay AICC meeting Jayakar telegraphed to Malaviya:
’Don't neglect present splendid opportunity by 
forming all India Nationalist Party broad rational , 
lines stop avoid short-lived humiliating compromises’
The Lahore session of the Hindu Mahasabha in October 1936
expressed the wish that provincial Sabhas should 'capture 
if
the elections’• The Sabhas were encouraged to form election
boards but no material support was provided nor was any real
uniformity demanded in policy matters. As late as December
1936 Padamraj Jain promised Jayakar support for any party
5
he might form, but it was a forlorn hope.
~*Times of India,11/8/36. The executive committee had been 
appointed before the April, meeting.
^See below, pp, 211-12,
•^ JP 630, telegram Jayakar to Malaviya, 28/8/36.
1+
JP 63, 'Report of Lahore session', resolution 22.
5
Ibid.t Padamraj Jain to Jayakar, 27/12/36.
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It is difficult to analyse the ideological positions of 
the Hindu communal parties, partly because of lack of in-
V/ v
formation and partly because of the disparate and elusive 
nature of the groups iivolved. Some of them were barely dis­
tinguishable from landlord groups, others were closely con­
nected with Congress. Although individual leaders were visible 
and were usually former Congressmen and/or members of the 
National Liberal Federation, their supporters were often con­
cealed within Congress or some other organization. Similar 
views on communal matters did not necessarily indicate agree­
ment on other questions.
In general, ideological positions covered the same 
range as within Cnngress, although with different emphases.
Some form of dominion status was perhaps more acceptable than 
it was to Congressmen. On strategy direct action was accepted 
and some adopted fundamentalist positions on office acceptance.
At the same time, however, others were even prepared to work 
the federal part of the 1935 Act to which Congress was im­
placably opposed. While the Bengal CNP flirted with the 
authoritarian socialism of Subhas Bose, most communalists 
adopted cautious attitudes to economic and social issues.
Some structural change was recognized as being necessary for 
economic development but no far-reaching reforms were pro­
posed. Urban elements were keen to see the removal of 
British-imposed blocks to economic development, while land­
lords were concerned that tenancy reform should not affect 
their incomes or social status. Even on communal issues
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there was not complete uniformity. All agreed that the 
minority communities should not be granted more than mini­
mum constitutional protection and should not have a veto 
on the development of legitimate Hindu interests. There was, 
however, no specific demand for a theocratic political system: 
only for non-interference by the state in religious matters.^ 
Despite the similarities in policy between Congress 
and Hindu communal groups, there remained the essential dif­
ference of priorities. The latter were not prepared to accept 
that independence might have to be attained at the cost of 
the establishment of a plural society. To Nehru and other 
radical thinkers, by establishing themselves as the protectors 
of their community's interests communaHsts were attempting
to avert the replacement of community by class as the organi-
2
zing principle of society. Yet this is only a partial ex­
planation of the ecology of Hindu communalism and of the 
complex relations between Congress and its communal fringe.
An immediate difficulty is to explain the patchy distribution 
of overtly commundparties. This can only partly be done by 
reference to the differing economic conditions of each pro­
vince. While in some provinces landlords and commercial 
interests (the main targets of the radicals in the 1930s)
■^ Even here opinions varied over what constituted a religious 
practice..The Sarda Act of 1929 had aroused considerable 
controversy, but some of its proponents, as well as its 
opponents, were communally-minded. There were advocates 
within Congress of the reconstruction of the state according 
to the ideals of ancient India although theocracy was not 
envisaged.
2
A systematic contemporary exposition of the radical view of 
communalism is provided by Asoka Mehta and Achyut Patwardhan, 
The Communal Triangle in India (19*f2).
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did support communal groups,in .others the same interests 
found political expression within Congress. Conversely, in 
certain areas much of the communal parties* support came 
from those professional classes that were elsewhere the back­
bone of Congress.
The analysis of communal conflict at the provincial level 
must therefore be refined beyond a simple description of economic 
structures. Clearly, the relative numerical strengths of the 
communities and their economic interrelations were crucial. In 
some areas economic cleavages largely coincided with communal 
divisions, while elsewhere the communities' profiles were 
similar. In the latter case each community could form a closed 
economic system, although in practice there was always some 
external contact. Although each type of interrelation could 
lead to communal expressions of economic conflict and compet- 
tition, each provided characteristic means whereby communal 
leaders could mobilize support; consequently the form of 
communaljarties varied, as did the nature of inter-communal 
co-operation.
Even when communal distribution has been taken into ac­
count, difficulties remain. Two further variables must be 
added to complete the theoretical framework. First, the situation 
within the Hindu community might have a bearing on the be­
haviour of certain of its members. Where there were sharp 
horizontal divisions the higher castes might ise communalism 
as a means to protect their hierarchical interests. Secondly, 
the position of the province in all-India Congress politics 
was important. Maharashtra and Bengal were both areas which
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had previously been the heartlands of Congress activity; in 
the 1920s the centres of power had shifted to Gujarat and 
northern India. This affected both the party’s leadership and 
its style. When communal leaders in Maharashtra and Bengal 
raised the question of thecfefence of Hindu interests they were 
at the same time asserting the importance of their region 
(whose particular genius they saw as being expressed in Hindu­
ism).^ Some communal groups can in fact be better seen, not 
as extraneous elements that were attempting to infiltrate 
the national movement, but as a minority within it repre­
senting an earlier strain of Congress politics based on 
Hindu revivalism within urbanized upper castes.
What has been said does not invalidate the radical view 
of the origin of communalism (although in the present state 
of knowledge it would be difficult to prove it beyond doubt). 
All the variables mentioned clearly have direct relevance to 
economic and social interests. It does, however, shift the
area of study away from the unreal dichotomy between Con-
2
gress and overtly communal groups. As Nehru himself wrote,
'many a Congressman was a communalist under his national 
3
cloak'» The pattern of communal politics at the provincial 
was as much a function of local Congress characteristics as 
of underlying class conflict. Similarly, the strength of
^Thus Moonje wrote to Jayakar that Maharashtra occupied a 
subordinate position in all-India politics and that there 
was a need to establish an independent position from that 
of Gandhi: JP 630, letter dated 29/3/3° (in fact 33).
2
It has already been observed that Hindu communalists defined 
Congress in broader terms than did the official leadeiship.
3
Autobiography (19^2, new ed.), p.136.
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overtly communal parties in a province was not an index of 
communal feeling there.
The lack of any absolute distinctions between Congress 
and a large section of the Hindu communalists accounts for 
the ultimate failure of all attempts to establish an all-India 
Hindu party. Besides the short-term obstacles - the non- 
implementation of the federal part of the 1933 Act, the lack 
of charismatic leaders, except for Malaviya who was too old 
and was unwilling to make a final break with Congress, and 
the absence of any community of interest on economic matters - 
there was always the fatal attraction of Congress as the in­
stitutional expression of the national movement. Had there 
ever been any serious possibility of an independent Hindu 
party or of the Congress Nationalists seriously eroding its 
position, Congress would only have had to make a few concessions 
to communal demands to re-establish its position.
Muslim Political Parties
Although they had not had to overcome the emotional trauma of 
the collapse of civil disobedience, the Muslims were equally 
affected by the developments of the 193°s. More effective 
party organization in the provinces was necessitated not 
only by the enlarged electorate but also by the new concept 
of collective responsibility within the legislatures. At 
the centre, the expected implementation of the federal part 
of the 1933 Act raised further fundamental questions about 
the future of the community as a whole. So did the probability 
that Congressmen would form the government in those provinces
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where Muslims were in a minority. The principal response to 
all this was a much greater degree of unity and organization 
among the Muslim leadership, and the increasing politiciza­
tion and mobilization of the masses. Four phases may be dis­
tinguished: first, provincial parties were established or
reorganized; secondly, under the leadership of Mohammad Ali 
Jinnah, the central organs of the Muslim League were strengthened 
and extended; thirdly, the League’s, in effect Jinnah’s, 
authority was asserted over the various provincial parties; 
fourthly, the League itself was transformed into a mass organi­
zation with provincial branches that were themselves the units 
of political action. The last of these processes largely 
took place after the 1937 elections.
Up to 193^ all-India leadership within the Muslim com­
munity was exercised on an individual basis either by leaders 
of provincial parties or by extremely powerful landlords who 
had climbed the ladder of official favour by being ministers, 
executive council members, etc., under the Montford reforms.
The Muslim League was simply a deliberative body where such 
people came together to pass resolutions on matters of general 
concern to the Muslim community. Implementation was left to 
individual leaders, except for the brief period around 1916.
Thus Muslim interests were well represented at the Round Table 
Conferences despite the fact that the League had been para­
lysed since 192? by the split between the Shafi and Jinnah 
sections.
In 193*+ there were other organizations apart from the 
moribund League which were potential foci for all-India
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Muslim politics. The Muslim Conference was a body which had 
met occasionally at moments of particular importance since 
1929. Even more than the League it was sin association of 
notables and there was little possibility that it could pro­
vide an organizational framework for Muslim politics.^ The 
Muslim Unity Board, set up in 1933, brought together a num-
2
ber of Muslims, mostly from U.P., with pro-Congress leanings. 
The most important were former Khilafatists who had belonged 
to Congress during the 1920s. Some, like M. A. Ansari,
Asaf Ali, and Tassaduq Sherwani remained committed Congress- 
men. Others, such as Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, had doubts 
about the Congress attitude towards communal safeguards, but 
remained on the Congress fringe. Ideologically not far re­
moved were a few progressive members of the taluqdar class, 
such as the Raja of Mahmudabad. The attitude of the ulema 
towards politics was always based on their theological views 
but did not always coincide with political communalism. While 
the official attitude of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind, the re­
presentative of the leading seminary in India, remained
ambivalent, individual leaders such as Maulana Ahmad Said,
3
were favourably inclined towards Congress. Mention must 
also be made of the Ahrar Party, founded in 1930. Primarily 
a provincial party from the Punjab, it had some support in
^For meetings of the conference in this period, see IAR 
193^ II, PP. 309-11,and IAR 1936 I, pp. '301-5.
2
Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan (1961), pp. 119-20.
3
For an account of the Jamiat, see Ziya-ul-Hasan Faruqi, The 
Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan (1965), chapter 3. 
This work overstates its pro-Congress leanings. See also 
Z. H. Zaidi, ’Aspects of the Development of Muslim League 
Policy, 1937-^7' in C.H.Philips and Mary Doreen Wainwright 
(eds.), The Partition of India: Policies and Perspectives
1935-19V7 (1970).-pp. 2^6-7.
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other parts of northern India. It wanted complete inde­
pendence, but its attitude towards Congress varied.'*'
Although it was dominated by Congress Muslims, the 
Muslim Unity Board did not make Congress membership obli­
gatory. Its primary aim was to achieve a settlement with
Congress on communal questions which could replace the Com- 
2
munal Award. Such a settlement, it was hoped, would lead 
to the obsolescence of communalism rdher than its institutional^ 
zation through separate electorates. It was in the tradition 
of a series of ’unity conferences', the last of which had 
been held in August 1952; its successor was to be the Azad 
Muslim Conference. Although Khaliquzzaman was involved in the 
setting up of the CPB and approved of the 'neither accept nor4 
reject' resolution of June 193*+» the Muslim Unity Board de­
cided to contest the 193*+ elections separately. Unlike the 
CNP, it had to face no Congress opposition.and Gandhi gave 
his approval for its action. In the event, its candidates
won three of the six Muslim seats in U.P. In the Assembly
x
they co-operated with the Congress members.
The two sections of the League had continued to hold
occasional sessions during the period of civil disobedience.
Then in March 193*+ they agreed to reunite under the presidency 
if
of Jinnah. Jinnah, who had been the original leader of . .
^Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Modern Islam in India (2nd ed.
19*+7), PP. 271-3.
*TChali quzzaman, op.cit. t p. 120.
3Ibid., pp. 123-30. For the results, see AICC 09/193*+.
L
S.S.Pirzada, Foundations of Pakistan, vol. ii (1970), p.229. 
See also Matlubul Hasan Saiyid, Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1953» 
2nd ed,), pp. 312-13.
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one of the sections and had failed to establish overall 
authority at the first Round Table Conference, was now the 
architect of unity. He was best fitted for this role because 
he had the necessary flexibility and originality of outlook, 
the skill in negotiating, and contacts with secular national­
ists and communalists alike. It was not only the League 
leaders who felt that the political.situation in 193^ demanded 
a new departure in Muslim organization. A number of national­
ist Muslims,led by Asaf Ali, attended a meeting of the League 
Council in April 193^i which was the first regular meeting 
since reunification. In the voting on the resolution accepting 
the Communal Award one of them voted against it while the re­
mainder abstained.^ In August 193^ + a joint meeting was held 
of the councils of the Muslim League and Muslim Conference.
It was decided not to put up candidates for the Assembly 
elections but an appeal was issued asking Muslims to vote for
candidates who subscribed to the League's views on communal 
2
matters. This marked a small move away from the previous 
domination of Muslim electoral politics by individual notables; 
much more important was the fact that the independent Muslim 
MLAs were welded by Jinnah into a cohesive group within the 
Assembly on a number of issues including the Joint Parlia­
mentary Report, the Ottawa Trade Agreement and the budgets.
Despite the activity of 193^ the League remained a relic 
of the suppliant age of Indian politics. It only began to
jPirzada, op.cit., vol. ii,p.231* 
^Statesman, 15/8/3*f.
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evolve after Jinnah*s final return to India in October 1935* 
His immediate concerns were Assembly matters and acting as 
mediator in the Lahore Shahidganj agitation. His next action 
was to ally himself with the Muslim Unity Board. Khaliquzza.- 
man had been approached in December 1935 by Pant who wanted 
the Muslim Unity Board, in effect, to contest the elections 
as the agent of the GPB. After the request was renewed in 
January 1936, Khali quzzaman arranged a meeting of the Board 
to discuss the question of the elections. This was to be 
held in February at Delhi. Shaukat Ali, Khali quzzaman and 
representatives of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind came, but Jinnah 
contacted the various members just before the meeting and 
was able to persuade them to postpone it until after the 
next session of the League, on the understanding that they 
would be madO members of the parliamentary board that was 
to be formed. Jinnah promised that he would purify the League 
and give members of their group a majority. When one of the 
ulema queried the League’s commitment to independence he was 
told 'when I give you a majority in the Parliamentary Board 
you can do everything*
The first annual session of the reunited Muslim League 
was held in April 1936 at Bombay under the presidency of Sir 
Wazir Hasan. Its principal achievement was the setting up 
of the Muslim League Central Election Board (CEB). The
^This account of the negotiations is taken from Khaliquzzaman, 
op.cit., pp. lAO-1. Khaliquzzaman v; ould have been concerned 
in his memoirs to emphasize his association with Jinnah, and 
it must be remembered that the negotiations took place before 
the establishment of the CPC.
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resolution stated:
'Whereas the Parliamentary system of government ... 
presupposes the formation of parties with a well- 
defined policy ... and co-operation between groups 
with proximate aims and ideals ... and whereas in 
order to strengthen the solidarity of the Muslim 
community and to secure for the Muslims their proper 
and effective share in the provincial governments, 
it is essential that the Muslims should organise 
themselves as one party, with an advanced and pro­
gressive programme, it is hereby resolved that the 
All-India Muslim League do take steps to contest 
the approaching provincial elections, and for this 
purpose appoint Mr. Jinnah to form a central 
election board under his presidentship, consisting 
of not less than 35 members, with powers to con­
stitute and affiliate provincial election boards 
in various provinces, having regard to the condition 
of each province, and devise ways and means for 
carrying out the aforesaid objects.'^
This resolution simultaneously extended the scope of the 
League's activities and gave Jinnah effective control of them. 
Thereafter the CEB rather than the League Council was the 
primary unit of action. By the words 'advanced and pro­
gressive programme' the radicals within the League, and 
also Congress, were told that it would no longer be the
^aiyid, op.cit., pp. 3^1-2.
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tool of vested economic interests. This impression was con­
firmed by the absence from Bombay of the leading landlords 
and by the presidency of Sir Wazir Hasan, who was known for 
his nationalist views,'*' At the same time Jinnah was instructed 
to have regard to the condition of each province, which left 
him full freedom of action.
The principal means of extending the mantle of the 
League over Muslim electoral activity was by the creation of 
provincial election boards, which will be considered later. 
Appointments to the CEB, which were made on a provincial basis, 
were also part of the strategy, A few days after the Bombay 
League session a meeting of the League Council was held at 
Delhi, which a number of Muslim leaders, including repre­
sentatives of the Jamiat and the Khaliquzzaman group, at­
tended by invitation, and informal discussions were held
2
concerning the composition of the board. Jinnah
followed this up with a visit to the Punjab, in some ways
3
the most important of all Muslim a r e a s . H e  then announced 
the members of the CEB in May. It was a remarkable achieve­
ment. Representatives of all shades of political opinion 
and from most groups of Muslims were included. In U.P. 
Congressmen and members of the National Agriculturist Parties 
belonged. In Bengal membership spanned the ideological and
Khaliquzzaman, op.cit.. p,l44.
^Leader, 28/4/36 and 29/4/36; Star of India, 28/4/36. 
•^Statesman, 1/5/36 and 4/5/36; Tribune. 2/5/36.
and personal differences between Fazlul Huq and the Nawab of 
Dacca and also included representatives of the Muslim busi­
ness community.^ The existing Muslim League structure was
ignored - the Bihar Muslim League actually protested against
2
the choice of members for Bihar.
There were, however, significant gaps in the membership 
of the CEB. The most important was the absence of any Union­
ists. Jinnah had also not included some Muslim conservatives 
who were too closely identified with the British admini­
stration. Theyin their turn attacked him for trying to estab­
lish a ’communal1 party. In June, the Nawab of Chhatari
3
and Sir Muhammad Yusuf resigned. There were also diffi­
culties with some of the radical members. At the April meet­
ing the Ahrar leaders had demanded that the League adopt com­
plete independence as its objective. They had nevertheless
2f
been named to the CEB but later resigned,, So too did Zafar
Ali Khan, the leader of the Ittihad-i-Millat, a 'small group 
m  the Punjab in some ways resembling the Ahrars. Khaliquz­
zaman said that the CEB was disfigured by the inclusion of
    - c
Nawabs. He and his followers nevertheless remained members.
The definition of the CEB as a political entity raised
important questions which were discussed at the League Council
meeting in April. First, it was confirmed that although it
^A list of members is given in Khaliquzzaman, op.cit., pp. 416-7* 
^Leader, 27/5/36.
Z
Leader, 17/6/36. Yusuf’s letter of resignation and an inter­
view with Chhatari are printed in ibid., 20/6/36.
Ll
Leader, 29/4/36, and Times of India, 25/6/36.




would follow general League policy the CEB would be able to 
frame its own rules and issue its own manifesto. Secondly, 
the position of CEB supporters who were simultaneously com~ 
mitted to other parties had to be clarified. Where such 
parties were primarily Muslim the problem was whether they
should be regarded as agents of the League or should be re­
placed by structures under its direct control; in other cases 
the issue was whether candidates of other parties could pre­
sent themselves as being sponsored by the League.^ No de­
cisions were made, as it was a matter for the CEB rather than
the League Council; in U.P., the one instance where it was 
a live issue, it was later claimed by
Khaliquzzaman that the NAP members of the CEB had given an
undertaking to stand only as League candidates, although Sir
2
Muhammad Yusuf and the Nawab of Chhatari denied it.
The CEB held several meetings, at the first of which 
a manifesto was produced, but it fulfilled its main function 
simply by existing."^  As a collection of provincial leaders 
with independent followings it lent additional weight to 
Jinnah1s position as leader of the Muslim community in all- 
India affairs; at the same time it profiled a means whereby 
Jinnah could prove to the various provincial leaders that 
the 1937 elections had all-India as well as local importance
deader, 29/4/36.
^Leader, 3/6/36; 4/6/36.
^For meetings of the CEB, see Leader, 13/6/36, and Times of 
India, 22/9/36.
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and that ultimately an all-India leadership had to be ac­
cepted. In his negotiations to set up provincial parliamentary 
boards Jinnah regarded himself as having plenipotentiary powers 
without any obligation to take account of the views of the 
League Council or CEB. He allowed local Muslim parties to 
continue to exist on whatever terms he thought most suited to 
the conditions of a particular province.
Any analysis of Muslim politics in this period must con­
cern itself first with Jinnah. During 193& his aim was to 
get Muslims of all political viewpoints to accept, not an ideo­
logical stance, even on communal issues, or an organizational 
structure, but merely the necessity on some issues for the 
Muslim community to regard itself as a political unit at the 
all-India level with the Muslim League as its representative. 
The framework that Jinnah was able to establish in 193& 
had no authority behind it and did not include the Unionists 
and other important groups but it was a major psychological 
breakthrough for him. By skilful manipulation of his electoral 
successes in 1937 and through exploitation of external factors, 
especially the establishment of Congress ministries,he was 
able to strengthen and institutionalize this authority and 
widen its scope, although even in 19^6 it was not complete.
In 1936 Jinnah1s problem was to reconcile groups with 
mutually exclusive views on social and economic questions in 
a situation where communal consciousness was not yet an over­
riding factor. He did this by giving the League as a whole 
a slightly progressive tinge while at the same time allowing
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provincial leaders who accepted membership of the CEB vir­
tual autonomy both organizationally and ideologically. Al­
though he tried to ignore them, serious differences existed 
between conservatives and radicals in U.P. Jinnah allowed 
the latter to predominate. In Bengal, however, the situation 
was such that,to begin with, the more conservative of the 
two Muslim parties became Jinnah’s agent. There were several- 
reasons for his allowing the League to appear progressive. 
First, although averse from revolutionary change, his own 
preferences were for development towards a liberal-bourgeois 
system of society. Secondly, it allowed greater room for 
negotiation with Congress. Thirdly, it was more expedient 
to make concessions towards the radicals. If the radicals 
were forced out they might be lost to Congress, while the 
conservatives were less likely to form a stable union with 
their Hindu counterparts. Even if in 1936-7 some of the 
latter preferred to participate in a three-cornered alliance 
with the government and other conservatives, it was certain 
that as responsible government was extended to the centre 
they would be forced back to communal-based support. Jinnah 
did not, of course, commit himself to any particular group 
or item of policy, even on communal matters, and took care to 
leave all his options open.
To his provincial allies Jinnah offered the prestige 
of the League's name and an association with an all-India 
organization, also in some cases the services of a mediator 
betwden rival personalities. In 1936 these things were of 
relatively little importance: Jinnah was operating in a
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buyer's market. In general, therefore, he got his support from 
groups and individuals whose political position was weak or 
who were in conflict with other Muslim groups. Thus the Union­
ist Party, whose position in the Punjab was strong and un­
challenged, refused to surrender any of its powers to him; 
in Bengal where the Muslim community was divided both on per­
sonal and ideological lines, he was able to get one of the two 
main groups to commit itself to the League. He was able to get 
support from the business community both in Bombay and Calcutta, 
whose position was never entirely secure, but had less suc­
cess with Muslim landlords.
A consequence of Jinnah's strategy at this time was 
that large areas of policy were left unexplored. As in Con­
gress, policy statements did not originate within the provinces, 
and at the national level statements were only made at the 
highest level of generality. In 193^ the aim of the League
was still self'government, as stated in its 1913 constitution.
1
This was changed in October 1937 to 'full independence'.
Jinnah condemned the federal part of the 1933 Act as 'funda­
mentally bad', but there were no scruples about working the
2
Act 'for what it is worth', if necessary by means of coalitions.
The CEB and the League did not commit themselves to any eco­
nomic and social policies beyond the broad goal of economic 
development. The manifesto published in June 1936 was in 
fact modelled on the Congress Karachi resolution, perhaps at. 
the instance of Khaliquzzaman* but any possibility of expropriation





The fourteen points that had been adopted in March 1929 
as a counterblast to the Nehru Report remained the generally 
accepted position on the constitutional protection of com­
munal rights. The 1935 Act’s federal scheme was regarded as 
dangerous because it gave too much power to the centre. The 
use of religious communities as units of political action was 
of course central to the thinking of most Muslims outside 
Congress, and to some inside it, but its implications had not 
been worked out in 1936, After independence the question had
to be faced of the definition of a Muslim but though the
2
Ahrars attempted to raise the matter of the Ahmadxs,
Jinnah used the entirely secular criterion of self-definition.
The ulema were led to believe that the Muslim League wished
to allow them a voice in matters affecting the community,
but no commitment was made.
The Muslim League has often been characterized as an
anti-national, reactionary, and even fascist phenomenon: to
the radicals of the time it was the natural counterpart of
3
the Hindu nationalist organizations. To a large extent the 
parallel is just, and what was said above applies here, 
mutatis mutandis. It is especially important to reiterate 
that communalism was not confined to any particular group.
In 1936 the members of the CEB and the provincial boards were 
held together by political circumstance. The economic interests
1IAE 1936 X, pp. 299-301. • '
Leader. 29/A-/36.
3
Lai Bahadur, The Muslim League (l9f&), chapter 16; Mehta and 
Patwardhan, op.cit,, p,15**«
represented the same wide range from urban professional to 
landowner. At the same time, however, there were significant 
differences. Because the Muslim community as a whole was in 
a minority, its middle classes were unable to take refuge 
within Congress. Even in the heartlands of Bengal and the 
Punjab the Muslims were not an effective majority and there­
fore most middle class Muslims were acutely aware of the need 
to protect their economic position. Only in N.W.F.P. was 
there the right combination of circumstances for the Muslim 
majority to take an active role in Congress. A second source 
of difference was that Muslim League leaders were more secular 
in outlook than their Hindu counterparts. They were not as 
concerned with the reform and revival of religion. Nor did 
Muslim communalism carry overtones of regional nationalism: 
as the expression of a minority it could not afford to. To 
some extent it was more analogous to the non-Brahman move­
ment than to Hindu communalism.
Congress and the League had worked together during the 
period of the Lucknow Pact, but co-operation thereafter was 
impossible because of the new style of Congress activity after 
Gandhi took over. The period after 193^ saw fresh possibilities 
for co-operation as Congress adopted a programme of activity 
vi.tbin the legislatures. By the end of 1937. the door was 
again closed but there had been at least exploratory contacts 
in the previous years. On the Congress side there were no 
inherent objections to establishing alliances with communally- 
defined groups, as the experience of the Muslim Unity Board
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had shown. On the other side, as has been seen, Jinnah rejected 
the totally collaborationist policies of the earlier generation 
of League leaders and had.deliberately courted radical ele­
ments within the Muslim community.
There had been no co-operation during the 193^ elections - 
Jinnah and most other Muslims won their seats as independents.
In the Central assembly itself, however, Jinnah gathered the 
Muslim members into a single bloc which held the balance be­
tween Congress and the official members. Although no formal 
understanding was ever established, Jinnah frequently used 
his position in favour of Congress. Thus the budget of 1935 
had to be certified and the Ottawa trade agreement was rejected* 
The most importance instance of this co-operation was the re­
jection of the report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee.
The original Congress amendment to the official resolution, 
which used the 'neither accept nor reject1 formula towards the 
Communal Award, was defeated. Jinnah then introduced his own 
amendment, which accepted the award 'so far as it goes, until 
a substitute is agreed upon by the various communities con­
cerned'. The Congress bloc abstained from voting on this part 
of his amendment, but supported the remainder, which condemned 
the actual report.'*"
To a large extent Jinnah thrust liis support upon the 
Congress leaders in the Central Assembly, but it was a base
The information in this paragraph is taken from S. Satya- 
murthi and Nilakantha Das, A Statement of the Work of the 
Congress Party in the Assembly: Delhi Session 1935 (1935).
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from which further contacts were possible. Apparently at
Prasad's initiative, a series of talks was held between the
two presidents in New Delhi in February 1935 j and a formula
was worked out, based on reservation of seats within a joint
electorate.■* It foundered, however, on Jinnah's insistence
that the formula be endorsed by the Mahasabha leaders, some
of whom were in New Delhi at the time in connection with an
'Anti-Communal Award Conference' and at least one of whom,
2
Bhai Parmanand, had conversations with Jinnah and Prasad,
In retrospect it seems impossible that Jinnah could have 
imagined that Hindu communal leaders, or even a large 
section of Congress, would have agreed to the formula.
Equally he could not have hoped to have swung more than a
3
section of the Muslim community behind it. One explanation 
of Jinnah's conduct would be that it was merely a cynical 
propaganda ploy, a foretaste of the tactics of 19V?-6, It 
is also possible that it was a sign that at this early stage 
he was still exploring the extent of his freedom of action 
and the possibilities open to him after his long absence from 
India. It is significant that the formula worked out in 
1935 was not dissimilar from the one he had proposed at Cal­
cutta in December 1928. Ultimately he was only prepared to 
negotiate on the basis that each party represented the whole 
of one community, but at this stage he may well have hoped
~Sstar of India, 16/2/35 and 11/3/35? 26/A/35* A feature of the
formula was that it provided for differential communal fran­
chises where a community was underrepresented in the elector­
ate.
2Ibid., 2/3/35; 16/2/35.
For the attitude of many Bengali Muslims, see Star of India, 
19/2/35.
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for an alliance based on sections of each community.
There were no formal contacts between the Congress and 
the League after the breakdown of the Prasad-Jinnah talks, but 
there have been claims that an informal understanding was 
reached over the elections. This is sometimes stated to have 
been a general understanding, sometimes to have been confined 
to U.P.‘L It is not in fact realistic to discuss whether or 
not an agreement existed because there was during the elections 
themselves little to agree about. Separate electorates and 
the limited support that Congress as a party had among Mus­
lims meant that there was no question of no-contest pacts 
or similar arrangements. In such circumstances the fact 
that Jinnah chose to make gestures towards the more radical 
section of the Muslim community led some people to think 
that . League and Congress had decided on a policy of friendly 
co-existence. Whether or not this was true, the essential 
point was that no mutual obligations had been created. In 
U.P. Khaliquzzaman and his friends chose to support the 
League rather than Congress. They undoubedly did so in the 
belief that a legislative alliance would later be possible 
between the two parties in U.P. but there is no evidence at 
all that there was any actual understanding to this effect.
Congress, the CNP and its allies, and the Muslim 
League were the only parties to have any claim to an all- 
India existence, but something must be said of the general
^See, for example, M.A.H.Ispahani, Qaid-e-Azam Jinnah..as I..Knew Him 
(1966), p. 3^, A.jit Prasad Jain. Rafi Ahmad Kid wax: A
Memoir of his Life and Times (1963), pp. and A.B.Rajput,
Muslim League Yesterday and Today (19^8), p.65.
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categories into which the numerous one- or two-province parties 
fell. Even in Hindu-dominated provinces Congress often re­
presented one particular complex of social and economic 
groups and other parties grew up to cater for other sections 
of the community.
Landlord parties
In almost all provinces there were parties led by the leading 
landholders, many of whom had sat in the Montford councils as 
independents. Indeed, such parties were little more than 
legislative groupings often formed at official instance.
Once the franchise had been extended and the method of cast­
ing votes changed in some areas to allow greater secrecy, and 
with the advent of Congress as a serious contestant, it be­
came clear to the more percipient landlords that they could 
no longer rely entirely on traditional patterns of loyalty 
and economic sanctions.
Few of the landlords were avowedly anti-independence.
At the same time most would happily have settled for dominion 
status* Above all else, progress had to be through constitu­
tional means and by agreement with the British at all stages. 
Only thus could the leading landlords preserve their economic 
and social position which, whatever its original source, by 
the 1930s depended largely on government support. Although 
there could be no question of extending occupancy rights to 
tenants-at-will, politically active landlords were in favour 
of considerable rural development in such fields as irrigation,
^See chapter 1.
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education, and extension of co-operative finance. With such 
policies they doubtless hoped to win over the smaller land­
owners and hereditary tenants.
The link between communalism and vested interests has 
already been discussed. Some landlord parties were avowedly 
communal or were in practice confined to one community. Thus 
the Independent Muslim Party in Bihar was at the same time the 
expression of a minority communal group and of landlord in­
terests. Other parties, such as the Unionist Party in the 
Punjab and the NAPs in U.P., were cross-communal although not 
non-communal. Many of their members retained active links 
with communal organizations. In U.P. some landlords actually 
stood jointly for the NAP and the Hindu Sabha.
Liberals
In the Montford councils there had been a number of members 
who held certain common views and belonged to the National 
Liberal Federation, but who were otherwise independent in 
that they organized their own electoral support and were sub­
ject to no party discipline. They were especially prominent 
in areas with a developed urban intellectual life, such as 
Bengal and U.P. Common to them all were beliefs in the de­
velopment of India through industrialization and in the 
diffusion of education. There was also a concern among most 
of them on the one hand for the reform of Hindu social practices 
and on the other for the rights of the Hindu community. This 
reflected the origins of Liberalism as the creed of those 
sections of Indian society that had first been affected by
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British rule. The largest group of Liberals came from the
upper reaches of the professions but some were industrialists
or large landowners. Some of the most influential belonged to
the Servants of India Society. Most of them had belonged to
1
Congress at one time or another.
In 193^ several leading Liberals had been defeated by 
Congressmen. In the provincial elections the Liberals were 
squeezed between Congress and the various communal and land­
lord parties, all of whiclihad more specific power bases and 
more articulated points of view either on strategies for in­
dependence or on the protection of sectional interests. Never­
theless, a few candidates stood as Liberals. A meeting of the 
National Liberal Federation was held at the end of 193&, 
whose resolutions bore some similarity to those of Congress,
but no effort was made to co-ordinate or promote electoral 
2
activity. Most former Liberals either opted out of electoral 
politics in 1937 or identified themselves with one of the 
parties whose ideology and class composition most closely 
resembled their own.
Non-Brahman and Tenant Parties
In some provinces the interests of the tenants and cultivating 
landholders were either looked after by elements within Con­
gress or were ignored. In other places, however, they formed 
the bases for local parties. One factor was the land tenure 
system in particular provinces. In Bombay, Madras, and the 
Punjab, sections of the peasantry had substantial rights
^For a general study of the Liberals, see B.D.Shukla, A_
History of the Indian Liberal Party . (i960).
2IAR 1936 II, pp. 2^1-9.
175.
over their land as the result either of ryotwari land settle­
ments or of subsequent legislation such as the Land Alienation 
Act in the Punjab. A second factor that led to the creation 
of local parties of this sort was the existence of social 
cleavages based on cultural and historical experience which 
reinforced those based on economic class. The leaders of such 
parties generally came from economically prosperous back­
grounds and were often themselves landlords, but they were 
able to build up support by exploiting their other common 
interests with the cultivators. Both in the Punjab and in 
Bengal Muslim leaders obtained support from the peasantry on 
this basis. In the Punjab, the Unionist Party exploited 
the rural/urban division, while in Bengal the Praja Party 
concentrated more on the tensions within rural society that 
paralleled communal divisions. In . Bombay and Madras the 
non-economic factor was non-Brahman resentment of Brahman 
domination of public life and of rural society. Landowners 
who resented the former could mobilize caste-fellows who 
experienced the effects of the latter. Non-Brahman parties 
were, however, inherently unstable in that Congress could at­
tempt to transform itself locally into a non-Brahman-dominated 
party or could appeal directly through tenant-oriented policies. 
They were helped in this by factionalism and caste conflict 
within non-Brahman ranks.
As with the landlord groups, non-Brahman parties co­
operated with the British government in working the Mont ford 
reforms. Rural development through the extension of education 
and credit facilities was important as a means for breaking
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Brahman domination of rural society. Job reservation within 
the public services provided a means to establish the rights 
of the non-Brahman majority in public life, as did the system 
of seat reservation.
Scheduled Caste Politics
Before 1937 the Scheduled Castes had principally been repre­
sented in legislative bodies by government nominees. Under 
the 1933 Act they were underrepresented in the electorate but 
by the Poona Pact were given a disproportionately high number 
of reserved seats. They thus became objects of political 
attention. At the same time their level of political aware­
ness and organization was extremely low, although there were 
a few exceptions. Three forms of Scheduled Caste activity 
existed. First, they could look to Congress for leadership. 
Congress was the party of Gandhi and also often the party of 
those who had direct economic control of village menials and 
landless labourers. In addition it provided a means of up­
ward mobility for the occasional educated member of a Scheduled 
Caste. Secondly, the Scheduled Castes could create their own 
parties. The Independent Labour Party (ILP) in Maharashtra 
was the only significant one. There was also the Depressed 
Classes League in Bihar but this was more of a caste associ­
ation than a political party. The aims of the ILP were 
limited to the improvement of the lot of the Scheduled Castes 
both economically and socially. Finally, Scheduled Caste 
representatives could be independents, veiy often men who 
had become wealthy through contracting work. These forms
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of Scheduled Caste activity developed partly on a regional basis 
and partly according to divisons betwen the various castes 
involved.
Independents
Most of the parties in 1937 were in any case collections of 
leaders with independent power bases, but there were in addi­
tion a number of completely independent candidates. Some of 
them would have stood for one or other of the parties but for 
personal disagreements. Others were independent from choice.
In some provinces such MLAs formed legislative groupings while 
preserving their electoral autonomy. Independents naturally 
held a variety of political views but most of them were con­
servative in their general approach. Common to many was the 
belief that policy was properly the concern of the legislators 
and that the role of the electorate was simply to choose its 
representatives on the basis of their ingaate qualities.
Table 2.2 gives the number of successful independent 
candidates in each province. The prevalence of independent 
MLAs was to some extent a reflection of a province’s level 
of political development. It was also perhaps a function of 
the system of separate electorates. An independent power base 
could be built on economic power, particularly land ownership, 
but it could also be built up through non-political leader** 
ship within the community. The latter source of power was more 









Assam 30 108 27.8
Bengal 79 250 31.6
Bihar* 26 152 17.1
Bombay 31 173 17.7
C*P. 17 112 13-2
Madras Ik 215 6.3
N.W.F.P. 3 30 6.0
Orissa 9 60 13.0
Punjab 19 173 10.9
Sind 13 60 21.7
U.P. kc 228 17.3
Total 281 1585 17.7
Source: Tables of results in chapter Europeans and
certain other groups are excluded. See p. 3^8.
II
THE PROVINCES
Unity was given to Indian pubHic life by British rule and 
the nationalist movement, also by the many all-India pro - 
fessional associations. Nevertheless, each province formed 
an autonomous political system.^ Within these systems the
■^ There were certain regional movements which crossed provincial 
boundaries, but except in Maharashtra they did not provide 
the bases for alternative units of action.
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distribution and strength of the parties or party-types 
described above depended as much on local historical factors 
as on economic and social cleavages. The condition of India 
was such that there were no overriding cleavages (in the 
absence of a mass movement of urban and rural labourers) 
which could dictate party divisions. Most parties in fact 
cultivated as wide a range of support as possible; this re­
flected the fragmented character of the social structure in 
which there was no single interest strong enough to dominate 
the rest. The actual party system in a particular province 
was only one of a number that were consonant with the economic 
situation there. Non-economic factors determined which pat­
tern was established. Caste and communal conflicts, rooted 
in the historical experience of each province as well as in 
class divisions, the pattern of British imperialism, the 
short-term demands of factional conflict within Congress, all 
played a part.
The limitations of the data are such that no set pattern 
J is used to describe the situation in each province. In all 
cases the government records provide some material, but the 
percipience and diligence of the writers of official reports 
varied considerably. Supplementary material for some areas 
v has been obtained from newspapers, the Congress records, and 
secondary sources. Table 2.3 provides basic information on 
the distribution of the population between urban and rural 
areas, and on the stratification of the rural population.
The latter figures give only the broadest indication, as 
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The communal distribution of the population is given in table 
1.2 (p.^).1
Assam
The province of Assam had been formed in the aftermath of the
repeal of the partition of Bengal. Although its creation had
administrative logic, communal divisions there were reinforced
by linguistic, racial, and geographical factors. To the north,
the Assam valley was populated by people who were Assamese
by race and language and mostly Hindu. The Surma valley in
the south contained a majority of Muslims who had originated in
Bengal, from where there was a continuing stream of immigrants.
Besides the population of the valleys, there were a number of
tribal people,, among whom external political influences had
not begun to work.
Congress was the only; political organization of importance
in the province. Its main strength came from the Hindu popu-
2
lation of the Assam valley. Sylhet district, which comprised 
the greater part of the Surma valley, was included within 
the Congress province of Bengal and seems, like the Punjab 
Congress, to have been faction-ridden in the face of the 
Muslim majority.^ When the Congress group in the Assembly 
came to elect a leader, an Assam valley man, Gopinath Bar- 
doloi, was preferred to the Sylhet leader, Basanta Kumar
^Additional references in the text to population distribution 
are in all cases derived from the Census of India, 1931.
2PR Assam, 28/10/36.
■^ GR Assam, May 1937 II. See also AICC E3/1936, report by 
disciplinary subcommittee of Sylhet DCC.
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Das, apparently on regional grounds.^ " Unlike the other pro­
vinces that had a substantial Muslim population, there seems 
to have been no major Hindu communal party. Although this 
may have been the result of the generally low level of 
politicization, the concentration of Hindus in the Assam valley 
and the fact that the Sylhet DCC was part of the Bengal Con­
gress may also have been factors.
Before 1937 organized Muslim political life in Assam
had revolved around occasional conferences, often on a valley 
2
basis. The most important leader to have emerged was Sir
Mohammad Saadullah, who had some influence in both valleys, but
he was unable to establish a single Muslim party from among
several competing groups.^ After the elections, however, he
was able to bring together all but the Muslim League MLAs
into a ’Muslim Party1. The Muslim League, under the local
leadership of Abdul Matin Chaudhury, had had some success,
4
particularly in the Surma valley. Although it may be as­
sumed that most of the Muslim candidates were landowners and 
local notables, there were some pasant associations on the 
same lines as the krishak samitig in Bengal. These could be 
used to mobilize support, and Congress also attempted to use 
them, although with little success.^
T^PR Assam, February 1937 II*
*Tor an example, see IAR 1935 II, PP* 315-6, report of Assam 
Valley Muslim Political Conference*
3PR Assam, 28/10/36.
4
FR Assam,November 1936 II, and PR Assam, 28/10/36.
^AICC E5/1936, letter from secretary of Sylhet DCC, FR 
Assam, October 1936 II, and Statesman, 17/6/36.
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Bengal
The numbers of Muslims and Hindus in Bengal were almost equal, 
but the profiles of the two communities were very different. 
Although points of contact existed they formed largely self- 
contained political systems. Mutual hostility and suspicion, 
however, which dated back at least to the partition of Bengal 
and had been reinforced by subsequent experience, provided 
much of the stimulus for political activity. The provisions 
of the Communal Award were felt by Hindus to bear particularly 
heavily upon their community, and the attempt to have them 
altered was a major theme of Bengali politics in the 3930s*
The Hindu community's political life was controlled by 
the bhadralok. This group, whose members were defined according 
to varying combinations of class, cultural pattern, and caste 
origin, dominated Calcutta and, through its control of the 
professions and much of the land, had a major influence through­
out the province.'*" Although the uneven distribution of wealth
and political power provided a basis for differentiation,
2
strife remained essentially fratricidal.
Congress in Bengal had from the first been controlled 
by bhadralok elements. Although some of its members were 
prepared to follow the dictates of the centre, they had al­
ways been outnumbered by those who identified more with other
groups in Bengal and resented their own lack of influence
3
within all-India Congress affairs. Terrorist activity,
"*"The three castes generally regarded as comprising the greater 
part of the bhadralok - Brahmans, Kayasthas, and Baidyas - 
formed l^ f°/o of the total Hindu population of Bengal, but 
*fl°/o within Calcutta.
*Tor a study of the bhadralok, see J.H.Broomfield, Elite 
Conflict in a Plural Society (1968), esp. pp. 3-20.
3
Ibid., pp. 268 and 306. Subhas Chandra Bose openly criticized
l8*f.
which was anathema to Gandhi, was encouraged by a few Bengali 
Congressmen and condoned by many more. Many of the leaders 
signed the Bengal Hindus Memorial to the Secretary of State 
for India in June 1936, although it was counter to official 
Congress policy.^ The party was also characterized by en­
demic factionalism at all levels. At the provincial level a 
constant factor was Subhas Chandra Bose (whose brother,
Sarat, deputized for him while he was abroad or in prison).
His first opponent, J.M.Sen-Gupta, had died in 193^ -» and
2
thereafter his main antagonist was B.C.Roy. Two interrelated 
issues divided them. The first was the place of constitutional 
action. Bose was strongly opposed to the possibility of ac­
cepting office, while Roy had been a founder cf the CPB. 
Secondly, Roy had strong links with Gandhi, for whom Bose 
had little time. Likewise, Roy was on good personal terms 
with Nehru, whose relations with Bose were somewhat fragile. 
Although neither supported Congress’ equivocation over the 
Communal Award, the Roy group was less prepared to come 
into direct conflict with the nationalleadership„ At the 
district level similar patterns of factional conflict existed. 
Although each district faction formed part of one of the pro­
vincial factions, it seems likely that they were of inde­
pendent origin.
The bhadralok had other political outlets. Communalism 
and conservatism led many to dissociate themselves from Con­
gress. Most of those whose disagreement was confined to
the style of Gandhi’s leadership: Bose, the Indian Stiuggle
192019*f2 (196*0 , pp. 210 and 293-7*
■'l
Statesman. 27/6/36.
^Broomfield, op.cit., pp. 26G and 268; K.P.Thomas, Dr.B.C.Roy
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communal questions in fact remained within Congress as members 
of the Bengal CNP. This had consolidated its initial success 
in the 193^ elections by getting the provincial Congress to 
declare itself officially opposed to the Communal Award.^ 
Although it supported Bose, its members formed a separate group.
After lengthy manoeuvres certain of them contested the elections
2 3
separately. There was also the Hindu-Nationalist Party.
Many bhadralok leaders stood and were returned as independents. 
The close-knit nature of the group made the task of the inde­
pendent easier. Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee was able to win 
the university seat,which in other provinces usually went to 
Congress.
The caste structure of the Hindu community in Bengal meant
that there was little scope for a non-Brahman party to develop,
but the Scheduled Castes formed a relatively compact unit and
were a greater proportion of the population than elsewhere.
The Namasudras and Rajbansis were numerically dominant and
seem to have developed already a sense of their political
importance. In Dinajpur, where Scheduled Caste voters were
in a majority, their leaders established a no-contest pact 
if
with Congress. Although politically active members of the
(1935)» pp. 187-B. Another major figure was N.R.Sarkar, but 
he had left Congress by the mid-1930s. For Nehru's uncompli­
mentary views on the Bengal Congress, see Nehru, A Bunch of 
Old Letters, p.117.
1IAR 1935 X, p.356.
*TTo.r further discussion of Congress and the CNP in Bengal, 
see below, pp. 25 —^8,
T^iroes of India, 25/11/6; PR Bengal., 6/1/37.
L
RO 20/IV/36-F, 'Summary of General Results of Primary 
Election of Scheduled Caste Candidates'.
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Scheduled Castes may have been pro-Congress, they were able to 
organize their electoral suppprt by themselves.
Although a few Muslims qualified as bhadralok there 
were many more cultivating tenants within the electorate.
There were also a number of aristocratic landowning families 
who, while they had something in common, were not part of the 
bhadralok. There were two types of Muslim political activity, 
based on the professional middle class and the landowning 
families respectively. The one exploited tenant discontent; 
the other relied on its hierarchical power. There were also 
overtones of conflict between Bengali and Urdu elements in the 
local Muslim culture. In some ways the two major parties of 
the period fit the stereotypes very well.
The United Muslim Party was founded in May 1938 with 
the general support of the government.”*” Its leaders had been 
active in provincial politics for a long time and the party 
was largely a means to extend the basis of their support.
Khwaja Sir Nazimuddin and other relatives of the Nawab of 
Dacca, the most prominent Muslim landlord, were the dominant 
force. As the Governor of Bengal himself pointed out, the
2
party had no clear issue on which to approach the electorate.
In opposition to it was the Krishak Praja Party of Faz-
lul Huq. Huq had been active in Bengal politics for many
years and, besides regular flirtations with Congress, had
built up a network of krishak samitis - peasant associations -
which mobilized support on class lines, although their member­
's
ship was predominantly Muslim. Huq was very much an
1Star of India, 25/3/36.
2PR Bengal, 31/12/36.
3
Ibid; Modem Review. April 1937*
unpredictable quantity in Bengal politics. Connected to all
groups but committed to none, he was prepared to do whatever
promised an immediate return. At the district level, however,
it is less easy to sort the parties into neat categories.
Traditional rivalries between families or factional conflicts
between Muslim bhadralok often determined party composition.^
Initially, Jinnah had been able to get both sides to
support the CEB. A committee was then appointed of the
Nawab of Dacca, Fazlul Huq, and Jinnah, to consider the question
2
of establishing a provincial board; Jinnah visited Calcutta 
for this purpose towards the end of August. After lengthy 
discussion, however, it became clear that the two sides could 
not be brought together into a single unit. Although personal 
calculation was clearly important, the differences were ex~ 
pressed in ideological terms. The provincial board therefore 
consisted almost entirely of members of the United Muslim
if
Party and Huq subsequently lost his membership of the CEB. 
Although in theory Jinnah had a choice, there were strong 
pressures on him to select the United Muslim Party as his ally. 
First, Huq was .unreliable and unwilling to accept Jinnah1s 
authority. Secondly, there seemed little possibility in 
Bengal of establishing a rapprochement with Congress on terms 
acceptable to the League. Lastly, Jinnah received his most
■*TR Bengal, November 1936 II.
^Statesman, 10/8/36.
•^Times of India. 2A/8/36.
A
Ibid., 26/8/36 and 3/11/36.
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committed support in Bengal from members of the Calcutta busi-r* 
ness community such as M.A.H.Ispahani, who were linked to the 
United Muslim Party rather than to Huq.'*'
Bihar
Bihar in the 1930s was almost entirely a rural province. Al­
though its tenurial system resembled that of Bengal and its 
social and cultural patterns to some extent those of U.P., 
its political development had been very different from both.
Although challenged from below, the landowning section of 
society controlled Congress in Bihar. While supporting the 
Gandhian approach to politics it was able to preserve its own 
interests. Caste was an important factor in the province’s 
politics, both as a cleavage within the landowning group 
and in reinforcing the social gap batween landlord and tenant*
Most landlords were either Rajputs or Bhumihar Brahmans 
(Babhans), between whom a traditional rivalry existed.
Kayasthas provided the other major element of the province's 
elite.^
The controlling element within Congress was made up of
3
Rajputs, Bhumihar Brahmans, and Kayasthas. Final authority
rested indisputably with Rajendra Prasad, who was a Kayastha,
if
but below him factions tended to form on caste lines. Apart
^Kamruddin Ahmad, The Social History of East Pakistan (2nd ed.
1967), pp. 3^-3. See also Ispahani, Qaid-e-Azam Jinnah as I 
Knew Him, pp. 17 and 23-33.
2Ramashray Roy, 'Caste and Political Recruitment m  B i h a r m  Rajm 





from the problem of internal dissension the landlords within 
Congress had to face outside challenges. The most serious was 
from the kisan movement aided by members of the CSP.^ " This 
was a genuine reaction to rural conditions, although the 
leadership may have included itinerant radicals from the towns. 
Its mass activities did not immediately concern Congress but 
throughout 1936 and after the elections its leaders attempted 
to extract concessions from the Bihar PCC. In return they 
could offer electoral support* Congress leaders were, how­
ever, sufficiently confident in their hold on the majority'
of the electorate to reject most of their proposals, for
2
example functional representation. A Kisan Inquiry Committee
was set up in pursuance of the Lucknow Congress request, but
its activities were primarily concerned with electioneering.^
Although he had reportedly made concessions to the orthodox
position as part of an agreement, Sahajanand Saraswati was
so disappointed with the number of election tickets given to
kisan sympathizers that he resigned from the PCC, although
if
he did not withdraw entirely from Congress. Another challenge 
to the Congress leadership came from the Tribeni Sangh which 
translated economic protest into caste arithmetic and com­
plained that only three Congress candidates came from the
^See above, p. 117.
^FR Bihar, August 1936 I.
^Ibid., June 1936 I.
^PR Bihar, 3/12/36.
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63 lakhs of Jadavs, Kurmis, and Kushwahas, while were of 
Rajput, Babhan, or Kayastha origin.^ It does not, however, 
appear to have been a serious threat. The elements of class 
and caste combined could in some circumstances have led to 
the emergence of a fully-fledged tenant party, but in Bihar 
the kisan movement lacked adequate access to local power 
structure. In addition, Congress could point to some genuine 
achievements on behalf of the whole rural population, parti­
cularly after the Bihar earthquake of 193^*
Besides a tenant party, Bihar also lacked a Hindu com­
munal party. This reflected the absence of a vigorous urban 
intelligentsia as well as of direct economic conflict be­
tween communities* There were no particular regional grievances 
and the principal Hindu Sabha leader in the area, Jagat- 
narayan Lai, was known for his pro-Congress sympathies. It 
was therefore possible for an agreement to be reached be­
tween Congress and the CNP without the difficulties that were 
encountered in western India. Under this agreement the Con­
gress Nationalists were allowed to nominate seven candidates
from the list approved by Congress, who would have freedom
2
of speech on communal questions. 4
Although the landowning class in general supported 
Congress, there remained some individuals, mostly leading
^AICC E6/1937, Jagdeva Singh (organizer of Tribeni Sangh) 
to . Nehru, V V 37. See also PR Bihar, lVl/37.
2
Times of India. 2/11/36. The main difference between this 
and other agreements appears to be that the CNP did not have 
carte blanche in its choice of candidates. As in Berar, the 
Congress sympathies of the CNP ( or DSP) leader may have been 
the factor which persuaded the central leadership to accept 
the pact. Prasad's sanction would also have been important.
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landowners, who had been too closely associated with the 
government to stand for Congress. Deprived, however, of the 
support of the lesser landowners, their position was very 
weak. Congress gained the support of the Scheduled Castes 
primarily by allying itself with the Depressed Classes League, 
headed by Jagjivan Ram. Congress had merely to pay the price 
of accepting ready-made npminations. A pact was established 
before the primary elections took place and in nine of the 
fifteen seats no contest took place.^
As in U.P., the Muslim community was more urbanized 
than ±he Hindu, although its traditional leadership came from 
the landowners. With most Hindu landowners supporting Con­
gress there was no possibility of a cross-communal party 
emerging and most Muslims supported either the United Muslim 
Party or the Independent Muslim Party. The former was led by 
Syed Abdul Aziz, a prominent figure in past Bihar politics,
the latter by Maulana Sajjad, who had some sympathy for Con- 
2
gress. The Ahrars formed a third group. Although they carried
on negotiations with Sajjad, in the end they contested the
......................................................  3  . . .
elections separately. There were also a number of inde­
pendent Muslim candidates.
^RO 20/IV/36-F, 'Summary of General Results of Primary 
Elections of Scheduled Caste Candidates'.




To an even greater extent than in the other multilingual pro­
vinces, Bombay's politics existed within separate regional 
compartments In the north was Gujarat, economically one of 
the most advanced areas of India. All levels of Hindu society 
there supported Congress and within it the established leader­
ship. Several factors accounted for this overwhelming support. 
First, Congress leadership at this time was not the preserve 
of any particular caste or economic interest. Although Brah­
mans were well represented, others were not excluded. Culti­
vating castes, notably the Patidars, the traditional mer­
cantile castes, and the mill owners all had a share of power 
within Congress.'1’ Secondly, the prevailing ideology of 
Congress which stressed social harmony was reflected in its 
actions in Gujarat. Gandhi himself hadestablished the Ahmeda- 
bad Textile Labour Association; the Bardoli satyagraha proved 
that Congress had the best interests of the cultivators at 
heart; the headquarters of the Harijan Sevak Sangh were at 
Sabarmati. Thirdly, both Gandhi and Patel were natives of 
Gujarat, and the area had been the scene of the most famous 
episodes of civil disobedience. Much of Congress's ideology 
of action derived from traditional Gujarati ways of thought.
In the Marathi-speaking parts of Bombay, however, the 
spirit of Bal Gangadhar Tilak was still strong and his 
former followers were a large part of the political elite.
Some continued within Congress; the more prominent established
^For the caste composition of the Bombay Assembly, see 
chapter table *f.^ . The Patidars came exclusively from 
Gujarat.
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first the Responsive Co-operation Party and then the DSP,
whose role as a Hindu communal party has already been noted.^
According to a Congress report in 1937? Poona was 'the temple
2
of... responsivism*. In the mid-1930s, however, the Maha­
rashtra PCC was dominated not by Tilakites but by Gandhians, 
led by Shankarrao Deo. It also contained a number of young 
socialists. Recognizing the support that the DSP enjoyed and 
the close links that its members had with Congress, Deo was 
prepared to consider the possibility of an electoral arrange­
ment and engaged in negotiations with Aney in mid-1936- The
latter was, however, unable to persuade the DSP to accept
3
the terms offered and therefore resigned as president.
N. C. Kelkar continued the talks with Deo but was unable to
If
reach a satisfactory agreement. Aney was replaced as presi­
dent by the overtly anti-Congress L.B.Bhopatkar under whom
e;
arrangements we re made to contest the elections,"' The 
Maharashtra PCC was less prepared to make concessions to 
another politically powerful group, the Khots of Ratnagiri 
district. Under pressure from above it was forced to tone down 
its attacks on them, but the Khot Association nevertheless 
put up its own candidates.^
^See above, p. 1^5.
p
AICC E23(D/1937? ’The Election Campaign in Maharashtra1.
T^irnes of India. 28/7/36, 3/8/36, and 17/9/36.
Ibid., 19/9/36.
5Ibld., 5/10/36.
AICC E23(i)/l937, loc.cit. Individual members of the DSP, 
notably S. L. Karandikar, were also active in the Khot Association.
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Congress in Maharashtra had to consider its relations 
not only with the old political elite but also with other 
sections of the population whose political strength was in­
creasing* The non-Brahman cultivating castes, themselves 
divided between Marathas and others, particularly Lingayats, 
were fighting a twofold battle against landlords and Brahman 
arrogance* Earlier, Congress had been associated with both, 
and in the 1920s some non-Brahmans had found that co-operation 
with the government was an easy road to power. By the mid- 
1930s Congress already contained a few non-Brahmans, notably 
K. M. Jedhe, and during 1936 a determined effort was made to 
win over the community en bloc* partly by nominating a 
number of non-Brahman candidates and partly by direct contact 
with established leaders.'*' Non-Brahman candidates had in any 
case to be put up for the seats reserved for the Maratha 
castes, and they were put up for other seats also. It was 
clear that Congress would be the future fount of power and it 
had shed some of its earlier features which had repelled the 
non-Brahmans. Jedhe utilized his position to win over a 
section of the community. At a provincial non-Brahman confer­
ence at the beginning of 1936 it was reported that there was
a division between the younger non-Brahmans and the rest over
2the attitude to be adopted towards the 1933 Act. The split
continued until in July a number of non-Brahmans decided to 
3
join Congress. It was later reported that the split had
■*Tor a general ccount of the non-Brahmans and Congress, see 
Maureen L*P.Patterson, 1 Caste and Political Leadership in 
Maharashtra’, Economic Weekly vol. vi, 25/9/5^j pp. 1063-7 
and below, pp. 2£>1-2„
^Leader,2/1/36.
^Leader, 27/5/36, FR Bombay, July 1936 II, and August 1936 I.
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been patched up, and official non-Brahman candidates were put
up.^ Some defections were permanent, however, and further
weakened the position of the estabU shed leadership within
the community.
The Scheduled Castes in Maharashtra were dominated by
the Mahars both numerically and in terms of political
awareness. Unlike most Scheduled Castes their political aware*
ness stretched some way back and expressed itself in a vigorous
independence of other parties. This was the result partly of
the charismatic qualities of Dr, B.R.Ambedkar, the principal 
2
Mahar leader. In order to contest the election, Ambedkar
2
established the Independent Labour Party in August 1936.
In theory it was open to anyone, but its support came al­
most entirely from the Mahars. Not believing that Congress 
had the best interests of the Scheduled Castes at heart, 
Ambedkar wanted to get what was possible out of the working 
of the 1935 Act. The Chamars formed the other large Scheduled 
Caste in Maharashtra; they supported Congress, partly at
if
least because the Mahars did not.
Jinnah himself came from Bombay, and his political 
style and ideas found a ready reception there. The Muslim com­
munity was predominantly an urban, mercantile one and lacked 
a landlord element which could have provided an alternative
^TR Bombay, 12/12/36.
^For a general account of Mahar political activity, see Eleanor 
Zelliot, 'Learning the Use of Political Means: the Mahars
of Maharashtra', in Kothari (ed.), Caste in Indian Politics, 
pp. 29-69.
3
Times of India, 13/8/36. See also Zellior , op.cit., pp.^9-51* 





base fcr political action. The existing political leaders were 
prepared to form themselves into a party under Jinnah1s guidance. 
The Bombay Muslim League Board was formed at a meeting of some 
300 Muslims on 3 July 1936, which Jinnah chaired; its first 
meeting was held a few days later. Jinnah was appointed 
chairman; the cbher leading members were Sir A.M.K.Dehlavi 
and Suleman Cassum Mitha, who were both well-known politicians.^ 
Some existing leaders, for example Fazal Ibrahim Rahimtoola, 
continued to operate outside the orbit of the League but 
maintained contacts within it. The dominant position of the 
League was not seriously challenged.
Although Gujarat and Maharashtra formed separate politi­
cal systems, for some purposes they were compelled to inter­
act. In terms of population Maharashtra predominated, but 
Gujaratis were more prominent within Congress. Bombay city 
provided one arena in which competition took place. The 
position there was complicated by the Parsi community, which 
had provided many Congress leaders in the past, and by the 
complex of radical activity based on the CSP and the trade 
union movement. The radicals were treated hostilely by the
local Congress leadership, and the application of the Communist
2
R.S.Nimbkar for an election nomination was rejected. Parsis 
continued to have an important place within Bombay city, but 
their position at the provincial level was precarious. The
^Leader, 8/7/36, and Times of India, 20/7/36.
^AICC El^/1936, S.A.Dange to Nehru, 19/1/37,and FR Bombay, 
November 1936 I.
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Bombay city Congress in the 1930s was controlled by a combin­
ation of Parsis and Gujaratis, and in the 193^ elections 
to the Central Assembly a Congress candidate in Bombay was 
said to have lost through attempting to rely on Gujarati 
solidarity.^ The other point of conflict at this time was 
the question of the leadership of the Assembly party. Here 
population numbers told, and B.G.Kher, a previously little-
known figure from Maharashtra, was preferred to K.M.Munshi, a
2
Gujarati, and K.F.Nariman, a Parsi.
C.P.
The politics of C.P. in many ways resmbled those of Bombay, 
although they were more parochial in style, and there were 
close links between the Marathi-speaking parts of the two 
provinces. In the northern part of C.P. was the Hindi­
speaking tract of Mahakoehal. As in Gujarat, Congress . 
predominated. It had suffered a setback when E. Raghavendra 
Rao, a former president of . the Mahakoshal PCC and
leader of the Swaraj Party in the C.P. Council, had left 
Congress to become a minister, but in general it enjoyed 
support from the dominant groups in the area. A few landlords 
were strong enough to stand as independents but the urban 
professional classes were firmly behind Congress. The 
pro-Hindi movement in the area was given a sympathetic hear­
ing. Unlike Bihar, there was no kisan movement, perhaps
■^JP *f08, Jayakar to Sapru, 23 /11/3^*
^AICC E7(i)/1937» and AICC E?(iii)/1937» passim, and PR Bombay, 
13/11/36.
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because economic categories were less clearly defined.
In the Marathi-speaking parts of C.P., which formed
the Congress provinces of Nagpur and Vidharba, Tilak's
influence had been widespread, and the same political parties
were found as in Bombay. The major difference was that the
two PCCs were sympathetic to the aspirations of the DSP
and in both provinces pacts were concluded under which the
local DSP units gave their support to Congress in return for
a guaranteed number of tickets and a declaration of opposition
to the Communal Award, in contravention of official Congress
policy.^ * In Nagpur the pact was vetoed by the national
leadership, partly because the list of candidates proposed by
N.B.Khare, the PCC president and an extreme Hindu nationalist,
2
was offensive to non-Brahman susceptibilities. In Berar,
3
however, despite a protest by Nehru, the pact was implemented. 
This may have reflected the powerful position of Aney within 
Berar and his strong links with many Congress leaders • In 
addition to the DSP candidates, a number of other Hindu national­
ist leaders stood as Hindu Sabha, Nationalist, or independent 
candidates.^
The non-Brahman movement in the Marathi-speaking parts 
of C.P. was not as substantial as in Bombay, but a focus was
1Times of India, 9/II/36; PR C.P., 9/12/36.
^Times of India, 20/11/36 and 23/12/36; PR C,P., 9/12/36.
^AICC El/1936, Nehru to Brijlal Biyani, 30/11/36.
^Times of India, 23/12/36; PR C.P., IO/H/36.
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provided by the Shetkari Sangh and some candidates were put up.^
Some prominent non-Brahman leaders, however, joined Congress
2
and were selected as candidates. The action of the central 
leadership in ensuring that the list of candidates in the 
Nagpur area was not dominated by Hindu nationalists and direct 
appeals on economic issues by Congress leaders were both 
of use in obtaining non-Brahman support. Scheduled Caste 
support was divided between the Independent Labour Party, 
locally influential figures, and Congress-sponsored candidates 
The Mahars were less dominant than in Bombay and the remainder 
of the Scheduled Castes had virtually no organization.
Perhaps because there was no leader from C.P, with a 
national reputation and unchallenged authority, both the 
Mahakoshal and the Nagpur PCCs were particularly subject to 
factional disputes. There was at the same time latent hosti­
lity between the Hindi- and Marathi-speaking areas but this 
was partly concealed by cross-PCC links between factions.
The Mahakoshal PCC was divided into the Govind Das and D.P.
3
Mishra and the Ravi Shanker Shukla factions; the Nagpur 
PCC was dominated by. N. B. Khare,. who faced.continual oppo­
sition from other Hindu nationalists, particularly Poonamchand
^TR C.P., October 1936 II. 
^ R  C.P., 7/3/37.
5PR C.P., 10/11/36.
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Eanka,^ The main link was between Khare and the Mishra-Das 
2
faction.
Muslim politics in C.P. were urban-based, but unlike 
Bombay the leadership was sharply divided into factions, 
led by Rauf Shah and M.Y.Shareef respectively, both of whom 
had been prominent figures in the 1920s. Both sides were 
represented in the CEB but established separate election
3
boards. Jinnah visited Nagpur at the beginning of January
1937 but failed to reconcile the two groups, although a ten-
if
tative pact had earlier been achieved. In the event the 
Shareef group became the official League representatives, 
but the choice appears to have been totally arbitrary, as 
Shareef himself later defected to Congress for the sake of 
a ministership.
Madras
The province of Madras was divided into Tamil- and Telugu- 
speaking areas, but in both the major political divisions of 
the 1920s had followed the cleavage between non-Brahman and 
Brahman. In the early 1920s the Justice Party had established 
itself as a party with some organizational structure outside 
the legislature. The non-Brahmans objected to Brahman ritual 
and social arrogance and also to their dominance within 
public life, although many Justice Party supporters were
1AICC Misc. 13/1937, Khare to Nehru, 7/12/36.
2GR C.P., September 1937 I.
3pr c.p., 9/12/36.
L
Times of India, k/l/y?.
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themselves substantial landowners. Congress was widely re - 
garded as a party of Brahmans intent on preserving their 
privileged position.'*’ By 1937? however, the situation had 
changed to the point where Congress was able to achieve a 
dramatic electoral victory.
The Justice Party had been defeated in 1926 by the Swaraj 
Party but had been able to re-establish its power following the 
withdrawal of Congressmen from the Council in 1930. During 
their period in office, Justice Party leaders attempted to 
strengthen their position by giving a larger share of govera-
2ment jobs to non-Brahmans, and by judicious use of patronage. 
The 1933 Act deprived the non-Brahman community of its re­
served seats but increased its representation in the elector­
ate. By 193^however, the Justice Party was in a very bad 
state. Congress victories in the Central Assembly elections 
and in many local board elections, together with defections, 
had demoralized and weakened it. It had always relied on the 
influence of substantial landowners among their caste fellows, 
mostly Kammas and Reddis, but this left room for other parties 
to erode its support. As the Justice Party relied on caste 
solidarity, so it was exposed to caste factionalism. Congress 
could also appeal directly to those who were dissatisfied with 
the Justice Party's policies, distribution of patronage, and 
general association with the politics of collaboration.
^E.F.Irschick, Politics and Social Conflict in South India
(1969).
2?R Madras, 1/11/36 and 1/3/37.
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Although in the 1930s Congress was the only party to 
which Brahmans belonged in any numbers it was no longer their 
exclusive preserve. Non-Brahmans within Congress secured 
their first victory when C.N.Muthuranga Mudaliar was elected 
president of the Tamilnad PCC in 1929.^ * Just as signifi­
cantly, he defeated S. Satyamurti for the same post towards 
the end of 1936. Satyamurti was particularly unpopular with 
the non-Brahmans and in recognition of their importance within
the electorate he was replaced as prospective leader of the
2
Congress group in the Assembly by Rajagopalachari. Although 
not a particular supporter of the non-Brahman movement he 
was recognized as having a genuinely national outlook and 
as being prepared to remove the social disabilities of the 
lower castes. Congress in south India, with the exception of 
the Kerala PCC, was in favour of office acceptance and of 
moderate economic and social policies, which must have com­
mended it to former Justice Party supporters. Entering the
arena of local board elections provided a means of recruit-
3ing through defections.
In the northern parts of the province, where landlord 
influence was stronger, the activities of the Kisan Sabha 
attracted support from sections of the community which had 
previously been ignored both by Congress and the non-Brahman
^Irschick, op.cit., pp. 328-9.
Madras, December 1936 I January 1937 II*
^Ibid., August 1936 I. Congress could also occasionally lose 
support: ibid., November 1936 II.
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movement.^ Although the kisan movement obtained some of its 
support through a direct economic appeal, it was also signifi­
cant that its leader, N.G.Ranga, was a Kamma who led a caste
2
faction in Guntur district.
As well as suffering defections to Congress, the Justice 
Party also lost ground in certain areas to the Peoples Party, 
which competed for the support of the same groups. It had 
been founded in May 1936 by the Maharaja of Pithapuram as a 
vehicle for his personal ambitions and rivalry with the Raja 
of Bobbili, a principal Justice Party leader. He was able 
to use his substantial influence within East Godavari district, 
and the party put up candidates in other parts of Madras as 
well.^
The Scheduled Castes were courted by both Congress and 
the Justice Party. They suffered at the hands of Brahman and 
non-Brahman alike, but Congress was at least the party of 
Gandhi with whom Rajagopalachari was closely associated.
M.C.Rajah, the most prominent Scheduled Caste leader, had 
taken part in Montford politics but he preferred to continue 
to work in co-operation with the government as an independent 
rather than to start a separate party.
The Muslim community, which only formed 3°/o of the 
population, was divided between Tamil and Urdu speakers. There 
were a number of Congress-inclined Tamil speakers as well as
^Ibid..November 1936 II.
2
Myron Weiner, Party Building in a New Nation (1967), p.l*fO.
•^Leader, 21/5/36, PR Madras, l/H/36, and FR Madras, January 
1937 I,
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Urdu-speaking conservatives. Jamal Mahomed succeeded in
bringing both groups together in August 1936 into a Muslim
League Parliamentary Board. He then went on to reach some
sort of electoral understanding with Rajagopalachari. The
Urdu speakers on the board resigned in protest and formed the
Muslim Progressive Party which in fact opposed all communal 
1
unde r s tanding s .
By the 1930s, therefore, Congress in Madras enjoyed 
support from many sections of the community. Although it 
was to lose much of its non-Brahman support - E.V.R.Naicker 
created difficulties for the Congress ministry as soon as it 
was formed and kisan leaders and communists also came into 
direct conflict with it - at this period it approximated 
to the stereotype of a middle-class-led movement for political 
independence which transcended conflict. As far as can be seen 
from the evidence available, there was not even any serious 
conflict between the Tamil- and Telugu-speaking areas. Raja­
gopalachari was from TamilP*ld but he was recognized as having 
the authority of the inner circle of leaders behind him. 
Congress at this time supported the idea of linguistic pro­
vinces and, unlike the situation in Bombay, Tamil**tunkTelugu- 
speaking areas shared many features of their caste systems 
and cultural patterns.
This account of Muslim activity is drawn entirely from 
Kenneth McPherson, 'The Social Background and Politics of 
the Muslims of Tamil Nad, 1901-1937'j Indian Economic and 
Social History Review, vol. vi no. 4 (Dec. 19&9), pp. 381-402. 
See also Statesman, 3/8/36.
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N.W.F.P.
N.W.F.P. had only been made a full province as recently as 
1932 and only one election had been held under the 1919 Act, 
but although the traditional tribal leaders of society, the 
Khans, remained powerful, its politics were more clear- 
cut than in most other provinces. The Khans, like the land­
lords in other provinces, were reluctant to organize themselves. 
The only one with any reputation as a leader with the skills 
appropriate to electoral politics was Sir Abdul Qaiyum Khan, 
who had been a minister, but he was regarded as an upstart 
by many of the others and was at first unable to persuade them 
to co-operate with each other.^ It was only after Congress 
had scored a striking success in the Peshawar district board
elections in October 1936 that he was able to bring some of
2
them into a very informal relationship. Jinnah visited the 
province once before the elections and formed a committee, 
but was unable to bring any major leaders into his orbit.^
Congress was not, as in the Punjab, largely confined to 
the minority Hindu community but was almost entirely Muslim.
It had a large measure of autonomy and its militant incar­
nation, the Red Shirts or Khuda-i-Khidmatgars, were suspected 
by the British of departing not a little from the true path 
of Gandhian non-violence. Congress in N.W.F.P. remained 
banned after 1934 and it was only as a consequence of the
1PR N.W.F.P., 9/11/36.
2Ibid., 7/12/36.
^FR N.W.F.P., October 1936 I and II.
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pending elections that the government allowed the revival of 
a PCC in 1936. It was kept under strict surveillance and 
Abdul Ghaffar Khan remained externed from the province. Both 
Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his brother Dr. Khan Sahib, who became 
president of the PCC, were members of the Khanate, but most 
Congress support came from the ordinary villagers. *■
The Hindu and Sikh communities were confined to the 
towns and had always regarded themselves as under more or 
less permanent siege by the Muslim majority. Although Congress 
put up some Hindu candidates, the majority supported the Hindu- 
Sikh Nationalist Party, which was formed in 1936 with the aim 
of protecting the cultural and economic interests of the two 
communities.2
Orissa
Orissa had only been separated from Bihar on 1 April 1936 and 
its political life was even less developed than its sister 
province’s. Its public life had traditionally been dominated 
by a few feudal families, but Congress too had the support of 
many landowners and other influential figures. The Utkal Union 
which had led the fight for separation had been a focus of 
political activity before 1936 and had enjoyed the support
3
of both Congress and notables. After separation had been 
achieved Congress withdrew its support, but the other members
1PR N.W.F.P., 9/11/36; Olaf Caroe, The Pathans, 530 B.C.- 
A.D.1937 (1938). pp. ^31-3.
2FR N.W.F.P., December 1936 I.
^F.G.Bailey, Politics and Social Changes Orissa in 1939 
(1963), pp. 163-5'and 170.
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did not establish a single landlord party.1 Instead, two
factions among them started separate parties. The Maharaja of
Parlakimedi started the National Party, and the Rajas of
Kanika and Khallikote were responsible for the foundation of 
2
the United Party. Although both were threatened by Congress
they were not prepared to co-operate. Indeed, It was thought
that the Maharaja of Parlakimedi had surreptitiously supported
Congress in the Ganjam district board elections so as to de-
3
feat a landlord rival. It may be that the only reason land­
lord parties existed at all was because of the political ex­
perience gained in the Utkal Union. At all events, the two 
parties were nothing more than loose coalitions of notables.
Congress was able to exploit hostility to the feudal 
landowners both at elite and tenant level, but it too suffered 
from factional disputes. F.G.Bailey refers to a division within 
the Orissa Congress between Gandhians, mostly Karans from
Cuttackand Balasore, and Swarajists, mostly Brahmans from 
. A
Pun. These groups would seem to coincide with the factions
led by Harekrishna Mahtab and Nilkantha Das respectively.
During 1936 the latter was PCC president but he was defeated
5
at the beginning of 1937 hy Mahtab. There was also a kisan 





Bailey, op.cit., pp. 168-9.
^AICC G. 63/1936, Kanungo to AICC Secretary, 13/2/36; PR 
Orissa, 17/2/37-
^FR Orissa, October 1936 II.
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of declared policy the Orissa Congress appeared somewhat 
radical - at one stage a majority of the PCC was reported to 
be against office acceptance.^ This may simply have been 
window-dressing for election purposes, but it may have been a 
result of the domination of much of Orissa by a few non-Congress 
landlords.
Punjab
The Punjab was still in the 1930s the " main. recruiting ground 
for the Indian Army and the Government of India remained as 
anxious for its political stability as it had been at the time 
of Jallianwalla Bagh. The province was unique in 1936 in 
possessing a long-established and still-flourishing non-Congress 
party. Political tension was generated in the conflict between 
the Unionist Party and conservative Hindu nationalists. Jin- 
nah’s activities created an additional centre of interest 
within the Muslim community. Congress itself was unimportant 
although there were radicals with Congress sympathies among 
the urban Muslims and the Sikhs.
The Unionist Party had been founded in 1923 and bad domi­
nated Punjab politics since then. Sir Fazl-i-Husain remained 
its leader until his death in July 1936. Although this was 
untimely, the party was well enough established for Sir Sikander 
Hyat Khan to take over smoothly while Sir Chhotu Ram, Sir Fazl- 
i-Husain's principal Hindu lieutenant, provided continuity.
1PR Orissa, 17/2/37. See also ibid.'. 10/2/37.
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The party was an alliance of rural Muslim and Hindu - mostly 
Jat- landholders, with a certain number of urban Muslims. Its 
communal policy rested on the constitutional recognition of 
religiously defined communities but it also had an economic 
programme aimed at protecting the interests of the whole agri­
cultural sector. Central to it was the preservation of the 
1902 Land Alienation Act.'*' In some ways the party was a 
landlord party. Its leadership was drawn from the principal 
landowners and it suffered severely from the continuation of 
traditional feuds such as that between the Tiwana-Noon and 
Wah jhmilies. At the same time it secured its mass support 
through its policies as much as through the exploitation of 
feudal loyalty. The Punjab contained a large number of in­
dependent landholders and substantial tenant farmers.
The Unionist Parly’s main antagonists, both on communal 
and economic grounds, were the well-organized Hindus from 
tlie mercantile and professional groups. They were by no means 
confined to the urban areas - on^ e of their principal grievances 
was the Land Alienation Act which limited their right to ac­
quire land - but their economic interests were opposed to the
landholding community’s. There was even a ’non-agriculturists
2
conference’ which acted as a spokesman for them. The Hindu 
Sabha was also an organization to which many belonged, for 
communalism embraced economic grievances. During the Montford
^Azim Husain, Fazl-i-Husain (19^6), pp. 153-5* See also Khush- 
want Singh, A History of the Sikhs vol. ii (1966), p.225.
^Tribune, 28/V36.
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period leaders such as Sir Gokul Chand Narang had been mini­
sters, but there had been no idea of joint responsibility 
with Unionist ministers. The Hindu Election Board (later known 
as the National Reform Party) was established in early 1936 
to cope with the 1937 elections.^ Its principal leader was 
Raja Narendra Nath. The Khalsa National Party, founded in
July 1936, was similarly the party of those Sikhs who had co-
2
operated in working the Montford reforms. Although opposition
to the Communal Award united them with the Hindus, the Khalsa
National Party leaders came mostly from the leading Sikh
landowning families.
Each of the three parties faced a challenge from within
its own community. The Unionists’ main opposition was from
the urban areas where several parties drew support from workers 
3
and small traders. The largest was the Ahrar Party, already 
mentioned as having support in several parts of northern India. 
Although bitterly opposed to it over the Shahidganj mosque 
dispute, the Ittihad-i-Millat drew support from the same strata. 
Its leader was Muhammad Alam who, like some of the Ahrar 
leaders, had previously belonged to Congress. Jinnah was in­
tensely concerned with the Punjab, because success there would 
provide a solid base. He had visited Lahore in connection 
with the Shahidganj dispute in February 1936 and he returned
^Leader, 30/4/36. The Hindu Sabha also set up an election board 




For the antipathy to the Unionists of Muslim intellectuals, 
see Husain.op.cit., pp. 313,-l6.
L.
FR Punjab, May 1936 II.
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at the end of April to attempt to bring as many groups as
possible under the umbrella of the League. Although he had
talks with leaders of all parties, including Fazl-i-Husain,
only the Ahraxs showed any interest.'1' At this stage the
Unionist Party felt that it could only lose support by linking it-
2self to Jinnah and his radical allies. It felt that its 
future lay as a provincial party rather than as part of an 
all-India grouping. Jinnah did have some support in the Pun­
jab, particularly from dissident Unionists such as Ghazanfar 
Ali Khan, but the League remained weak until after the 
elections.^
The challenge to the Hindu Election Board came primarily 
from Congress. Within the Hindu community its support came 
mainly from the urban areas and on all but communal issues 
its policies were little different from other Hindu groups.
Indeed, some of the leaders of the Hindu Election Board had 
earlier belonged to it. The leadership was sharply divided 
into two factinns, led respectively by Satyapal and Gopichand 
Bhargava, and the party was not a major force in Punjab poli­
tics. Between Congress and the Hindu Election Board was the 
Congress Nationalist Parly, led by Mahashe Krishan, which 
hoped to combine the appeals of both. In the face of the 
common Unionist enemy, the three groups made several attempts
Leader, 2/5/36 and *f/5/36; Tribune, 2/5/36 and 5/5/36*
^Husain, op.cit., pp. 307-8 and 310.
3
Unionists, however, continued to be the strongest gropp 
within the Punjab Muslim League Council, even while they 
boycotted the election board: FR Punjab, June 1936 I.
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to establish a common platform. The initiatives came from
each group in turn and lasted until Malaviya's visit to the
province at the end of October. It would appear that some sort
of understanding was reached between Congress and the CNP but
it did not extend to every constituency.^ It seems to have
depended on personal relations between the respective leaders
in the various districts.
Unlike the Hindu community, the Sikhs were sharply
divided and there was no possibility of a reconciliation.
Economic divisions within the community had hardened in the
1920s, partly as a consequence of a three-cornered fight over
2
the control of Sikh religious endowments. The Akali Dal that 
was then formed provided the opposition to the Khalsa National 
Party in the 1930s. It had always had links with Congress 
and its only major difference was over the question of the 
Communal Award. Although in June 1936 it stated that it would 
contest the elections independently, by December an electoral
3
pact had been established with Congress. There had always 
been a number of Sikh revolutionaries and several of them be­
came Congress candidates under this arrangement, although 
Akali candidates retained their separate identity.
■^ AICC E17/1937, Satyapal to Nehru, 25/12/36, and secretary 
of Punjab CSP to president of Punjab PCC, 29/9/36.
^Khushwant Singh, op.cit., chapter 13- The quarrel was not 
directly between the two groups of Sikhs but the moderates 
were eventually drawn in by Sir Malcolm Hailey on the side 
of the government.
^Leader, 16/6/36; Tribune, 15/12/36, and AICC E17/1936, 
Gurdit Singh to Nehru, n.d.
213.’
Sind
Sind had been separated from Bombay in 1936 so as to give its 
Muslim population, who formed an overwhelming majority, a 
separate identity. The Hindu community was very largely urban 
and mercantile but there was not the open social structure 
and separatist sentiment which had led in N.W.F.P, to the 
emergence of Congress as a Muslim party. Politics were thus 
very simple, Muslim politics were dominated by leading land­
owners and pirs (religious dignitaries); Congress and the 
Hindu Sabha vied to protect the economic and cultural interests 
of the Hindus.
The three most prominent Muslim leaders were Sir Ghulam
Hussain Hidayatullah, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, and Abdulla
Haroon. With the encouragement of the governor, the United
Party was formed towards the end of 193& as a loose coalition
of landlords.'1' Originally all three leaders were associated
with it, but Hidayatullah almost immediately broke away and
was in fact able to gather enough support from among the
elected MLAs to form the ministry. Although the United Party
also secured a number of seats, it split into factions im-
2
mediately after the elections. Jinnah made no headway at 
all within the province. The Muslim .majority was such that 
the leaders felt no need at the time to secure additinnal 
safeguards at the cost of subjecting themselves to an all- 
India organization.
XPR Sind, 16AQ/36; GR Sind, 19/ V 37.
2GR Sind, 19/ V 37; PR Sind, 22/3/37; FR Sind, November 
1936 I,
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Congress and the Hindu Sabha had to obtain their support 
from the same sections of the population. The differences be­
tween them appear to have been as much personal as ideological, 
although Congress made no attempt to outflank the Hindu Sabha 
by declaring its open opposition to the Communal Award. Con­
gress was divided into two factions. The dominant one, led 
by Jairamdas Doulatram and Choithram Gidwani, was largely 
comprised of members of the Amil community'}. Its position was 
strengthened by Doulatram1s links with the all-India leader­
ship, The opposing faction was led by Swami Govindanand and 
seems to have been centred on Karachi. It wanted Congress 
to take a stronger line against the Communal Award but was
powerless in the face of the central support its opponents re- 
2
ceived. After his application for a Congress ticket was re­
jected Govindanand in fact broke away to form a ’Peopled
3
Congress Party1, but it did not receive popular support.
U.P.
To the British, U.P. was perhaps the meet important of the
provinces. Although its population was not the largest nor its
strategic position vital, it was, with the Punjab, the province
where there seemed the most chance of integrating British
rule into the structure of rural society through the co-operation
if
of both Hindu and Muslim landowners. Conversely, it was
\lCC El8/1936, Hiranand Advani to Nehru, 23/1/37.
2
Ibid., Govindanand to Nehru, 3/12/36.
■^ FE Sind, November 1936 I.
if
Thomas E. Metcalf, The Aftermath of Eevolt: India, 1837-
1870 (1965). pp. 172-3.
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the province where Cnngress posed the most real threat not 
only to British rule hut also to the social order. Many 
middle-class Muslims and Hindus shared a common cultural back­
ground and as in Bengal there was no sharp urban/rural divide. 
United action against imperialism as well as in favour of it 
was possible*
Congress in U.P. was well established before the Gandhian 
takeover but after 1919 it took on a new life and was one of 
the chief centres of non-co-operation and rural unrest. During 
the civil disobedience period Congress again received support 
from many rural areas as well as from the towns. Although it 
never had their full loyalty, it received support from a 
section of the Muslim community. By the mid-1950s it almost 
certainly contained a numerical majority of socially con­
servative elements but the radicals who had emerged in several 
of the major cities made all the running.^- Nehru’s position 
in all-India politics gave them protection and prestige. U.P. 
was also notable for the number of its full-time social and 
political workers. The Servants of the People Society had 
many of its workers there, and the Kashi Vidyapith continued 
to operate.
Although the U.P. Congress was dominated by the upper 
castes - the Congress ministry of 1937 was known as the all- ^ 
Brahman ministry - caste conflict did not play a major part 
in politics. One reason was that, except for the Scheduled 
Castes, no single caste formed a large section of the
]_
For examples, see above, pp. 129-30 and 1^2.
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population. ^ A second reason may be thct the efforts made by 
Congress leaders to improve rural conditions reconciled the 
lower castes to their leadership.
Many landlords in U.P. chose to establish separate 
parties, rather than work through Congress as in Bihar or 
Bengal (this was probably a cause rather than a consequence 
of the relative radicalism of the U.P. Congress). Congress 
received support from some of the small zamindars. but the 
aristocratic landowners who dominated parts of the U.P., en­
couraged by the government, set up the National Agriculturist 
Parties (NAPs) of Agra and Oudh, based on the local landowners 
associations. The NAPs were perhaps the archetypal landlord 
parties - Hindu and Muslim landlords combined in.^ effort to
preserve their position through carefully controlled develop-
2
ment of the rural areas. Despite prodding from the govern­
ment, however, they were unable to see that for the 1937 
elections the exercise of personal influence was not enough. 
Some Kanpur businessmen also supported the Agra NAP, although 
there was continued tension between them and the landlords.
Much o f the drive behind the A*gra NAP campaign in fact came
3
from Sir J.P.Srivastava, who was a businessman. Many NAP 
members maintained strong links with their respective com­
munal organizations; as these organizations decided to contest
^Paul Brass, 'Uttar Pradesh', in Jfyron Weiner (ed.), State 
Politics in India (1968), p.68.
*Tor a study of the NAPs in this period, see P.D.Reeves, 
'Landlords and Party Politics in the United Provinces,
193^-7', in D.A.Low (ed.), . Soundings in Modem South
Asian History (1968), pp.261-93*
3Ibid., p.272.
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the elections, so some landowners decided to stand for them 
rather than for the NAPs, or to stand jointly. The NAPs 
themselves, however, were partly protected from communal 
conflict by their loose structure and by separate electorates.
There were two strands in Hindu nationalist politics: 
landlords and the urban professionals. The former were able 
in some areas to gain support through their position in rural 
society. The latter, however, had to compete with Congress 
on the same ground. Almost all of them had at one time be­
longed to Congress and some o f them were active members of 
the Liberal Party, but nothing comparable to the DSP emerged. 
There were no regional grievances, nor was there a dissident 
group within Congress. Malaviya, who might have been a focus 
for a Congress Nationalist Party, was in U.P* prepared to rely 
on his jersonal influence within the party.
It has already been pointed out that it was vital for 
Jinnah to have a firm basis in U.P. and that his progressive 
posture was at least partly designed to attract those Muslims 
associated with the Muslim Unity Board and the Deoband seminary. 
He had also to consider the possibility of attracting the Mus­
lim members of the NAP and prominent independent Muslim land­
lords. He had an initial advantage in that some of the Muslim 
landlords had been prominent in the League beforel936, and he 
was able to persuade representatives of all groups to join 
the CEB in April 1936. His triumph was short-lived, however, 
as disputes flared up between the two halves. After a public 
controversy with Khaliquzzaman over their relations with the 
NAPs,the Nawab of Chhatari and Sir Muhammed Yusuf resigned
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from the CEB.^ At the beginning of July a meeting of Muslim
leaders was held to consider alternative courses of action.
Most who attended were NAP members, but other leading Muslims 
2
were also present. A number of Muslim landlords, led by the 
Rajas of Salempur and Mahmudabad, remained with the provincial 
League board, but most swung against Jinnah*^ Although most 
of the formerly pro-Congress Muslims followed Khaliquzzaman's 
lead, Congress retained enough support to make it worth its 
while to put up a few Muslim candidates at the elections.
^Leader, 8/6/36, and 20/6/36. 
^Leader, 2/7/36.
3
At the initial meeting of the provincial League board in 
August, a group led by Liaquat Ali Khan walked out because 




During the period from the formation of the CPC in April 1936 
until the poll in the early part of 1937 j a number of pro­
cesses took place which may collectively be called the election 
campaign. The primary determinants of the nature of an election 
campaign are the unique features of the political system and 
culture concerned, but if the campaign is regarded as a self- 
contained process it can be analysed in more general terms.
In this chapter the various processes are described within a 
framework derived from a dichotomy between the categories of 
direct and indirect mobilization. The specific techniques 
used by each party are also analysed in terms of their pro­
bable effectiveness and theirimpact on the party's structure 
and characteristics. In the first place, however, the 1936-7 
campaign will be located on certain other dimensions common 
to all elections in a competitive party system.
Scope One definition of an election campaign would be those 
political activities carried on with the specific object of 
persuading electors to cast their votes for a particular 
party or candidate. Such a definition, however, faces diffi­
culties if applied to the 1936-7 campaign in India. It is 
first of all possible, because of the limited franchise, that 
some activities ostensibly directed to raising electoral sup­
port were in fact intended to reach the majority of non­
electors. Conversely, Congress as a movement had members 
whose activities were not overtly political in the sense of
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being election-oriented, and who might even disagree with the 
wisdom of contesting elections, but who were nevertheless 
prepared to allow structures that they had built up to be used 
for electoral purposes. Secondly, the fact that the elections 
were to be held according to the provisions of the 1933 Act, 
and that therefore the new assemblies were to have much greder 
powers, was itself directly responsible for the number of small 
parties which came into existence during 1936.
It therefore seems that the definition of the campaign 
should be widened to include all political or quasi-political 
activities which took place from April 1936 to February 1937*^ " 
For convenience, major .areas of activity with wider relevance 
have heen treated in separate chapters, but they must also be 
regarded as part of the campaign.
The Timescale The timescale of an election campaign has other 
relevances besides being a contributory determinant of its 
saliency. In the English system an election can be held at short 
notice, and where it is not held at the end of a five-year 
period it is usually the result of a crisis within the legis­
lative subsystem or.of the calculation by the prime minister 
of short-term advantages. Party organization remains in readi­
ness for a campaign, but the election itself only dominates 
political life for a short time. Where fixed terms are laid 
down for elected bodies, the campaign can develop according to
^Cf, Thomas Hodgkin's definition of African nationalism as a 
description of all groups opposing European authority, what­
ever their ideology and institutional forms: Nationalism in
Colonial Africa (1936), p.23. The scope of an election 
campaign is not necessarily to be equated with the importance 
of the election's functions within the political system.
In some situations, for instance, an election whose main 
function is the symbolic affirmation of legitimacy may be 
attended by much display and publicity.
a schedule. American party conventions, for example, not only 
fulfil a vital role in the choice of presidential candidates, 
but are also an integral part of the public display necessary 
in a campaign. In India, after the suspension of civil dis­
obedience in 1933, Congressmen who were not committed to the 
Gandhian or socialist programmes had had very little to do, 
except perhaps to contest local elections. Provincial councils, 
from which all Congressmen had resigned in 1930» provided little 
excitement for members of any party in view of their imminent 
disappearance. The coming elections and the associated 
question of office acceptance were therefore discussed long in 
advance, and the ordinary business of political life acquired 
a patina of relevance to them. The Congress Working Committee 
passed its first resolution on office acceptance at its Wardha 
meeting in July 19331 and stated that it did so in response to 
several resolutions passed on the subject by lower Congress 
committees. At the same meeting, a resolution from the Berar 
PCC concerning election organization was referred to the Parlia­
mentary Board. The AICC also discussed the question of office 
acceptance at its meeting at Madras in October. It took no 
stand itself but raised no objection to general discussion of 
the issue within Congress.'1' A further consequence of the 
protracted timescale and the absence of alternative political 
interest, and also of the wide scope of the campaign, was 
that considerable awareness of the election was generated 
among the general public. The salience of the campaign was
'or references, see above, p.110.
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one factor in producing the relatively high turnout of 5^°/o 
in an electorate largely composed of new members.
The approximate date of the elections was known at least 
a year in advance, although the official announcements were not 
made until the latter part of 1936.^ * This led to the formal 
inauguration of campaigns long before they actually got under 
way. A further feature of the 1937 election was that polling 
dates varied from province to province, according to admini­
strative convenience. Even within each province polling was
spread over some days. This meant that there were possibilities
2
for co-operation, as happened between the U.P. and Bihar PCCs.
A ’band wagon1 effect was also possible as the results were
3
not announced simultaneously.
Perception of the electorate In a country with a well-established 
electoral system, information about the class or ethnic com­
position of the electorate can be assumed to be equally available 
to all the major parties. The development of opinion surveys 
has also provided campaign planners with behavioural data about 
particular groups in the electorate. In India in 1936 there 
was a new but limited franchise. This affected the.ecological 
information that was available and also the campaign managers' 
perception of what would happen. Most qualifications for 
electors were based on the possession of land or property, and
economic programmes could therefore easily be angled to appeal
^See above, pp. 80-1.
^AICC El(a)/1936, 'Report of the All-India Parliamentary 
Committee', 13/3/37*
■^ HPU 1/52/36, Emerson to Craik, l^ f/9/36. See also Pran Nath
Chopra, Rafi Ahmad Kidwai (i960), p.*f6.
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to the tenants or cultivating landowners who formed the bulk 
of the electorate. Separate electorates obviated the need 
for balancing Hindu and Muslim votes. Further information 
about the voters was, however, limited. This was largely ir­
relevant to those like Nehru who simply took the election 
campaign as a starting point for a broad appeal to the masses, 
but the campaign strategists and district leaders had to take 
important decisions in areas where their knowledge and per*- 
ception was inadequate.
Previous experience was of limited use. Many locaLboard 
elections were fought on more limited franchises than those 
used in 1937, and in any case modem experience in India has 
shown that such results can be very different from those of 
legislature elections.^ Candidates and local leaders always 
have considerable unsystematic knowledge of the population* 
Congressmen would usually have taken part in civil disobedience 
and were often active in social service organizations, but 
this by no means enabled them to predict how a peasant would 
vote. Many Congressmen and other politicians, although 
often coming from rural backgrounds, lived in the district 
towns and followed professional occupations. Landlords, 
whether in or out of Congress, might well overestimate the 
inpact of their position. Local leaders were also liable 
to have their outlook distorted by considerations of local 
politics. Leaders at higher levels were detached from 
purely local issues, but might be affected by their own
For example, Weiner, Party Building in a New Nation. p.l69, 
and Donald B. Rosenthal. The Limited Elite (l970). chapter 
9.
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factional alignments. They were also more likely than local 
leaders to miss the significance of hitherto non-politicized 
elements in the electorate and of social structures at the 
local level that might affect voting.
There were three areas in which lack of information about
the electorate was a serious limitation* First, there was no 
exact way of relating the economic divisions on which the 
franchise was based to the equally valid cleavages of caste 
and village factionalism. Secondly, strategy based on any 
pattern of group support had to take into account variable 
rates of turnout. The use of a wealth qualification for the 
franchise meant that, where a group was economically backward, 
an automatic equalizing mechanism in effect existed, but the 
turnout rate was determined by cultural as well as economic 
factors. A major complication was that the Scheduled Castes 
had been given .especially low qualifications, so as to en­
franchise a given percentage of them, and after the Poona Pact
a substantial number of general seats were reserved for their
members. As well as estimating relative turnouts, the plan­
ners had also to guess at the overall rate. Thirdly, in many 
parts of India newly enfranchised tenants were in a hier­
archical relationship with their landlords* Even where here­
ditary tenancies were assured by law, the landlord had other 
sanctions. Although the ballot was, at least theoretically, 
secret, there were frequent claims that landlords wore 
able to exercise undue influence.'*' Congress and non-landlord
^See above, p.75.
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parties had to choose between appealing directly to the tenants 
and making some sort of deal with the landlord. Campaign 
planners therefore had not only to decide what the composition 
of the electorate was, but also to make a further effort of 
the imagination to decide how best to approach the new electors. 
Mobilization Mobilization of mass support is a primary func­
tion of most political parties, but when it is carried out for 
electoral purposes it has several distinguishing features.
First, the support need not be placed on a regular institu­
tional basis. Many parties would not welcome or have the re­
sources to cope with a mass membership. Secondly, the units 
involved are finite. On the one hand, the voter has simply 
to mark a ballot paper, an act which is usually encouraged by 
the government of the day. On the other, the party's object 
is simply to have a particular individual elected. Almost all 
parties, of course, aim at achieving diffuse as well as speci­
fically electoral support, and this applies a fortiori in a 
colonial situation where the legitimacy of the regime is 
challenged. This being so, the dichotomy of direct and 
indirect mobilization is not completely valid, but it is 
heuristically useful when analysing an individual election 
campaign.
Direct mobilization includes all efforts made by the 
parties and their candidates to establish a direct relation­
ship with the electorate on the basis of the advantages, 
material and psychological, to be gained from their success 
at the polls.
Indirect mobilization describes those methods whereby
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the candidate or party exploits a relationship with the electors 
which was not primarily established for the purpose of gaining
electoral support. Where the candidate (or his party) does
not himself control the relationship, a two-stage process
operates in that he has first to secure the support of those
who do. Three types of relationship can be distinguished, ac­
cording to the position of those who control them:
(l) Associational relationships. Mass parties of extra- 
parliamentary origin frequently have allied organizations to 
cater for particular groups, and Congress was no exception.^- 
In addition to its peripheral political organizations, such 
as the Congress volunteers, and its informal links with the 
All-India Trades Union Congress, Congress was supported by 
bodies such as the All-India Women's Conference, the All- 
India Students' Federation, and the All-India Kisan Sabha, 
all of which were run by people with strong nationalist sym­
pathies. It would perhaps be wrong to speak of them as Con­
gress * fronts', but they lent general support to Congress 
objectives, and in some cases socialized their members into 
political roles. There were also the various social service 
organizations which had been started at Gandhi's initiative, 
and were under Congress auspices but completely autonomous.
For their leaders, Congiess remained the political expression 
of the national movement, but for some of those among whom 
they worked, the particular organization rather than Congress
■^ Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (1964 ed.), pp. xxx- 
X 3 d c l v  and 6.  Congress was not of course a true 'indirect' 
party.
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was the reality. It was a feature of the period that higher 
levels of personal commitment were often found among those 
working outside the arena of electoral politics. In a situ­
ation where a colonial government still retains power, non­
political organizations can be especially useful in blaming 
the ills of society onto the government. Although Congress 
did not actually control them, the organizations mentioned 
above were so closely bound up with it that their support 
for its election efforts was automatic. In many cases candi­
dates or Congress leaders held office within them at district 
or provincial level. Non-Congress candidates had a more 
limited range of associational relationships to draw on. Some 
would have held office within co-operative banks and other 
quasi-official bodies, while in some areas, particularly 
Bengal, kisan groups were under non-Congress control. Com­
munal pressure groups such as the Hindu Mahasabha, although 
based on ascriptive ties, were in some senses associational 
in that they appealed differentially to members of the pri­
mordial group.
(2) Ascriptive relationships. Where a candidate wished 
to mobilize support on a communal basis, he lad access to the 
religious and cultural leaders of his community, provided 
they agreed with his concept of communal action.^ Similarly 
he could appeal to his caste fellows for support. Such sup­
port could of course be given as a result of direct mobili­
zation techniques. There were obvious advantages to the
^Even when religious leaders did not support overtly com­
munal candidates, they could still use their influence, as 
did certain members of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind: see
above, p.1^6.
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elector in voting for a member of his own caste.^ Only those 
cases are being considered in this section where the internal 
structures of the caste and community were used to deliver the 
vote. That this happened at all was the result of the exist­
ence of different levels of political action in India. Models 
of political interaction derived from western competitive 
democracies are based on a polarity between elite(s) and mass 
within a single political system. Although leaders act in 
response to the articulated demands of the electorate, often 
transmitted by intermediaries, mobilization is essentially 
from the top downwards. In India, however, there are distinct 
levels or arenas of political action within the formal con­
stitutional unity of the nation. Since independence, an in­
creasing number of vertical linkages have been established 
which serve to integrate the various levels. On the one hand, 
the locus of power within the parties has steadily shifted 
towards the district level, and on the other, groups which 
previously functioned only at the parochial level have ex­
tended their scope.
In 1937) however, there were no such linkages as 
panchayati raj. Also, some new recipients of the franchise 
had not been socialized into the roles of elector or member 
of a political party whose instructions were to be carried 
out. They were not, however, socially isolated, and owed 
loyalty to their primary group and its leaders. Campaign 
managers were therefore unable to reach them effectively by
■^ Thus the Independent Labour Party and the specifically 
caste-based parties of the post-independence period.
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simple appeals to national or party interest. In many cases 
the party was associated with the group's traditional rivals 
at the lower levels of politics. Horizontal mobilization on 
economic issues was another possibility which was tried in 
some areas, but most parties lacked the resources and often 
the inclination. Some sort of bargain was therefore neces­
sary between the party leaders and the group or a section of 
it. From the group member's point of view, such an arrange­
ment provided better access to the administration and the 
possibility of individual members becoming actors at higher 
levels. The situation where a candidate was of the same caste 
or group as a substantial number of the electors has al­
ready been mentioned. The difficulty for the observer who 
has to rely on written records is to know whether such 
choices were merely prudent planning by the party's leaders 
or were the result of informal bargaining between • 
the party and the group. The major variables were probably 
the degree of political awareness among the group and the ex­
tent to which it was already represented within the party."*' 
An alternative means of establishing an agreement was for the 
group to form a political organization which could then bar­
gain directly with the party. This was liable to happen if 
the group concerned functioned over a wide area, and also if
"*"It was perfectly possible, however, for a group that had 
participated in Montford-style provincial politics to adapt 
itself to the radically new environment of 1936-7 by means 
ofgroup bargaining. 'The behaviour of non-Brahmans in Bombay 
and Madras could be analysed in this way.
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its traditional leadership was inadequate.'*' It is not, of 
course, being suggested that the parties in 1937 necessarily- 
organized their support on caste lines* Lack of information, 
factions both within the party and the caste, the political 
costs of exclusively caste-based support and the unwillingness 
of many to make the compromises that such a policy demanded 
all meant that caste mobilization was only one option, even 
where it was feasible.
(3) Hierarchical and factional relationships. As well as 
making use of ascriptive loyalties, party leaders could attempt 
to use other relationships. Landowners.considered that they 
commanded the support of their tenantry, and they were pre­
pared to trade this support for formal endorsement if they 
were themselves candidates, or for influence within the party 
if they were not. There were also men who in later times 
might have formed completely separate parties, but who in 
193^-7 felt themselves unable to break from Congress completely. 
Congress leaders sometimes tried to accommodate these men 
where they commanded support among the electorate, especially 
if their price was limited to a share of the nominations 
rather than control of policy.
The candidate has several times been mentioned as the 
means whereby the party is able to make use of the various 
types of indirect mobilization. It must be noted that a
^The peculiar position of the Scheduled Castes is relevant to 
this whole process. Their guaranteed seats gave them a much 
greater importance than before, but at the same time they often 
lacked any established leadership beyond the local level.
candidate may consciously establish a non-electoral relation­
ship with the local population with the intention of cashing it 
for electoral support.
Other categories can also be used for classifying tech­
niques of mobilization. The distinctions between vertical and
1 2 horizontal and between stalactite and stalagmite mobilization
both relate to structure, and parallels are possible with the 
categories suggested here. Vertical mobilization is related 
to 'two-stage' mobilization by hierarchical or caste leaders, 
but the dichotomy between vertical and horizontal perhaps sug­
gests a class structure that is not entirely applicable to 
India in 1936-7 and also diverts attention from the frag­
mentation of Indian local politics and from the mobilizing 
power at sill levels of the symbolism of national independence. 
In a colonal situation, all indigenous mobilization is of the 
'stalagmite' variety, but the further distinction made by 
Nett‘1 between 'national-constitutional' and party-based legi­
timation would be useful in a comparison of independence move- 
ments. It would serve to stress the legitimacy accorded by 
many Indian politicians in 1936-7 to the legislative in­
stitutions of the ra.j and in consequence to the elections.
Other classifications refer to the style of mobilization.
The dichotomy between ideological and instrumental appeals 
is useful. So also is the modem/traditional/saintly classi­
fication.^
^Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, The Modernity 
of Tradition (1967), pp. 2^-6.
J.P.Nettl, Political Mobilization (1967). pp. 271-2.
•^Ibid., p.219.
k
W.H.Morns-Jones, 'India's Political Idioms’, in C.H.Phi lips 
(ed.), Politics and Society in India (1963), pp. 133-3^.
Organizational Structures
Just as the officials had to develop new administrative tech­
niques for the elections, so did the party leaders. Before 
1936 only Congress had had a permanent administrative structure 
below the provincial level, and that had been developed for 
managing agitations rather than elections. The setting up of 
the CPC in April 1936 has already been shown to have been im­
portant in marking Congress’s emergence as a fully fledged 
political party which had integrated the parliamentary pro­
gramme into its activities. The CPC was also responsible for 
adapting Congress organization to the demands of the election 
campaign. The Working Committee, or more precisely the inner 
circle around Gandhi and the president, was universally recog­
nized as Congress's strategic planning body. The decisions 
to initiate civil disobedience were taken by it, as was the 
decision to embark on electoral activity,, - . It was, however, 
an oligarchic, largely self-perpetuating body. It contained 
some members who were not concerned with electoral activity, 
and who were not in touch with the lower levels of the party.
It was rightly known as the 'High Command', and was an unsuit­
able body to take direct responsibility for the campaign.
What was needed was a body which contained on the one hand 
those members of the Working Committee who were national 
organizers and on the other the effective leaders of the pro­
vincial units. The majority of the CPC was therefore made up 
of the PCC presidents ex officio. The remaining seven were all 
members of the Working Committee.
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The CPC was set up in accordance with the wishes of the 
Lucknow Congress by a resolution of the Working Committee at 
the end of April. The resolution read as follows:
’Resolved that a Parliamentary Committee ... 
be constituted, to take such steps as may b.e 
necessary in connection with the organisation 
of elections to the legislatures. The Committee 
shall report to the Working Committee from time 
to time and shall be guided by the Working Com­
mittee’s directions.'^
Its first meeting was at Wardha on 1 and 2 July 1936. Patel, 
Prasad and Pant were elected as office-bearers, with Patel 
in the vital role of president. The remaining eleven present
were all regional leaders, with the exception of Bhulabhai 
2
Desai. An executive committee of eleven was appointed, 
which included all the important members. As attendance at 
full meetings was never more than seventeen, it is probable 
that the appointment of this committee was simply an attempt 
to give an appearance of formality and hierarchy. It was 
resolved that a committee of action should be appointed to 
tour the provinces and give general help with the campaign,
A series of rules was also made for the guidance of PCCs,
3
dealing inter alia with the subject of candidate selection.
■^ INC III, p,2*f: CWC proceedings, 27-9/^/36.
2
Desai was leader of the Central Assembly Congress group. 
■^ AICC El(a)/1936, minutes of meeting.
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A second meeting took place six weeks later at the time of 
the Bombay session of the AICC. A few nominations were ap­
proved and the division of powers between component PCCs and 
the composite committees that existed in certain areas was 
settled.'*' Its only other action was the endorsement of the
manifesto which had already been approved a day or so pre-
2
viously by the Working Committee. A further meeting took 
place at Benares at the end of October. Its main concern was 
candidate selection. It also considered the question of a 
national fund-raising appeal.^ In addition, one meeting of 
the executive was held at Simla in September, which also con­
cerned itself with selection questions and cleared up a minor
bproblem concerning the Madras composite committee.
The matters over which the CPC exercised direct con­
trol can thus be listed as selection of candidates, the mani­
festo, national financial appeals and inter-province co­
operation. All of these except the last will be examined in 
detail later.
^Since 1919 Congress had been organized according to linguistic 
provinces and in 1936-7 each PCC looked after its own election 
campaign, even if it was not coterminous with the governmental 
unit. The composite committees were simply co-ordinating 
bodies. The real problems came after the elections, when 
ministers had to be chosen. For this, the Working Committee 
set up a much smaller Parliamentary Sub-Committee, which 
consisted only of national leaders.
2
Ibid., minutes of meeting, 23/8/36.
3
Ibid., minutes of meeting, 2^-5/10/36.
Zf
Ibid., minutes of meeting, 26-7/9/36. Only six members were 
present.
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Besides having direct authority in some spheres, the 
CPC was also intended to provide general assistance to the 
lower levels of Congress leadership. A secretariat was estab­
lished at Bombay shortly after the first meeting of the CPC
and a series of circulars to PCCs was issued. Unfortunately, 
only some of these are preserved in the AICC records.^ These
are as follows:
No. *f. 22/7/36. This rehearsed the CPC's recom­
mendations for provincial election organization, 
and urged their adoption. It suggested that election 
workers be appointed for each constituency, and 
asked to be informed of the progress that had been 
made. There is, however, no evidence of any follow- 
up to this request for information. PCCs at this 
time were notoriously bad at responding to such 
appeals.
No.6. 8/IO/36. This was an appeal for funds ex­
pressed in general terms.
No. 7. 3/11/36. This reminded provincial organizers 
of the need to ensure that, where a candidate was 
formally disqualified as a result of a prison sentence 
of more than two years, appropriate action should be 
taken for removal of the disqualification.
No. 8. (i) 10/11/36. This laid down that the fort­
night beginning 16 November should be used for fund 
collection. No specific procedure was laid down for
1In AICC EL(a)/l936,
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dealing with the money.
No. 8 (ii) 16/11/36. This advised local organizers 
that electors in remote constituencies had to be 
approached, and that electors had to be told how to 
divide their votes in multi-member constituencies. 
Unnumbered. 19/11/36. This laid down that Congress 
members of the Central Legislative Assembly would not 
normally be allowed to stand as candidates for pro­
vincial assemblies. This was an anti-careerist measure. 
Members of the Central Legislative Assembly might 
reasonably have expected to have become ministers if 
allowed to stand for election in their provinces. In 
actual practice, the rule was often breached. Pant 
was the most prominent of those who retired from the 
Central Assembly. Others included S.K„Sinha in Bihar, 
N.B.Khare in C.P. and Dr. Khan Sahib in N.W.F.P.
Pant also issued a circular letter to all members of 
the CPC in May, which suggested a number of measures that 
provincial organizers should take. It mentioned the need to 
ensure that the electoral registers were as complete as 
possible, and that the ’necessary machinery1 had been set up 
for organizing election work.'*' This circular is of addi­
tional interest in that it was issued before the first meet­
ing of the CPC and contains several references to work car­
ried out by the CPB.
^HPO 4A5/36, copy of circular letter from Pant, 8/3/36.
Certain of the regular AICC circulars also dealt with 
election matters.'1' They were issued from the AICC office in 
Allahabad and the relevant ones were all drafted by Nehru.
They are clearly attempts to ensure that Congress would not 
become constitutionalist in its approach, and would not give 
prominence to 'unsuitable1 people in its search for votes.
The following list includes all AICC circulars in 1936 that 
related to electoral matters:
No. 18. 23/9/36, emphasized the need to publicize
the manifesto.
No. 23. 26/11/36, called for use of the national
(i.e. Congress) flag during the campaign.
No. 26. 2/12/36, deplored the lack of knowledge of the
manifesto among many candidates.
No. 27. 2/12/36, called for more women to be nominated
for unreserved seats.
No. 32. 19/12/36, laid down new disciplinary rules
to deal with the new types of offence arising in the 
course of the election campaign.
With the exception of No. 32, however, all Nehru's 
circulars were advisory, even though he was Congress president. 
Effective power lay with Patel, who was less concerned with the 
niceties of Congress purity.
Besides CPC and AICC circulars, there was another sig­
nificant missive to the provincial organizers from the national 
leadership. This was signed by Nehru, Patel, Prasad, Abdul
AICC Pl/1936 contains a complete set of AICC circulars for 
this period.
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Ghaffar Khan and Jamnalal Bajaj, and deplored the selection 
in some provinces of unsuitable candidates, in particular 
some who had until shortly before their election actively 
opposed Congress. It warned against striving for a 1 ficti­
tious majority’.^
There were also some direct contacts between the CPC 
and the provincial leaders. There is no record of any activity 
by the Committee of Action set u]p at the July meeting, but ex­
tensive tours were made by various national leaders. The most 
important were the propaganda tours of Nehru, but he was not 
a member of the CPC. Patel, Prasad and Pant more usually 
toured for specific purposes, normally candidate selection, 
although they too conducted propaganda tours in the period 
immediately preceding polling. Patel visited N.W.F.P. in
company with Bhulabhai Desai in December. Congress there
2
still had to operate under severe restraints. Patel's re­
gional interests were centred on Bombay, so that he had no 
need to travel to oversee them..When not in Bombay, Prasad 
spent much of his time in Bihar, of whose PCC he was presi­
dent. It was at Patna that he met Bengal Congress leaders 
to try to sort out the Bengal PCCs internal difficulties.
When he visited C.P. on the eve of the poll, the government 
report stated that he had systematized Congress propaganda 
in the rural areas there.^ Pant also intervened in Bengali 
affairs and visited Calcutta to assist in candidate selection.
^AICC El(a)/1936, statement issued from Wardha, 17/11/38.
2
HPO 40/3/38, N.W.F.P. Government to secretary of Congress 
Parliamentary Board, 7/8/38, and PR N.W.F.P., 7/12/38.
3
FR C.P., February 1937 I.
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It may be assumed that during all these visits the leaders 
made sure that the provincial arrangements for propaganda 
were adequate. There was no formal division of territorial 
responsibilities, as.there was to be later with the Parlia­
mentary Subcommittee, but there was some degree of speciali­
zation according to the regional interests of the leaders.
The CPC office was set up as soon as Patel and Prasad 
returned from the Wardha meeting,^ It opened on 6 July and
was situated in the Congress House in Bombay, which was
2
very much Patel’s home ground. It was arranged that the
triumvirate would take it in turns to supervise the work 
3
there. It must be stressed, however, that except over 
the matters already mentioned, the CPC exercised no direct 
control over the provinces. It took action only where 
there was a danger that election disputes might weaken the 
fabric of Congress or where co-ordination was necessary, 
but otherwise confined itself to an advisory role. This meant 
that control of the selection of candidates was by far its 
most important function.
One reason for the circumscribed authority of the CPC 
was that it was itself largely composed of PCC presidents.
By being associated with the framing of organizational re­
commendations they acted in effect as informal agents.of 
the CPC. It is significant that Pant’s letter of May,
^Capital, 16/7/36, pp. 80 and 92. 
^Statesman, 7/7/36.
^leader, 8/7/36.
suggesting that electoral machinery should already be being 
set up, was addressed to PCC presidents in their capacity 
as members of the CPC.
In the provinces there was no uniform pattern of organi­
zation. As at the centre, the most important function was 
candidate selection.'*' Whereas the CPC as such had only to 
see that suitable candidates were chosen and to arbitrate 
in cases of dispute, the provincial organizations had actually 
to choose individuals, and were therefore often the arena for 
factional disputes. Thus the main determinant of provincial 
organizational forms was the existence or -otherwise of a 
factional rivalry and the relationship between any such 
factions. The size of the PCC was also significant. No parti­
cular guidance was given by the CPC. The PCC, or in larger 
provinces the PCC executive committee, could itself undertake 
the task of candidate selection, or it could appoint an ad hoc 
committee or board-,: of which the PCC president was usually
the chairman. For other election work, which did not have 
the same bearing on the power balance within the PCC, a pro­
paganda sub-committee was often appointed. Functions of such 
a committee included translation of the manifesto into the 
regional language, the production of supplementary manifestos 
and other propaganda material, local appeals for finance, 
and arrangements for the tours of national leaders. Beyond
'LThis was always the prerogative of the Congress provinces.
The Madras Presidency composition committee attempted to 
carry out the selection itself, but was restrained by the 
CPC: AICC El(a)/1936, minutes of CPC executive council 
meeting, 26-7/9/36.
this, the PCC or parliamentary board had to be satisfied 
that each constituency or district was adequately supplied 
with resources, and that the local leaders were using them 
properly. It had to distribute such financial resources 
as it had. This supervisory and controlling function could not 
easily be carried out by a committee, and it usually happened 
that whoever was the president of the appropriate committee or 
board undertook the work, in some areas with help from other 
prominent leaders.'*' By doing so he was able to reinforce 
his own position.
Below the province, the district, which normally in­
cluded a number of assembly constituencies, was the basic 
Congress unit. There were instances of DCCs setting up election 
committees on the provincial model, but it was probably
more common for the DCC itself or its executive committee to 
2
control the work. Alternatively a local figure of undis­
puted prestige might be responsible for the organization.
A.P.Jain wrote that he 1looked after1 his home district of 
Saharanpur in U.P. in the same way as his patron Kidwai 
(who was president of the U.P. Parliamentary Board) looked
after the province. Certain DCCs however were either mori-
k
bund or totally immobilized by factional disputes. In such
■*"The Bihar PCC appointed Ramcharita Singh as ’special 
election officer’ in May 1936: Leader, 20/3/36. With
Prasad as PCC president, Bihar may have needed a more 
formal organization.
2
The existence of such oommittees is mentioned in FH 
Bombay, August 1936 I.
•^Rafi Ahmad Kidwai: A Memoir of His Life and Times (1963),
p. 18. Jain became a parliamentary secretary in the U.P. 
Congress ministry of 1937.
if
PCCs were equally liable to factional disputes, but the out­
side pressures on them were normally such that a modus vivendi 
had to be found.
districts candidates presumably either managed their own 
campaigns entirely, or relied on informal support from one 
or other of the local leaders who could make contact with 
the provincial leadership if necessary. In any case, the 
crucial variable in the relationship between the DCC and 
the campaign on the ground was whether the candidate had an 
independent power base within his constituency or was de­
pendent on the DCC or a faction within it.
There was no system of constituency agents as such.
Pant had advised the provinces in July that full-time workers 
should be appointed in each constituency. There were indeed 
numerous full-time Congress workers, but it is by no means 
certain that they carried out the functions that Pant had 
envisaged. Some of them would have been itinerant propa­
gandists rather than organizers. Each candidate had by law 
to nominate an election agent, but could nominate himself.
There is no information as to who was appointed, and whether 
the appointments were more than nominal.
The organizational structure of Congress has been ex­
amined in detail partly because much of what has been said 
is applicable to the rudimentary organizational forms developed 
by other parties. In particular, the technique c£ having a 
separate committee to control election work was used by a 
number of different groups, including the Muslim League. It 
has been mentioned earlier that Jinnah’s strategy at this 
time was to use the elections as a means of activating Muslim 
politics at the provincial level and of establishing his own
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and the League’s suzerainty over the Muslim community. The 
League's Council in 1936 wns representative only of the landed 
or otherwise established Muslim upper classes and in any case 
only met occasionally. Rather than transform the League's 
institutions from within, Jinnah saved time by bypassing 
them.
After being given full control of the election campaign
at the April 1936 League session, Jinnah proceeded to recruit
as many Muslim politicians as possible to the CEB. Its
personnel was announced in May 1936, and the first meeting
took place at Lahore in the middle of June. Rules were
drawn up and officers elected: Jinnah became president, and
Abdul Matin Chaudhury secretary.^ A second meeting took place
at Simla in September, at which a number of provincial
2
boards were affiliated.
Unlike the CPB or the CFC, the CEB had no organizational 
functions. At the June meeting it agreed on a manifesto, but 
that was the sum total of its activities. Its function was 
to provide a structural framework into which Jinnah could slot 
provincial Muslim groups as and when he persuaded them to 
contest the elections under the League banner* The only 
central organizational work was carried out by Jinnah or 
occasionally by such lieutenants as Abdul Matin Chaudhury 
and Shaukat Ali. This was confined to identifying suitable 
Muslim groups in each province, and negotiating the establish­
ment of provincial League election boards. Alternatively, 
special relationships were established with particular parties,




which left the internal structure of the latter uncharged. In 
theory, the boards had the same powers and responsibilities 
as their Congress equivalents, but in practice they had little 
authority. This was inevitable since they did not have effect­
ive control of the selection process. The Bombay board perhaps 
came closest to the Congress model in that it was based on an 
existing Muslim League and on a well-established tradition 
of Muslim public Hfe, and had no serious rival. In U.P., 
however, although the province was the i±ronghold of the 
League, the CEB was simply a means of bringing together 
antagonistic groups, each of which had alternative structures 
to turn to.
Very little can be discovered about the internal organi­
zation of any other party, and it may be assumed that very 
little existed. As with the Muslim League, inability to 
control the selection process removed the main purpose of 
electoral organization. Men who intended to stand for 
election whatever happened, had no need of financial or 
lqgistic support. Even if they derived any symbolic support 
from their association with a party and its leaders, this 
oould be obtained informally.
A broad division can, however, be drawn between parties 
and election boards as primary units of political action.
In one sense the difference between an election board or 
other ad hoc electoral committee and ephemeral groups such 
as the United Orissa Party is purely a verbal one. Both 
were set up in situations where previous political groupings
2^5.
had been so informal that they had no public image nor any 
corporate identity with which other groups could negotiate. 
Members of both were usually men who had already established 
themselves in political life or who came from backgrounds 
from which politicians had been recruited before 1937*
Election boards and local parties, although created under 
the same external pressures, did, however, spring from slightly 
different sources within the political system. It may be 
suggested that election boards were more often to be found 
where the members’ support was communal, and parties where 
it was based on patronage and personal loyalty. A related 
point is that election boards may have arisen in circum­
stances where the differences between groups were not based 
on irreconcileable political or personal differences but 
simply on separate communal identities. Election boards 
were also more often to be found where the people concerned 
had actually taken part in dyarchy politics, and parties where 
the new conditions of politics had galvanized a hitherto 
dormant class. It follows that election boards were more 
likely to be found among urban groups, for before 1937 
politicians had come overwhelmingly from the towns and 
cities. Finally, election boards were more likely to be the 
political expression of a group than of the followers of a 
single provincial leader.
L good case study of local parties and election boards 
is provided by the Punjab. The predominant political force 
there was the Unionist Party. Unlike most local parties, it
had built up loyalty to itself as well as to individual leaders*
At the same time, however, it was a party of local magnates
on which was superimposed the authority of the party’s
leaders, in particular Fazl-i-Husain and his successor
Sikandar Hyat Khan, and Chhotu Ram. Rather than attempt to
cope with the inevitable personal disputes among the district
notables, or indeed with the wider rivalry between the Tiwana-
Noon and Wah families, the leadership often simply allowed
several candidates to stand in its name.'*' The Sikhs formed
an extremely well-defined community but one which was at the
same time deeply divided within itself. The non-zamindari
Sikhs had been organized as the Akali Dal since the mid-1920s.
They had strong nationalist sympathies, but wished to retain
their separate political existence. They therefore set up
2
an election board at the end of June. The landowning Sikhs, 
some of whom had token part in the politics of the dyarchy 
period, were organized into the Khalsa Diwan, but for the 
elections constituted themselves into the Khalsa National 
Party rather than an election board.^ Some members of the 
Hindu community who had taken part in dyarchy politics formed 
the Hindu Election Board, which later became known as the
Zf
National Progressive Party. The Punjab was of course





Tribune, 2k/7/3& and 23/2/37-
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exceptional in that Congress was relatively weak among the 
Hindu community, but similar local parties existed elsewhere. 
The factors mentioned above did not always determine 
a group's political and electoral organization. Situations 
existed where the factors were inconsistent, or where an ex­
ternal circumstance affected the outcome. This particularly 
applied to groups on the fringes of Congress, The Congress 
Nationalist Party in some areas was made up of men who might 
have been expected to have formed a Hindu election board on 
the Punjab model. The overwhelming presence of Congress 
made it difficult for them to establish a totally separate 
organization.*’
Finally, mention- must be made of the organization of 
groups that were involved in the process of indirect mobili­
zation. The nature of the relationship between candidate and
2
caste leaders meant that it rarely took an institutional form. 
Sometimes, however, larger units found it necessary to dis­
cuss the elections formally. In western India, leaders of 
the non-Brahman castes discussed the question of their 
political allegiance. It was not however, until after in­
dependence that election matters were widely discussed on 
a formal basis within castes or caste associations. Various 
voluntary associations also considered that they held a 
watching brief and discussed election matters at their
1Tribune, 2A/7/36 and 23/2/37.
2
A glimpse of the relationship is given in a letter from a 
U.P. elector to the Pioneer, quoted by P.D.Reeves in D.A.
Low (ed.), Soundings in Modern South Asian History (1968), 
p.278. 'Tribe' in this letter may be equated with caste.
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conferences or elsewhere. In particular, the Hindu Mahasabha, 
in addition to participating in the moves to promote an all- 
India Hindu party, suggested to the various provincial Hindu 
Sabhas that they should contest the elections 'wherever neces- 
sary'.
The selection of candidates
Both logically and in point of time the selection of candidates 
comes first in a consideration of the actual campaign. It 
was through this process that the basic characteristics of 
a party's campaign were established. It was the moment at 
which electoral alliances were cemented and when appeals could 
be made to particular groups by judicious selections. It was 
also a process with implications for the internal structure of 
the party. The candidates themselves, by the very fact of 
their selection, were given a standing within the party. 
Factions gained and lost according to their share of nomina­
tions.
The statistical data to be presented in the next chapter 
provide insights into the end products of the selection pro­
cess, but there are aspects of the process to which the general
2
characteristics of the candidate are not relevant. Where 
a candidate was clearly representative of a particular group, 
it is important to know if this was the result of perception 
of the nature of the constituency by the campaign organizers,
■4ar 1935 II, p.36-
2
The data presented in the next chapter relate only to suc­
cessful candidates while the present discussion is also 
concerned with those who failed at the polls.
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of 'colonization' of the party by the group concerned, or 
of a bargain between party and group. In more general terms, 
one often needs to know why one of a number of similar as­
pirants was chosen. It is therefore important to study the 
actual process of selection, although the material available 
for 193^-7 relates mainly to the formal structure. It has 
already been pointed out that it was only within Congress 
that selection of candidates was a significant process; v/ 
therefore only Congress will be considered.
The criteria for selection There were no substantial pre­
cedents in 1936 so that Congress leaders had a free hand in
laying down procedures, within the general constraints of
1
the political situation. They had first to ensure that the
candidate chosen had a good chance of winning. Apart from
the core of committed Congress workers, the electorate was
not so well disciplined that it would have voted for a
2
bullock, let alone an untouchable. Although caste con­
siderations played a part, it was not simply a matter of 
arithmetic calculation. Apart from the factor of differential 
turnout, a candidate's personal qualities and sacrifices, 
his inherited prestige, or his acquired authority all played 
a part in determining his chances of success. Secondly, 
it was desirable that the candidates should be men who would 
maintain the reputation of Congress as an- organization
^The Swaraj Party and the CPB had carried out the process of 
candidate selection, but within a different framework.
2
See above, p. 89* See also AICC Ell/1937* letter from a 
voter to Nehru, 11/2/37, and note by Nehru.
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devoted to the cause of national freedom. Apart from the 
moral aspect, it was obviously in Congress's longterm inter­
ests to uphold its internal standards. Thirdly, a candidate's 
selection, should not so offend other Congressmen, either on 
personal or ideological grounds, as to endanger the party's 
unity and effectiveness, both during the campaign and in 
the future. Finally, any arrangements with other parties or 
groups had to be honoured. These aims were by no means always 
compatible. The possible conflict between the second and the 
others is obvious. The third was liable to conflict with the 
first, in that in some instances factional conflicts were so 
strong that people might prefer the selection of a particular 
candidate at the expense of electoral success. Such attitudes 
might stem from particularistic or ideological motives, 
and were even to be found among national leaders, although 
more commonly at .the provincial level. Preference for a 
particular candidate at the expense of electoral success 
might also occur where Congress had been 'colonized' by a 
minority group.
The only formal conditions for applying for selection 
as a Congress candidate were the signing of the Congress 
pledge and a contribution of Rs 50 to the election funds.
The pledge stated:
a) I am a member of the Indian National Congress 
at ...
b) I offer myself for election for the Assembly 
(Council) for the constituency of ...
251.
c) If I am not accepted as a Congress candidate 
I hereby undertake not to stand independently 
or on any other party ticket against a candi­
date put forward by the Congress.
d) On my being accepted as a Congress candidate 
for the said or any other constituency, I 
hereby undertake to conduct the election cam­
paign in accordance with the instructions 
issued by the Congress Committee.
e) I further declare that I will follow the 
principles and policy laid down by the Congress 
or by any competent authority on its behalf 
and will conform to the rules and directions 
duly issued from time to time, as well as to 
the instructions issued by the party organi­
sation in the Assembly (Council) for the guid­
ance of the members thereof.
f) I also undertake to resign my seat whenever I 
am called upon to do so by a competent Congress 
authority.'*'
Clause e) was not likely to weed out any intending candidates, 
except on the major issue of communal policy. The commit­
ments an applicant had to make all concerned his future be­
haviour.
It should also be noted that no length of membership 
was specified. The CPC had decided at the outset that as
1IAR 1936 II, p.182.
many seats as possible should be contested and had resolved
that, ’so far as practicable, the Congress should set up
candidates not only for the General Constituencies, but also
for scheduled caste, Mahomedan, Sikh, and other special
constituencies’.^  As Congress had few supporters in certain
of these categories, the CPC also had to provide that non-
Congressmen could be selected as candidates, if its specific
2approval was obtained. This provision was in practice ir­
relevant, because the length of time over which the selection 
process took place gave intending candidates time to enrol 
themselves as primary members.
In addition to the pre-selection contribution of Rs 50, 
candidates were also expected to be able to pay their own 
election expenses. Exceptions for poorer applicants were 
possible, and Scheduled Caste candidates were particularly 
mentioned as needing support from general election funds.^ 
Nevertheless, when a prospective candidate wrote to Nehru
complaining that he was unable to find the Rs 50 contribution,
k
he was firmly told that he should ask his friends for it. 
Another disappointed Congressman wrote to Nehru to complain 
that he was refused a ticket specifically because he was not 
a wealthy man. ^
The circular from the national leadership warning 
against the achievement of a 'fictitious majority1 by the 
selection of unsuitable candidates has already been mentioned.
1Ibid.
2Ibid., p.181.
3AICC El(a)/1936, CPC circular no. 6, 8/10/36.
Il
AICC El^ f/1936, letter to Nehru, 7/9/36, and note by Nehru. 
^AICC G5(kw)(ii)/1936, T.S.ThiagaraJa Pillai to Nehru, n.d.
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Because of the range of provincial situations and the dis­
cretion that had inevitably to be allowed to the lower levels 
of leadership, it was impossible for more specific criteria 
to be laid down at the all-India level. Where conflict arose 
between the different aims of the selection process, no rigid 
rules were laid down for its resolution. Where the norms of 
the national and provincial leaders were at variance those 
of the latter prevailed, unless the national leaders took 
specific action.
The selection procedure The CPC had to approve all nomina­
tions and could if necessary substitute other names0 At its 
first meeting Patel, as president, was given authority to 
approve nominations.^ In practice, the other leading members
of the CPC were given similar powers for particular pro- 
2
vinces. The CPC was not, however, an initiating body, the 
Congress province was the level at which the primary de­
cisions were taken. As has been seen, in some cases a 
counterpart parliamentary committee or board was set up* 
while in others the PCC or its executive committee undertook 
the work of selection. Procedure varied, depending on the 
size of the province and whether divisions existed within 
the PCC. In some cases the PCC invited applications directly 
to itself, while in others it relied on recommendations from 
the DCCs, either endorsing their decisions or choosing from
^AICC El(a)/1936, minutes of meeting, 1-2/7/36®
^For example, Pant in Bengal: ibid., minutes of meeting,
2^ -5/10/36.
23k.
a short list.'*’ Although the procedure adopted was the responsi­
bility of the PCC, Nehru at least considered that it was de-
2
sirable that the DCCs should have a say. At each level,
therefore, the selection procedure was flexible, often re-
3
fleeting the balance of power within the party.
The selection of candidates in Bengal The points made above 
are well illustrated by a case study of Bengal but, as always 
with Bengal, it must be said that the degree of internal 
dissension within the Congress there was such that the actual 
pattern that evolved is not directly comparable to those in 
other parts of India.
The political situation in Bengal has been outlined 
in chapter 2. Congress had no hope of gaining an absolute 
majority because the general seats formed a minority of the 
total. The party itself was highly factionalized both on 
ideological and on personal grounds. At the provincial level
^For the procedure in Tamil Nad, see FR Madras, October 1936 
II; for Bombay, Times of India, 19/8/36; for C.P., AICC 
G5(kw)(ii)/1936, D.P. Mishra to Nehru, 23/8/36.
2AICC El/1936, Nehru to Patel, 12/10/36: ’Such selection 
should not be left to the Provincial Board entirely but 
should come originally from the districts. I think this 
is a good practice everywhere and specially so in Bengal.'
•^ The selection process in 1936-7 can usefully be compared 
with the account of the process in 1937» 1962 and 1967 by 
Ramashray Roy, 'Selection of Congress Candidates’,
Economic and Political Weekly vols. i and ii, 31/12/66, 
pp. 833-40, 7/1/47, pp. 17-2T, and 14A/671 pp. 61-76.
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there was a division between the Sarat Chandra Bose and B.C. 
Roy factions. The former included a number who may be iden­
tified as Congress Nationalist. Factions paralleling the 
provincial divisions existed within most districts. In 
this situation, the main efforts of district and provincial 
leaders went to maintaining or improving the position of 
their own factions. The national leadership could not re­
main entirely neutral on the issue of communal policy, but 
otherwise it had to respond by making preservatinn of Con­
gress unity its first aim. In the Bengal situation, where 
Congress was not completely dominant within the Hindu com­
munity, an open split was a major possibility. Although 
there were those within the Bengal Congress who might have 
welcomed such a split, the leaders of the two factions 
were prepared to make concessions in the cause of party 
unity.
At the end of 1933 the Bose faction had largely suc­
ceeded in eliminating the Roy group from the PCC, but had 
not destroyed its local power bases. Members of the Roy 
group were, for instance, elected to the Calcutta corporation 
as independents against official Congress candidates in March 
1936.  ^ As the initial preparations for the campaign began, 
and after the attempts in June at a rapprochement between 
Congress and the CNP over communal policy, the two groups 
made efforts to reach a new understanding. On 16 August. 1936
^Statesman, 20 & 28/3/36.
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the Roy group accepted a compromise whereby Sarat Bose formed
a new Bengal PCC executive committee with representatives
from both groups. Under this agreement candidate selection
was to be left to a parliamentary committee of which Roy was
to be chairman, and which was otherwise to be composed equally
of the two sides. The price of this accord was a resolution
of the Bengal PCC condemning the Communal Award.^ On 2
September after the publication of the Congress manifesto, a
further resolution was passed claiming, against the plain
and simple meaning of the manifesto, that substantive Congress
policy had altered and that open agitation against the Com-
2
munal Award was not legitimate. It was an attempt to get 
Congress as a whole to pay the price of Bengal unity, but 
the price was too high. Prasad wrote to Roy to say that Ben­
gal's candidates for the election could not be chosen until 
the PCC's misinterpretation of the manifesto had been dealt 
with.^ After considerable effort, including a visit by 
Nehru to Calcutta, a compromise resolution was evolved which 
preserved the ideological unity of the Bengal PCC.
Nevertheless, the personal ‘differences remained and 
became more significant as the time for the selection of 
candidates approached. The procedure was that nominations 
were made by the districts and were then forwarded to the
"4) . Chakravarti and C* Bhattacharyya, Congress Policy on 
Communal Award. Bengal Forces a Change 11939)«
^Ibid., . p. 36.
^AICC El/1936, Prasad to Roy, 8/IO/36.
L
Times of India, 9/11/36, and AICC G2*f(i)/1936, draft of 
resolution in Nehru's hand.
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parliamentary committee which adjudicated in disputed cases. ^
Presumably because Roy was chairman, the decisions of the
committee appeared to favour his group. As a result, eighteen
members of the committee, headed by Prafulla Chandra Ghose and
Indranarayan Sen-Gupta, resigned and Bose himself threatened 
2resignation. The disputed nominations were referred to the 
joint decision of Roy and Bose, with Pant as final arbiter-,
Not surprisingly, Pant’s arbitration was needed, and of the 
nine cases referred to him four were altered so that the 
nominations at issue were almost equally divided between the 
two camps.^ Throughout the 1950s the national leadership 
repeatedly intervened in Bengal to restore the unity of its 
PCC, and this policy was followed during the election cam­
paign, both because of the intrinsic value of unity and in 
order to win seats. Even so there were losses. On the one 
side, Royieis so disgruntled that he withdrew from any active 
part in the campaign. On the other, certain members of the 
Bose faction, whose commitment to communal politics was 
stronger than their Congress allegiance and whose applications 
for nominations had been rejected, defected and stood as un­
official Congress Nationalist candidates. A couple of members
of the Roy faction who had been denied tickets also stood as 
k
independents. But unity at the top had been maintained so
*^ AICC E5/1936, Narendra Narayan Chakrabarty (?) to Nehru, 
3/12/56.
2
Times of India. 3/12/36.
^AICC E5/1936, Roy to Pant, 17/12/36.
A
Ibid., loc.cit., and telegram Bose to Nehru, 5/1/37.
that only one or two of the rebels were successful. Although 
Bose at first prevaricated, Nehru finally forced him, as presi­
dent of the PCC, to take disciplinary action against the re­
bels, even where they were his supporters
In Bengal candidates had also to be chosen after the 
main elections for the seats in the Legislative Council which 
were to be filled by election from the Legislative Assembly, 
Their selection does not appear to have been an issue between 
the factions, perhaps because of Roy’s withdrawal from an 
active role in the campaign. Complaints were, however, made 
from several quarters that of the ten Congress candidates, 
six or seven had not previously been Congressmen and some had 
openly opposed Congress in municipal elections. Several 
were also objected to as communalists or wealthy businessmen. 
In his defence of the selections, Bose claimed that the people
concerned had 'rendered extremely valuable help during /^Ehe/
2
elections'. Although the selections were criticized, there 
was no attempt to overthrow them as they were not threatening 
Congress unity.
The Bengal case is well documented in the central Congress 
records, but it mainly illustrates the selection process 
as it affected Congress unity. The upper castes in Bengal 
were relatively homogeneous and were not seriously challenged
^Ibid., telegram Nehru, to Bose, 6/1/37, and telegram Bose 
to Nehru, 15/1/37.
2AICC E5/1936, telegram, Bose to Nehru, 23/2/37.
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from below, so that the question of the representativeness of 
candidates was subordinate to factional disputes. Elsewhere 
it was of much greater importance, and Congress successes 
demonstrate that most candidates were acceptable to the 
electorate. No very definite indication can be given of how 
this was achieved. To argue back from post-independence 
experience is unreliable, owing to the emergence of previously 
unpoliticized groups as self-conscious units. There is 
virtually no information concerning the caste of the success­
ful candidates. All that can be attempted is to suggest what 
happened in a few, perhaps typical, cases.
Particular units of Congress in 1936-7 can be placed 
on a continuum showing their representativeness of the poli­
tically important groups in the population. At one extreme, 
Congress was controlled by the dominant castes of an area, 
as in Gujarat. Candidates chosen according to achievement 
norms would at the same time usually satisfy the ’representative 
ness’ criterion. At the other extreme, Congress had little 
or no support, not necessarily among the population as a whole, 
but among a community that had a separate electorate. De­
spite official policy, most such seats were left uncontested. 
This applied to almost all the -Muslim seats outside N.W.F.P,
In the intermediate situation, where Congress was controlled 
in 1936 by a minority group, some diffusion of power within 
Congress usually took place, either as the result of a volun­
tary act by the existing leadership or through a takeover 
by the previously excluded groups. In many areas, the 
selection of candidates marked a significant shift towards
260.
representativenesa. It was not of course a clear-cut process. 
On the one hand, it is unlikely that the dominant group in 
the electorate had had no contact with Congress before 1936, 
and on the other, that the minority group lost all influence 
at that point. The diffusion of power could take place in 
two ways. A unit of Congress could allow those of the dominant 
group in the electorate who were already its members to take 
leadership roles within Congress or it could make room for 
outsiders who already had leadership roles in the dominant 
group and adopt them as candidates.
Madras provides an example of the former. In the early 
1920s the Justice Party was the main vehicle for non-Brahman 
political expression, but the declining competence and 
blinkered vision of its leaders led many to transfer alle­
giance to Congress. After an initial success in 1929, when 
C.N.Muthuranga Mudaliar was elected PCC president to succeed 
Srinivasa Iyengar, non-Brahmans participated in the civil 
disobedience movement.^ Thus when the time came for the 
selection of candidates, there were many non-Brahmans available 
within Congress. The list of successful Congress candidates 
contains a number of Reddis and Naidus and others whose names 
are recognizably non-Brahman. B.R.Ambedkar claimed, without 
giving ils source, that of the 159 Congress MLAs in Madras,
38 were Brahman, 90 non-Brahman.of clean cafete, 26 untouchable,
2
and 5 of unknown caste. Also significant was the replacement
^E.F.Irschick, Politics and Social Conflict in India (1969)« 
pp. 328-9.
2
What Congress and Gandhi have Done to the Untouchables (2nd 
ed. Bombay 1946), p.216. Ambedkar may have used a legislative 
directory. The Bpmbay directory gives a certain number of 
caste affiliations.
of. S. Satyamurti as prospective leader of the Congress parlia­
mentary party by Rajagopalachari. Both were Brahmans,but 
Rajagopalachari was more acceptable to non-Brahman Congress­
men.^ Non-Brahman hostility to Congress persisted, but the 
Self-Respect movement which took up the struggle drew its 
support more from the lower economic strata of non-Brahman 
castes, which had not taken part in Justice Party activities.
After 1937 the movement also attracted non-Brahmans who had 
2
been Congressmen. But in 1937 Congress was able to win a 
landslide victory by using its own non-Brahman membership 
to capture the Justice Party1s ground.
The non-Brahman movement in Marathi- and Kannada- 
speaking areas also lost heavily to Congress in this period, 
but the process whereby Congress was non-Brahmanized appears 
to have begun rather lata* than in Madras. In Belgaum district, 
for instance, A.B.Latthe, a prominent state administrator 
who had been active in non-Brahman associations, did not 
join Congress until 1936 but was immediately chosen as a
candidate. In the same year the Belgaum DCC acquired its
.................  • 3 ...............................
first non-Brahman president.^ Latthe's nomination had in
fact more than district significance. His prominence as a
non-Brahman leader and as an administrator were recognized by
his being made finance minister in the Congress government.
In other areas the non-Brahman community was divided. There
were splits between the radicals and conservatives and between
^FR Madras, January 1937 I.
2
For the Self-Respect movement, see Irschick, op.cit.,
PP. 330-30.
^Myron Weiner, Party Building in a New Nation (1967), pp. 231-5*
Marathas and others. Congress was able to play its own version 
of divide and rule and induced non-Brahmans who had already 
decided to stand to accept Congress tickets.^- Bombay thus 
illustrates the second way in which Congress could absorb 
new elements through the process of candidate selection. But 
both in Madras and Bombay it is important to note that this 
was a controlled and partial process; the existing provincial 
leaderships did not relinquish power, nor was the disproportion­
ate share of political power held by the Brahman community 
totally reduced.
Discipline
The fact that Congress as such was contesting the elections 
meant, first, that some who might otherwise have stood as in­
dependents wanted to stand as Congress candidates, and secondly 
that it was directly against Congress’s interests to allow 
any of its members to stand for election except as official 
candidates, or to work for non-Congress candidates. The sur­
plus of applicants over available tickets produced strains, 
which in some cases led to direct defiance of Congress. It 
was therefore necessary to evolve suitable disciplinary pro­
cedures. Even during the 1920s occasions arose when in­
dividuals came into conflict with Congress policy. Of parti­
cular relevance was the call for the resignation of all
2
Congress MLCs and MLAs made at the Lahore Congress of 1929.
Bombay, 12/12/36.
^Pattabhi Sitaramayya, History of the Indian National Con­
gress, vol. i (19^ 6), p.337.
A few refused to do so and left the party. The 193** con­
stitution gave the party leaders adequate powers, and procedural 
rules were laid down.^ Nevertheless, in December 1936 the 
Working Committee found it necessary to strengthen the rules.
As Nehru explained, they were not meant to penalize opinion 
but to deal with direct and deliberate action against Congress. 
They laid down that any member; (or any Congress committee) 
could be suspended for the general offence of lowering Con­
gress power or prestige. Action could be taken by the presi­
dent, the Working Committee, or a PCC. The person concerned 
was to be given ’full opportunity for explanation', and all 
action taken was to be reported to the AICC office. It was
said that the new rules were a direct response to the situation
2
produced by the elections. The most prominent individual to 
fall foul of the rules was M.M.Malaviya, who had supported 
anti-Congress candidates in the Punjab while at the same 
time supporting Congress candidates in U.P. Nehru asked ad­
vice from the other members of the Working Committee, most of
whom were not in favour of taking formal action. In the end
3
the matter was allowed to drop. This was partly a tactical 
move in that Malaviya enjoyed widespread support within Con­
gress, but it was also the result of a genuine desire not to 
be vindictive. Apart from this one instance, disciplinary
"Sl.V.Ramana Rao, Development of the Congress Constitution 
(1958), pp.60-1; INC II, pp. 39-**l: CWC proceedings,
16-18A/35.
AICC PI/I936, AICC circular 32, 19/12/36. The rules were 
approved by the Working Committee on 11 December: INC III,
PP« 3**-6, CWC proceedings, 9-11/12/36.
3
AICC E17 and E2A/1937} passim. The only person to request 
action was Azad.
actinn was taken at the provincial level, and was applied 
quite extensively in some areas. The aftermath of the Bengal 
dispute over candidate selection was the suspension of the 
rebels, and the Mahakoshal PCC took action against at least 
2k individuals.*** The most serious offence was for an un­
successful applicant to stand against a Congress candidate, 
but action could also be taken against those who supported 
non-Congress candidates. The new disciplinary powers could 
be used as a weapon in factional battles. The Sylhet DCC for 
instance set up, apparently on its own initiative, a discip­
linary subcommittee which recommended action against a number 
of people. Its report was not accepted by the Bengal PCC,
and the DCC complained that this was because the accused
2
were ’agents' of those in power in the PCC. The opposite 
situation, where no action was taken against offenders, could 
also occur. In Sind, Jairamdas Doulatram, himself a member 
of the Working Committee, undoubtedly helped members of his
3
community m  their election campaigns and suffered no penalty.
After receiving reports of the vindictive action taken in
some places, Nehru had to circulate further instructions
that disciplinary action had to be confirmed by the whole
PCC, not Just by the office-holders, and that all cases
k
were to be reviewed by the Working Committee.
^Mahakoshal Congress Committee Papers, File AICC 11, letters to 
AICC office, 17/1/37, V2/37, 18/2/37, 23/3/37. There are 
some inconsistencies in the lists. 2k is the minimum figure.
2
AICC E3/1936, report by disciplinary subcommittee of Sylhet 
DCC, n.d. (? April 1937).
•^ AICC E18/1936, 'some Sind Congressmen1 to AICC president 
(Nehru), 8/2/37; Hiranand Advani to Nehru, 23/1/37. Doula­
tram belonged to the Amil community, as did the president 
of the PCC, Choithram Gidwani.
A
AICC Pl/1937, AICC circular 10 ®f 1937, 7/2/37.
Participation in the elections thus forced Congress to 
define itself more closely. Before 1936 no action had been 
taken against those who did not observe the rules concerning 
khaddar and spinning, but anti-Congress activity in the com­
petitive arena of elections was a different matter. A de­
fence put forward by those accused of anti-Congress activity 
was that primary membership of Congress did not involve an 
obligation to follow specific political strategies.^" How­
ever justifiable in terms of Congress’s past history as a 
movement, this was hardly an appropriate philosophy in 1936. 
Even so, Nehru and the Working Committee attempted to mini­
mize the disruptive effect on Congress unity of taking dis-c- 
linary action. Discipline was to be a continuing problem. 
Offenders during the campaign were mostly minor figures; 
later K.F.Nariman and N.B.Khare both fell foul of the Work­
ing Committee as a result of the formation or operation of 
the Congress ministries.
Finance
Finance is an area where accessible information is very 
limited, although this in itself is highly significant. The 
basic questions are how much the campaign cost, and where 
the money came from. The possibility of imposing a limit
"*"See the statement by L.B.Bhopatkar in Leader, 22/1/37*
This applied only to those who had not applied for Congress 
tickets and had therefore not had to sign the pledge de­
manded of prospective Congress candidates. The fact that 
the CPC felt it necessary to draw up such a pledge is in 
itself significant of the equivocal status of Congress.
on election expenses had been raised during the formulation 
of the 1933 Act.^ For the 1937 electinn only U.P. and Madras 
imposed a limit, although all provinces insisted on a return 
of expenses. In U.P. the limit was Rs 20,000 in rural con­
stituencies and Rs 15,000 in urban ones. In Madras the 
limit was Rs 1,000 where there were less than 8,000 electors, 
and 2 annas per elector in other cases, i.e. Rs 1,000 per 
8,000 voters. ^y contrast, the limits in 1932 varied
•7.
from Rs -^,000 to Rs 8,000 in single-member constituencies.
These divergent figures can hardly be taken as guides 
to actual expenditure. Returns of election expenses were not 
forwarded to the Reforms Office in New Delhi, but even if 
they had been, they would probably not have included several 
major items of expenditure. For example, the practice of 
'treating' voters to refreshments was legalized by the 1933 
Act and such expenditure was supposed to be declared, but it 
is highly likely that much of it went unrecorded. Donations 
to local causes and payments to canvassers may also have 
been understated.
The only provincial figures available in the AICC files 
concern Berar and Kerala. In the former, the total constitu­
ency expenditures given range from Rs 1,700 to Rs 10,000 
with a mean of Rs -^,787.^  It may well be that these figures
^See above,pp.78-9.
2
RD 6^3^ Part III, governors' rules.
3
Report on the First General Elections in India, 1931-2
"(1955), vol. 1, p.174.
i f
AICC E23(i)/1937, report from Vidharbha PCC secretary,
12/4/37.
relate only to the Congress candidates' official returns.
The Kerala report simply states that the cost of the cam­
paign for the twelve successful candidates was Rs 20,OCX), 
an average of Rs 1,667 per candidate*^ This figure may 
only refer to the amount spent by the PCC and not to the 
candidates' own expenditure, although low expenditure figures 
might be expected in Kerala, in view of the small size of 
constituency there.
Reports also exist for some individual constituencies.
In Coconada Rural, in the Telugu-speaking area of Madras, 
it was said that the election canpaign itself cost approxi­
mately Rs 8,000 and that a further Rs 3»000 were spent on 
propaganda by the DCC. It was claimed that the other can­
didate, the immensely rich Maharaja of Pithapuram, had
2
spent the vast sum of Rs 250,000. In the election in 
Coconada town it was said that Congress expenses were less
3
than Rs 1,000,while the opposition- spent Rs 20,000.
Summary figures for a few individual constituencies in
If
C.P. range from Rs 1,250 to Rs 20,000. The Jhansi by- 
election, which took place in July 1937 j was critical in
^Ibid., report from Kerala PCC.
2AICC E23/1937, report on Coconada Rural constituency.
3
-"Ibid., report on Coconada Urban constituency.
^AICC E25(i)/l937j report on C.P. elections.
Congress's relations with Muslims and it therefore received 
a great deal of support from the major Congress leaders in 
U.P. Keshav Dev Malaviya, who was in charge of the organi­
zation, estimated that a total of Rs 4,600 would be re­
quired.^ " This perhaps represents a true total of what was 
spent within the constituency, but there were in addition
the travelling expenses of outside helpers and the personal
2
expenses cf the candidate. It was said by several Con­
gress workers ‘that the Raja of Mahmudabad had agreed to
3
finance the League campaign to the extent of Rs 15,000.
It would seem therefore that a Congress candidate in 
an average-sized rural constituency might have to spend be­
tween Rs 5,000 and Rs 10,000. There were, however, wide 
variations in the geographical size and population of consti­
tuencies, which were aggravated by separate electorates. In 
addition, the district and province had to spend substantial 
sums on the printing of propaganda material and on election 
tours. Not even the most approximate figures can be sug­
gested for non-Congress candidates. The expenses of a local 
notable would largely have depended on whether his support 
came from his control of a large tenantry or relied more 
on large-scale patronage. According to a Central Intelli­
gence Bureau report, 'in many cases the amount of money
1AICC G61/1937, Malaviya to Nehru, 7/7/37.
2
Ibid., Nehru to Nisar Ahmad Sherwani, 5/7/37.
■^ Ibid., Sherwani to Nehru, 2/7/37; K.M.Ashraf to Nehru,
777737.
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spent by Congress in fighting the elections was small as
compared with the vast sums expended by its opponents’
The source of electoral finance is as difficult to
determine as its extent. One must assume that the majority
of non-Congress candidates financed themselves or received
money informally from relatives or friends. Where a powerful
landlord’s influence extended over several constituencies,
he might meet the expenses of candidates who formed part of 
2
his clientage. The Muslim League’s candidates were unable 
to look for help to the Parliamentaiy Board, but on the 
other hand wealthy supporters in the various provinces may 
have made money available, as the Raja of Mahmudabad did 
in Jhansi.
The conventional account of the sources of Congress 
finance in general, and therefore of its election funds, is 
that substantial and sufficient support was received from 
the Indiaa business community which found itself hampered 
by British rule. This support came above all from Gujarat, 
Bombay city, and the Marwari community, and was mediated 
through Patel and Gandhi. As such contributions were given 
informally, it is impossible to determine their -extent. It 
has, however, been shown that constituency expenditure was 
often quite small, and there is also evidence that some PCCs
^Political (PJ) Collections 117-C-42, 2750/37, 'Note on 
Congress Policy up to 1st May 1937'.
2
The Maharaja of Pithapuram, for instance, met the expenses 
of Peoples Party candidates: FR Madras, November 1936 I.
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ran into financial difficulties.^ To gain a true picture,
one must examine Congress finance at each level.
The day-to-day running of Congress was the responsibility
of the AICC office in Allahabad, which was financed by fixed
dues from the PCCs (often in arrears), a small percentage
of purses given to the president, and the income from the
Tilak Memorial Fund, The AICC was in no position to make
2extensive finance available, A loan of Rs ^,000 was made 
to the U.P. Congress Parliamentary Board, but this may be 
considered a special case in view of the location of the AICC 
office and the interlocking of personnel. Nor were the 
PCCs in any position to finance the provincial campaigns 
out of their regular income. The money therefore had to 
come from ad hoc sources. The Rs 50 contribution from all 
applicants for tickets was partly intended to deter frivolous 
applicants, but it was not returnable. Financially more 
significant was the ruling that candidates should meet 
their own election expenses wherever possible. In view of 
the effect of this ruling on the type of candidate chosen, 
it could hardjy have been adopted as official Congress 
policy unless there had been strong practical reasons for
■^ AICC G61/1937, secretary, U.P, PCC to Sherwani, 3/6/37;
FR Bombay, January 1937 I; Mahakoshal Congress Committee 
Papers, File DCC Jubbulpore, Avadesh Pratap Singh to 
Patel: n.d. (mid-January 1937)? ’Provincial parliamentary
board is bankrupt’.
2
Prasad wrote at the end of 1933 that the AICC had no re­
serves and that ’we are just managing to make the two ends 
meet’: AICC Misc. 4/1935* Prasad to Satyapal, 22/11/35®
^AICC Fl8/19351 loan made to Kidwai, president of U.P.
Congress Parliamentary Board, 16/11/36.
it."*" A particularly striking example of the need for candi­
dates to provide the bulk of the finance is provided by a 
report in Sind that a candidate was nominated on condition
that he paid a prominent Congressman's election expenses in
2
addition to his own. The PCCs would also have raised some
funds locally to pay for their own expenses and perhaps to
assist the candidates. In addition to its loan of Rs 5*000
from the AICC, the U.P. board also borrowed Rs 3*910 from
3
the Shri Gandhi Ashram at Meerut. The 'extremely valuable
help' received by the Bengali Congress from its Council
if
nominees may well have been financial. The Bombay city 
PCC was able to appeal to its many wealthy supporters for 
help, and reportedly collected Rs 98,000.^ The Bihar PCC 
received Rs 10,000 from Dalmia, a rich Marwari industrialist, 
and Rs 7*000 from a local supporter (possibly Dalmia).^ A 
major source of PCC election funds was the money collected 
during the tours of national leaders, especially Nehru. The
^'It would appear that the nominations ... were influenced . 
to no small extent by the capacity of candidates to finance 
the campaign,1: FR Bombay, November 1936 I.
^AICC E18/1936, Advani to Nehru, 25/1/37* Advani cannot 
be considered a reliable observer, but he claimed to be 
quoting from the local press.
•z
AICC F19(ii)/1937« The loan is mentioned on a receipt dated 
2/1/39.
4
See above, p. 25o.
^Between 1937 and 1940 the PCC kept from 75°/o to 90°/o of 
such money, the remainder going to the AICC; AICC F19 (ii)/1937.
^FR Bihar, December 1936 I, and February 1937 I.
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bulk of such money remained within the province. Similarly,
most of the money raised during the national appeal for
funds made during the fortnight beginning l6 November was
received by the provincial or lower level Congress committees,
although the totals collected are not known.
Despite everything, however,many provinces would have
needed help from central election funds, which were under the
control of the CPC rather than the AICC. Patel acted both
as. receiver and dispenser of such funds. On one side of him
were the wealthy merchants and millowners of western India;
on the other the eternally hard up PCCs. Certainly considerable
sums were given to the provinces by the CPC. Bihar received
at least Rs 25,000; Orissa Rs 8,000; N.W.F.P. Rs 22,000.^
Of these block grants, some money was used for provincial
purposes while some was passed to the districts and candi- 
2
dates. The CPC also sent earmarked grants to help specific 
Scheduled Caste and Muslim candidates.^ Yet circumstantial 
evidence would seem to indicate that there was still a 
shortage of money in some areas, despite Patel's disburse-
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 f . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ment of commercial and industrial wealth. It may be
\a) Bihar: loci cit.
(b) Orissa: FR Orissa, February 1937 II*
(c) N.W.F.P.: FR N.W.F.P., January 1937 I.
The information available to the government was not 
necessarily accurate or inclusive.
*TR Bihar, February 1937 I*
3
Mahakoshal Congress Committee Papers, file DCC Jubbulpore, 
Avadesh Pratap Singh to Patel, n.d.
^The CPC published no accounts. All records relating to the
CPC in Congress House, Bombay, were removed by the authorities
in 1942 and not returned: information obtained from S.K.
Patil.
suggested that part of the discontinuity lay in the rudimentary
and uninstitutionalized channels of distribution. There was
no way of getting candidates to account directly to the CPC.
Once the money was given to the PCCs the CPC was unable to
control its distribution.^ Money could therefore only be
given to PCCs of whose loyalty and probity Patel was confident.
The problem was to a certain extent solved by giving control
of financial aid to the president of the PCC. Thus in
N.W.F.P., money was given to Dr Khan Sahib and in Orissa 
2
t.o Nilkanth Das.
The consequences of this inadequate method of distri­
bution were several. PCCs whose leaders were not on good 
terms with Patel, such as Nagpur, did not have ready access 
• to national funds. There was also considerable scope for 
the prejudices of the donor to operate. This period was the 
highpoint in Nehru’s avowal of socialism, and it would not 
be surprising if money was given on the understanding that it 
was not to go to socialist-dominated PCCs such as the U.P.
PCC. It may also have been the case that donors wished 
their money to go to those parts of the country with which 
they had ties. This and Patel’s preference for giving money 
through informal channels may explain why little money was 
spent on 'speculative' seats. Such seats were above all
^This did not mean that earmarked grants could not be made, 
only that the CPC had to rely on the good faith of the PCC,
2
FR N.W.F.P., January 1937 I; FR Orissa, February 1937 II»
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Muslim but also included general seats in difficult areas 
like the Punjab.
The intelligence report quoted earlier concluded that, 
’where it was necessary for money to be spent, Congress was 
able to obtain it without difficulty1.^  This was true in 
many, perhaps in most, cases but one should add that it was 
not the result of any overall financial strategy. If a can­
didate was poor, if the area was not within the ambit of 
Patel’s interest and if the PCC did not have access to 
independent funds, then electoral finance could be difficult.
Policy formulation and propaganda
As well as selecting and supporting its candidates, Congress 
had also to produce evidence to the electorate of why its 
candidates should be returned. In the other parties this 
function was almost entirely carried out by the candidate 
himself, and this applied to Congress to a large extent.
There was limited scope for denunciation of opponents* 
legislative records, as many were standing for the first 
time, but ad hominem attacks could easily be made. Conversely, 
advocacy of the candidate’s personal qualities was a prominent 
feature in all campaigns. In most cases this was the sum 
of meaningful propaganda. Those parties which existed to 
preserve the social order naturally assumed that their leaders 
should be allowed to decide detailed matters of policy.
Separate electorates meant that communal policy, as distinct
1p.269.
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from the communal credentials of the candidate, would not 
be a major issue. Where policy statements were issued, they 
were couched in the broadest of term and promised something 
to everyone. The Congress manifesto was also somewhat vague, 
but is important in that it was a touchstone for other parties’ 
policies. Some parties simply plagiarized (and to a certain 
extent bowdlerized) it, while others defined their ideolo­
gical stance in terms of their disagreement with it. There 
were also certain issues on which the manifesto took a 
specific position in accordance with previously determined 
Congress policy.
The first steps to prepare the Congress manifesto were 
taken at the initial meeting of the CPC when a subcommittee 
of Patel, Prasad, Pant, Bajagopalachari, and Bhulabhai Desai 
was appointed to prepare a draft.^ The next official re­
ference to the manifesto comes in the proceedings of the 
Working Committee, CPC, and AICC meetings at Bombay from 
l8th to 23'. August. The manifesto was considered and adopted 
by the CPC and Working Committee, and then formally adopted, 
with some verbal changes, by the AICC. This bald account, 
however, conceals the fact that the original draft drawn up
by the CPC subcommittee was abandoned in favour of a draft
2
prepared by Nehru, apparently acting alone. This could
^AICC El(a)/1936, minutes of meeting, 1-2/7/36.
2
The exact sequence of events at Bombay cannot be determined, 
as the draft manifesto in Nehru's own hand is not dated.
A letter attached to the copy of the CPC subcommittee draft 
that was forwarded to the Working Committee is dated 20/8/36. 
Possibly Nehru wrote his draft after reading this copy.
Both drafts are contained in AICC G71/1936. The final Con­
gress manifesto is contained in INC III,pp. 2-8.
have been for two reasons: first that the original draft was
not considered sufficiently radical; secondly, that it was 
not considered good enough from the point of view of style 
and clarity. The first possibility is given credence by 
the fact that three of the five members of the CPC sub­
committee were among those who had threatened resignation 
from the Working Committee on • 29 June 1936 in protest at 
Nehru's preaching of socialism. It would, however, have to 
be explained how Nehru was able to push his own draft through 
a hostile Working Committee. He would hardly have had 
Gandhi's support on such an issue. The weight to be attached 
to the second suggested reason must remain speculative, 
but it fits in better with the actual contents of the two 
drafts.
On questions of land reform and general economic policy, 
the CPC draft sets out the Karachi Congress resolution on 
economic policy in full, while the Nehru draft simply cites 
it. Bothrefer to the Lucknow Congress agrarian policy re­
solution, but the Nehru draft goes a little fur-her in hint­
ing at radical measures to come.;
' ^Congress/ stands for a reform of the system of 
land tenure and revenue and rent, and an equitable 
adjustment of the burden on agricultural land ... 
the declaration of a moratorium, an enquiry into 
and scaling down of debts and the provision of 
cheap credit facilities by the State.1 
Nevertheless, no firm commitment was made to any particular 
course of action except a debt moratorium. Nehru's draft
?77,
mentioned a wider range of issues than did the CPC's, for 
instance prison reform, women's rights, and the improvement 
of industrial conditions in accordance with international 
standards, 'as far as the economic conditions in the country 
permit'. On constitutional questions both drafts reiterated 
the well-known Congress position. The right of India to 
frame its own constitution through a constituent assembly 
was asserted. Despite his personal views, Nehru's draft 
endorsed the postponing of a decision on office-acceptance. 
How Congress communal policy evolved has been shown elsewhere, 
and neither draft diverged from the official position,, It 
should be noted, however, that the language in which the 
Communal Award was condemned was less inhibited than previous 
Congress pronouncements.
Thus, although the Nehru draft stressed economic and 
social issues a little more than the CPC's, there is nothing 
to suggest that one presented more radical policies to the 
electorate than the ether. To an outsider, however, Nehru's 
reads more convincingly: the work of a single intellectual
rather than a committee of organizers, it has considerable 
style. One has only to compare the perorations. Nehru's 
runs:
'For the fight for independence a joint 
front is needed. The Congress offers that joint 
national front which comprises all classes and 
communities, bound together by their desire to 
free India, end the exploitation of her people 
and build up a strong and prosperous and united
nation, resting in the well-being of the 
masses.
With this great and inspiring goal before 
us, for which so many men and women of India 
have suffered and sacrificed their all under 
the banner of the Congress, and for which today 
thousands of our countrymen are suffering silently 
and with brave endurance, we call upon our people 
with full hope and confidence, to rally to the 
cause of the Congress, of India, of freedom.’
The CPC draft runs:
'The Congress therefore appeals to the 
people to put aside all other considerations 
and to rally under its banner. The Congress 
hopes that its services and past record justify 
its claims for the confidence of the people in 
its ability to meet every situation, as it may 
arise, with wisdom, courage and patriotism.'
Similar comparisons could be made at all points.
If the Nehru draft was preferred on stylistic grounds, 
it is easier to imagine why it was chosen rather than the 
CPC's. Nehru was recognized as a sort of official apologist 
for Congress, and the members of the CPC accepted this, pro­
vided always that his socialist views were kept to himself. 
One might also suggest that the organizers set no great store 
by manifestos as instruments for mobilizing the electorate. 
The manifesto, which was written initially in English, was 
meant to impress the intelligentsia, the government, and
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foreign sympathizers, especially European and American radi­
cals, rather than the ordinary electors. It was a piece of 
prestige advertising.
In addition to producing the manifesto, which simply
restated existing policy in electoral terms, Congress also
attempted to gain support by amplifying its ideas on agrarian
reform. The terms of reference for the ’agrarian programme1
served both as heads of discussion and as guiding principles,
for example, f a just allotment of state expenditure for social,
economic and cultural amenities of villages'.^ This resolution
was partly the result of the growing.pressure on Congress
of socialist and kisan sabha leaders, but it was also a means
of popularizing Congress among the mass of the population.
The resolution itself was moved by Bhulabhai Desai, who would
not normally have taken the initiative in such a matter.
Each PCC was to have reported by 1 August,but only certain
socialist-inclined PCCs, such as U.P. and Maharashtra, took
any action at all. The question was reconsidered at the
Faizpur session, and an agrarian programme resolution was 
2
passed. This laid down thirteen points, pending the 
framing of definitive policy. These amplified the Lucknow 
principles,especially on the questions of indebtedness and 
fixity of tenure, and added provisions for co-operative farm­
ing, an agricultural income tax, and the protection of
^INC II, pp. 79-80: Lucknow session proceedings, 12-14/4/56.
2INC III, pp. 96-7.
agricultural labourers. The Faizpur resolution was more 
specific and therefore more radical than its somewhat plati­
tudinous predecessor. It reflected the stronger position 
of Nehru after his re-election as president. His first cir­
cular after the Faizpur Congress emphasized that the re­
solutions adopted there should be used as election propa­
ganda:
’Although this /the agrarian programme/ is a 
provisional programme, it has great importance 
and the vast body of our rural electors and 
others will appreciate it. It should therefore 
find prominent place in our election campaign, 
especially in rural areas’^
One result of Nehru's election as president had been the 
re-appointment of the Congress Labour Committee which kept 
in touch with the All-India Trades Union Congress and 
National Trades Union Federation and endeavoured to sup­
port union activities. No general statement of Congress
2
policy on labour questions was produced, however.
At the provincial level, PCCs had a linn.ted area in 
which they could contribute to the policy content of the 
campaign. They were empowered to produce supplementary 
manifestos dealing with local issues. The only ones men­
tioned in the central Congress records were produced by Sind
^ICC Fl/1937, AICC circular 1, 2A/37,
2
See above, p.1^ 3, Electors qualified under the labour 
franchise did of course form a separate electorate.
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and Bengal.'*' Election pamphlets issued by PCCs or the
candidates themselves presumably made policy statements on
local issues. The PCCs were also able to produce detailed
proposals for agrarian reform. The Maharashtra PCC produced
a scheme calling specifically for the abolition of the khoti
system of intermediary land tenure that existed in certain
districts, and intended to base a supplementary manifesto
on the issue. The Khots were, however, a well-organized
group, and approached Patel and S.K.Patil, who was secretary
of the Bombay Presidency Parliamentary Board. The latter wrote
to the Khot Association assuring it that the majority of the
board’s members did not approve making the khoti system an 
2
election issue. The Maharashtra PCC could still have issued 
its supplementary manifesto but in face of such opposition
3
it adopted a more conciliatory policy. Another instance-of
4 nC III, pp. 33-if: CWC proceedings, 9-11/12/36, and AICC
C71/1936, Sind,, supplementary manifesto; AICC G2^(i-)/l936, 
Bengal supplementary manifesto.
^AICC G3(^w)(i)/1936, Achyut S. Patwardhan to Nehru, 22/10/36.
■^ AICC E23(i)/1937, ’The election Campaign in Maharashtra1.
In addition to its direct relevance to the formulation of 
policy statements, this episode illustrates other points 
in this chapter:
(a) The Khot Association traded with Congress very much 
on equal terms, although the units were policies rather 
than nominations.
(b) Despite the concessions it made, Congress lost all 
the seats in Ratnagiri district, partly to the ILP and partly 
to candidates standing specifically in the khot interest. 
Patel was of course personally in favour of the preservation 
of the rights of small and medium landowners, but his per­
ception of the situation was also faulty.
(c) Although the Maharashtra PCC in theory had control 
of the campaign-within its area, it was at the same time 
under the informal control of Patel, in his role as regional 
leader.
a PCC attempt to formulate general policy occurred in Bengal.
As mentioned above, the Bengal PCC interpreted the manifesto's 
attitude towards the Communal Award as an outright condemna­
tion of all electoral arrangements based on communal divisions. 
Although it was eventually induced to compromise, it was 
allowed to retain on record a significantly different ver­
sion of Congress communal policy. The compromise resolution 
stated that the Communal Award would be replaced by an agreed 
solution, but prejudged the issue by stating that the solu­
tion would be 'on the basis of a joint electorate and adult 
franchise, or any other agreed basis consistent with independence 
and the principles of democracy.''*’
It is clear from these examples that there was no ideo­
logical consistency within Congress, either between regions 
or between the different levels of authority, but contro­
versial issues could be ignored or glossed over by generalizing 
national policy proposals. A range of local policy proposals 
was then possible. As a movement Congress did not need a 
detailed programme. As a party, it had no national rival 
with a clearly defined ideological position.
The Muslim League did not produce a statement of policy 
specifically for the campaign, but the CEB adopted a pro­
gramme at its meeting in June 1936. This was a brief list 
of points, the first of which stated that the Board would 
'protect the religious rights of the Musalmans'. On the 
political position of the community, the programme merely
■*\AICC G24(i)/1936, draft of resolution.
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mentioned the protection of Urdu, the 'amelioration of the 
general conditions of Muslims', and the creation of a 
'healthy public opinion and general political consciousness 
throughout the country'. The other points called, in the 
most general terms, for the reduction of taxation, the pro­
motion of industiy, the relief of agricultural indebtedness, 
and similar objects.^ The programme merely reproduced what 
had been cliches of Indian politics even before the Karachi 
resolution.
Other parties also produced manifestos throughout 1936, 
but on the whole they were, like the CEB manifesto, state­
ments of general policy rather than specific attempts to
2
gain electoral support. The DSP provides an interesting
example in that it put out two manifestos, one in August
3
1933 and the second in October 1936. The first made only 
one reference to economic matters, and was primarily concerned 
to demonstrate how the party differed from Congress. The 
second, in addition to rejecting the Communal Award and 
pledging the party to office-acceptance, listed a number 
of measures for economic development, and concluded with a 
promise of co-operation with all nationalist forces. Differ­
entiation was the keynote of the party in its early days, 
but during the election campaign it emphasized its simi-. 
larity to and affinity with Congress.
^Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan (1961), p.^17.
2See, for example, Statesman, 3/8/36(Oudh NAP), Times of 
India, 27/8/36(Bombay Non-Brahman party), and FR U.P.,
October 1936 II (U.P. Hindu Sabha Election Board).
3
IAR 1933 II, pp. 319-20, JP 600, text of 1936 manifesto 
(n.d.), and Times of India, 5/10/36.
Campaign Methods
The discussion so far has been concerned with the ways in 
which the parties adapted themselves to become election- 
fighting organizations, and with how they produced the neces­
sary outputs of candidates and policies. The methods by 
which the parties sold their products to the electorate must 
now be considered. In some cases they had to make sure that 
the elector voted at all, as well as voting for a particular 
party. The range of methods available was limited by the 
way in which the various internal processes had been carried 
out. The analysis will deal with the techniques used by the
parties at each of three levels - the all-India and pro-
1
vincial, the local organization, and the candidate. As
before, the main emphasis will of necessity be on Congress.
The all-India and provincial level In the 1936-7 campaign
communication between the elector and the party leaders was
2
restricted. Radio was not used. Although the newspapers 
carried considerable amounts of election news, they were 
only directly available to a small minority in urban areas. 
The Indian-language press was mostly in the hands of Con­
gress sympathizers,although where Congress faced a strong 
Hindu communal challenge as in the Punjab and Maharashtra, 
the leaders of the latter might well control influential 
papers. Only part of the English-language press fully sup­
ported Congress, but by 1936 there was much less direct
^A level is defined as a relationship between the elector 
and a political party or individual.
2
Its use was ruled out by a government decision: HPO
52/10/36, note by Sir H. Craik, 25/7/36.
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opposition from the Anglo-Indian newspapers. Congress was 
criticized rather than condemned.^ Substantial information was 
now given about Congress activities, even if the editorial 
attitude was hostile*
To some extent, the public personae of political leaders 
are defined by their disputes with opponents rather than by 
their own qualities* In this sense there were limited oppor­
tunities for Congress leaders to impress themselves on the 
electorate. The British Government was impersonal and not 
directly affected by the election results. Within the Hindu 
community there were no major, overtly anti-Congress leaders. 
Jinnah and Nehru fired o ccasional press statements across 
the barrricades of the separate electorates, but no real 
debate developed, the echoes of which might have reached the 
ordinary elector. Their very remoteness, however, strengthened 
the symbolic strength of the national and, to some extent, 
provincial leaders. Accounts of them, however garbled or ex­
aggerated, had reached the smallest village, and were retained 
within the oral culture. Gandhi had by far the most powerful
2symbolic appeal. The sources of it have been described before. 
Official reports on the election frequently mention the extra­
ordinary reverence that voters had for him or for anything
3
that was associated with his name. Although he took no part in
1
See, for example;, the change in tone of the Civil and Military 
Gazette of Lahore, which had earlier been outspoken in its 
support of Sir Michael 0’Dwyer.
2
Rudolph and Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition, part two, and 
Anthony Parel, Symbolism in Gandhian Politics1, Canadian 
Journal of Political Science, vol. ii no. (Dec. 1969), 
pp. 513-27.
3
HPO 111/57, 'Memorandum ... on the Results of the Elections....', 
RO 20/III/56-F, 'Report on the General Elections in Bihar,
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the campaigna the three major social service organizations 
that he had founded were active in most areas of India.
Through their links with these associations, candidates could 
claim a vicarious acquaintance with the Mahatma. Nehru,
Patel, Prasad, and Rajagopalachari, in addition to sharing 
in Gandhi’s reflected glory, were also remembered by many 
as leaders of the civil disobedience movement, and as leaders 
of specific movements against landlords or the government 
such as the Bardoli and Champaran satyagrahas. Nehru in 
particular was known as a young aristocrat who had given up 
a life of comfort to serve the nation. All the national 
leaders addressed a certain number of election meetings, 
especially in the period immediately before the polling dayse 
As president, Nehru covered the whole country in a series of 
extensive tours. Using at times a chartered aeroplane, 
he was able to address hundreds of meetings. Attendances were 
usually numbered in tens of thousands and it was said that over 
100,000 people attended some of them.1 His intention was 
to bring the Congress message to the unenfranchised as much 
as to win votes, and in the earlier tours he made little men­
tion of the elections, but nearer the time he was able to
2
use the mass meetings to appeal for support at the polls.
January 1937% PR C.P., 10/2/37* See also AICC 
E23(i)/1936, report on C.P. elections: 'Mahatma Gandhi ...
proved to be a magic and enchantment1.
y
G* S.Halappa (ed.), History of Freedom Movement in Karnataka 
vol ii (193*0, pp. 248-30i and B.S.Baliga, Studies in Madras 
Administration vol. i (i960), pp. 17-18.
*TTor summaries of Nehru’s speeches, see HP0 4/7/36, 4/14/36, 
4/13/36, 4/32/36, 4/34/36, and 4/36/36.
Certain provincial leaders also enjoyed an aura, not of 
charisma perhaps, but of aloofness from local politics, and 
were identified with the wider interests of India. Examples 
are Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Gangadharrao Deshpande, T. Prakasam, 
and Subhas Bose. It was not necessary for such leaders to 
take an active part in the election campaign or to be com­
pletely dominant within their own province; the blending 
of their image with that of Congress provided support for the 
candidates. It is significant that each of the men mentioned 
was associated with regional aspirations which, although 
supported by Congress, enjoyed separate support, and in the 
Karnataka and Andhra cases had separate institutional forms.
The mobilization of support through loyalty, respect, 
and affection for individual leaders was by no means confined 
to the rural areas or the illiterate sections of the electorate 
While villagers attended them, the meetings of major leaders 
were mostly held in towns and cities. Regional nationalism 
was largely an urban phenomenon. When Bose was forced out of 
Congress in 1939* he took with him followers from all levels 
of the party.
The manifesto and other official policy statements were 
another possible means of communication between the national 
leadership and the electorate. The gist of the English ver­
sion was published in the press. The CPC ordered the mani­
festo to be translated into all the provincial .languages 
and to be widely distributed,1 The resolution appears, however
^ICC El(a)/1936, minutes of meeting, 23/8/36.
to have remained a dead letter in some areas, for in December 
Nehru issued an AICC circular regretting that even some of 
the candidates themselves were not acquainted with the mani­
festo's contents.1 Whether the manifesto was translated in 
full into every provincial language is uncertain, although 
in a shortened form it would probably have been the basis 
for many of the pamphlets that were issued at the local level, 
and would have been printed in the press.
The local party level The way that the elector related to 
the party at the local leveldepended on the position of the 
elector as well as on the characteristics of the party. If 
he lived in a village that had taken part in civil disobedience, 
he might well have had direct relationships with Congress 
members based on common experience. These could easily be 
cashed for votes. In many areas, locally influential men 
would have belonged to Congress, and the support that they 
enjoyed would have been exploited by the campaign organizers.
Equally, however, the elector might form part of a 
faction whose interests were linked to those of one or other 
of the parties. Village factions existed, but whether they 
were relevant in 1937 is doubtful. The conditions did not 
yet exist whereby party leaders could develop large-scale 
clientages of such factions. DCCs were themselves very often 
factionalized. A negative consequence of intra-party 
factionalism was that if a faction was dissatisfied with
^ICC Pl/1936, AICC circular 26, 2/12/36,
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the nominations it might not take an active part in the work 
of the campaign or, in extreme cases, might form a rival 
partyAdvantages could accrue in cases where the factions 
within a DCC were based on particular castes, for electoral 
support could then be mobilized through traditional channels, 
perhaps by men not directly connected with Congress.
Another possible link between the local party and the 
electorate lay in the role of party officials as expediters 
of local grievances and problems, but in 1936-7 this was of 
limited importance. Local power was still heavily centralized 
in the district collector’s office, and access at this level 
was largely the prerogative of the larger landlords and 
supporters of the government. At the same time, however, 
Congress was usually the only organized group opposed to 
the bureaucracy and therefore often took up strictly local 
grievances as part of its general agitation. During the 
campaign it was at last in a position to promise to do some­
thing about them. This commitment of local units of Congress 
to dealing with local grievances lay behind the remarkable 
way in which some of them began to act after the elections 
as if they were local agents of the government.
Congress could also derive some advantage from its 
control of certain local boards. Although district boards 
were still confined to such functions as primary education 
and minor roads and were subject,especially over finance, 
to overriding government control, considerable patronage was
^For example, in Lahore, FR Punjab, January 1937 I| and in 
Orissa, FR Orissa, Januaiy 1937 I.
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available. The Calcutta Corporation is a well-known example 
of a local authority being used to further political ends. 
Another instance in 1936-7 was Jubbulpore, where the teachers 
employed by the district board were ordered to carry out 
election work for Congress.'*'
Contact with the electorate was also established in 
certain areas by kisan organizations. These were particularly 
active in eastern India, and also in the northern part of 
Madras. Although Congress was not prepared to grant their 
specific demands, the leaders of the All-India Kisan Sabha 
were prepared to support Congress candidates. In Bengal, where 
there were organizations of Muslim peasants - krishak samitis - 
that were not allied to the national movement, the Praja 
Party was the beneficiary. These organizations were pre­
pared to use economic issues as bases for the horizontal
2
mobilization of the small and medium tenant-cultivators.
Where the CSP was active, it too was prepared to support Con­
gress candidates.*5
The candidate The distinction between the candidate and the 
local party is to some extent artificial and misleading. The 
candidate himself could have links with particular factions 
or caste groups, and the local party unit might equally be 
regarded as a collection of influential individuals. Never- 
theless the distinction emphasizes the point that a great
^This tactic could be tried by other parties. An instance 
relating to the NAP is mentioned in HPO 24/13/36, letter 
from U.P. Government, D.O. No. 967-CX. See also RO 
20/III/1936-F, 'Report on the General Elections in Bihar , 
January 1937' •
2
See above, p. 117.
^HPO 4/6/37, CSP circular no. 1 of 1937.
deal depended on the personal position of the candidate. At 
its most extremej the situation could arise in which Hafiz 
Muhammad Ibrahim could win the same seat (Bijnor) twice.
The candidate's relationship with his constituents was 
in many ways closer than it would be today. First, many con­
stituencies were small in terms of their electorates, although 
their geographical size was large.^ Secondly, almost all 
candidates were local men, at least to the extent of living 
in the district that contained their constituency. Many had 
therefore held office in their local,.party unit, on local 
boards, or in other local organisations such as co-operative 
banks. Candidates very frequently had records of 'constructive 
work'. In addition to the established All-India Spinners' 
Association and the Harijan Sevak Sangh, the All-India 
Village Industries Association had been created in 1934. Al­
though these associations were non-politicalj their office­
holders were by definition Congressmen.^ They undertook 
much work that is now carried out by government-sponsored
jFor example, Bombay Assembly Muhammadan Rural constituencies 
ranged from 2,304 electors to 13,223, Bihar Assembly General 
single-member constituencies from 14,162 to an exceptional 
37,619. The largest constituency in area covered 6,6ll 
square miles in the first case, and 4,912.3 square miles in 
the second: Return Showing the Results of Elections in India,
1937, Cmd. 3569 (1937), pp. 34-3 and 83-6, and Report of the 
Indian Delimitation Committee, vol. ii, Cmd. 3100 (1936), 
pp. 30-1 and 137-l¥f.
2 •
See below, p. 32/f.
^The resolution which set up the All-India Spinners' Association 
stated thatit was to be 'an integral part of the Congress or­
ganization, but with independent existence and powers', D.G. 
Tendulkar, Mahatma vol. ii (1931), p.268.
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bodies. A certain amount of patronage was available to can­
didates who were active in the various organizations, but it 
was the social service side of their work that was most visible 
to the electors.
Besides associational ties, candidates had ascriptive 
ties with their constituencies. The system of separate 
electorates meant that if a candidate was faced by an overtly 
communal opponent, he had no alternative sources of support, 
and had to compete in communal as well as political terms. 
Although a Hindu candidate would by definition be linked by 
caste to some electors and not to others, it has already been 
suggested that the correlation of the caste of a candidate 
and the largest caste in the area was not as marked in 1936-7 
as in more recent elections. It may have been more significant 
in the case of Scheduled Caste candidates. Under the terms 
of the 1933 Act, the Scheduled Castes had to provide a certain 
number of MLAs, but their candidate had few sources of support 
to draw on apart from caste affiliations.
Finally, most candidates were men<o'f ’standing1 in their 
districts. Many DCCs were dominated by urban professional 
men. Although their activities as lawyers or doctors did 
not necessarily make them well known in the more remote 
villages, many would have owned land within the district or 
have come from joint families which did. Some would also have 
been known as leaders of civil disobedience or of regional 
movements.
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Direct Contact with the Electorate The various relationships 
that could exist between elector and party have been outlined. 
Some of them were operational from the beginning, but others 
were latent and needed to be activated by election workers.
For instance, to some sections of the electorate the association 
of Gandhi and the Congress election campaign was obvious, but to 
others it had to be pointed out that to vote for Congress was 
a means of showing support and respect for the Mahatma. As 
the last part of this analysis, therefore, it is necessary to 
look at the methods by which the elector was approached directly.
The first approach was made during the preparation of 
the electoral rolls, and its object was to ensure that all 
those qualified did in fact register themselves as electors.
Those qualified under the property franchise were registered 
automatically, and fairly accurate lists of such electors 
could easily be compiled from the tax records. Those quali­
fied under the educational franchise and the special franchise 
for women had, however, to apply for registration. In the 
Bombay area, therefore, a *perfect roll* campaign was under­
taken, both to urge educationally qualified electors to re­
gister, and to check that all those qualified by property were 
included.
The timing of the campaign was necessarily determined 
by the government. Provisional rolls of those qualified by 
property had been prepared in 1933 j and these were used as the 
basis of the draft rolls.^ Applications for registration
^RO 14/36-F, Bombay Government to Reforms Office, 2/6/36.
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were then allowed until 10 July 1936. The main part of
the campaign appears to have taken place in May and June.
On 7 and 8 May, Patel met Congress leaders from all over
the presidency to discuss election plans, and a committee
of six was set up, initially to deal with registration 
2
matters. Patel, accompanied by S.K.Patil, followed this
up with a visit to the Chief Secretary to discuss registration 
3
arrangements. Later on in May, a meeting of almost 1,000 
Congress workers was held in Bombay, at which Patel out-
/f
lined the work to be done. Thereafter registration drives 
were reported from all parts of the presidency. The re­
sults of the campaign cannot be quantified. The Times of India
5
regarded it as having had *some success*. The Gujarat PCC
later claimed that the draft rolls had been enlarged
£
by Jf0-50 /o, but this seems a little improbable.
There were other reports of Congress activity in this 
field, but only in Bombay was it tackled systematically.
This was the result partly of the organizational ability of. 
Patel and Patil, partly of the concentration of educationally 
qualified electors in Bombay city, and partly of the fact that 
Congress faced more than token opposition in Maharashtra. There
^Times of India, 20/5/36.
^Leader, 10 & 11/5/36, and FR Bombay, May 1936 I.
^Leader, 11/5/36.
L
Times of India, 28/5/36.
5lbid., 3/7/36.
AICC E23(i)/1937, report from Gujarat PCC, 10/3/37.
was always of course the danger of helping the opposition by 
indiscriminate encouragement of enrolment, but this was more 
than counterbalanced by the advantage of establishing an 
electoral organization that was in touch with the electors 
from the very beginning.
The Congress election campaign itself was formally in­
augurated by Patel at a mass meeting in Bombay on 7 July.^
Similar meetings took place in the various provinces during
2
the following months. Intensive work, however, did not
begin until candidates had been finally chosen. The election
workers could use three approaches - individual canvassing,
mass meetings, and distribution and display of printed
material. The official reports on the election indicate
that individual persuasion was more effective than mass meet- 
3
ings. The canvasser could concentrate on an individual’s 
specific orientations towards Congress, its leaders, or 
its candidates, and endeavour to cash them for electoral 
support. Things could be said privately that could not be 
said at a public meeting where a CID officer might be present 
or where an opponent might remember them. Disgruntled 
British officials often attributed Congress success in 1937 
to the wild promises that were made to the new rural electors 
Although extravagant promises, many of which could not be 
fulfilled within the framework of the 1933 Act and were made
deader, 9/7/36.
2
Statesman, 20/7/36, and Times of India, 27/7/36.
3
HPO 111/37, ’Memorandum ... on the Results of the Elections.
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only to discredit it, cannot be regarded as primary causes of 
Congress success, they can explain how Congress was able to 
obtain electoral support from people who had not previously 
been socialized into electoral roles.
Congress was able to indulge in large-scale individual 
and group canvassing primarily because of the network it had 
built up in the preceding years. Although formal Congress 
organization mostly stopped at district or tahsil level, 
many villages contained Congress supporters who could can­
vass other villagers' votes.^ Such supporters had often been 
recruited during the civil disobedience movement. In some 
villages there were also full-time social-cum-political 
workers. They were usually connected with one or other of 
the social service organizations and, if they were paid,
drew their salary from it, but at the same time could act
2
as election workers. Where villages were within easy 
reach of towns, the local Congress could send out groups of 
workers for short periods. Finally, the elector could have 
been approached by people whose influence over him was non­
political. Where, as in Bihar, landlords supported Congress, 
their employees might have canvassed for Congress. Else­
where, a caste elder might have done so. In the latter case, 
the canvasser could persuade the elector to support a parti­
cular candidate in terms of shared normative values concerning
^In U.P. Congress was said to have had workers in almost all 
villages: FR U.P., February 1937 I.
2
N.T.Katagade gives an interesting account of his life as a 
village worker at a slightly earlier period in 'Pundalik', 
in D.D.Karve (selected and translated), The New Brahmans:
Five Maharashtrian Families (196.3), pp. 2 3 67.
caste solidarity.
The mass meeting approach nevertheless had its value. 
Above all, it provided the symbols which the canvassers 
could exploit. Meetings addressed by national or provincial 
leaders had an effect even on those who only heard reports 
of them. Where election workers were sent out from a town 
and had no prior knowledge of the area, village meetings 
might be effective as an entree. Some villages were barred 
to Congress workers because of the hostility of a local 
landowner or of the village officers. Where this was the 
case, a meeting held nearby could be used to appeal to the 
villagers. On the election day itself, Congress workers 
often organized processions to the polling stations. The 
main purpose of these was to make sure that electors realized 
the importance of actually casting their votes.^
Printed material was not of major importance as a 
means of reaching the electorate, except in urban and special 
interest constituencies. It could, however, be used as an 
auxiliary both to mass meetings and to individual canvassing. 
Those who were literate were likely to be influential in 
their immediate locality. In particular, parrphlet material 
provided active Congress supporters with help in their can­
vassing activity.
The candidate has emerged as the crucial figure in the 
Congress campaign. He could draw on a rich stock of sym­
bolic status derived from his association with the national
■*Tor general accounts of Congress techniques, see AICC 
E23(i)/1937, report on Gujarat elections, 9/3/37.
movement and had the benefit of a long-established organization, 
but he had also to meet his opponent on the politically neutral 
ground of status, power, and ascriptive support.
Other parties Candidates of other parties had to undertake 
almost the whole work of mobilizing support. With a few ex­
ceptions, no party could draw on any established prestige of 
its own or rely on the reputations of individual national 
leaders. The Muslim League of course had Jinnah, but he had 
still to develop his charismatic appeal to the Muslim masses. 
The main purpose of his national tours was to establish pro­
vincial League parliamentary boards; where he did address 
meetings they were in the main towns. League candidates 
also received active support from Shaukat Ali. Malaviya was 
another exception in that he supported non-Congress candidates 
in the Punjab.
At the provincial level, there were some non-Congress 
leaders who could appeal to the whole province or to large 
parts of it. They were mostly men who had been associated 
with Congress at some point and had broken with it for per­
sonal or ideological reasons. In Bengal, Fazl-ul-Huq had 
even been a general secretary of Congress, as well as Mayor 
of Calcutta and a member of the Central Legislative Assembly.
In the Marathi-speaking areas of Bombay and C.P., there was a 
group of men who had been associated with Tilak and who had 
perpetuated his brand of Hindu- and region-based nationalism. 
The most prominent were N.C.Kelkar and B.S.Moonje. In the 
Punjab many urban Hindus recognized the leadership of men
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like Gokul Chand Narang who had at one time belonged to Con­
gress. There were also politicians who had co-operated in 
working the Montford reforms from the beginning. The prestige 
and patronage of ministerships and memberships gave them a 
certain provincial status especially if they had also built 
up party systems. The most important instance was the powerful 
position enjoyed in the Punjab by the various leaders of the 
Unionist Party. In Madras the leaders of the Justice Party 
in 1937 lost much of the support they had earlier enjoyed, 
partly because their record in office had not been distinguished. 
Other examples were S.A.Aziz in Bihar and the Maharaja of 
Parlakimedi in Orissa. Most provinces therefore had one or 
two non-Congress leaders who had considerable experience, 
but they were mostly not well known among the rural electorate.
There were no local party organizations as such. Yet 
an informal clique or faction within the constituency may 
have fulfilled some of the same functions as a local party 
unit, especially in establishing contacts with other local 
structures such as caste councils.
The non-Congress candidate, therefore, was very much 
on his own. In many cases he was independent in name as 
well as in fact. The various sources of support already men­
tioned as available to Congress candidates were available 
to him also. Power derived from landholding was especially 
important to many non-Congress candidates. Indeed, it was 
through a miscalculation of the strength of their socio-
300,
economic influence that so many failed.^ Where a candidate 
was not a powerful landlord he had alternative sources of 
support in his caste or communal appeal. Free from the 
secularist ideology of Congress, such appeals could be veiy 
blatant.
P.D,Reeves, 'Landlords and Party Politics in the United . 
Provinces, 193^-7'» in D.A.Lcw (ed.), Soundings in Modem 
South Asian History (1968), pp. 276-9. See also FR U.P,, 
December 1936 I and February 1937 I; F0 20/III/1936-F, 
'Report on the First Elections to the U„P, Legislature'c, 
See also R0 20/III/36-F, 'Report on the General Elections 




This chapter presents the results of a study of selected 
characteristics of successful candidates in the 1937 elections. 
Efforts were made to obtain data on all MLAs and MLCs, but 
the material that was consulted in New Delhi and Bombay pro­
vided a somewhat limited sample. Uneven distribution of the 
sample between provinces and political groupings, and analysis 
of the sources from which the data were drawn, mean that in 
some cases more reliable results have been obtained.
The Method and the Data
The usual reasons for studying the social and economic back­
ground of members of legislative institutions rest on the 
assumption that they form a positional and reputational elite. 
Their background may affect them in the process of decision­
making, and knowledge of the social strata from which they
come enables general statements to be made about the political 
1system.
The assumption that legislators form a generally re­
cognized elite does not, however, necessarily apply in a 
colonial situation such as India in 1937» where final con­
trol over policy was pre-empted by an outside agency. It 
is also by no’means certain that MLAs and MLCs formed a 
reputational elite within Congress. Gandhi had sanctioned
"Ssee Donald R. Matthews, The Social Background of Political 
Decision-Makers (193^)» chapter 1.
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the formation of the Congress Parliamentary Board in 193^ 
but he had made it clear that he regarded parliamentary work 
as in no way superior to the ’constructive programme *.
There are, nevertheless, substantial reasons for studying 
legislators in this restricted situation. First, the 1935 Act 
did allow a large degree of responsible government at the pro­
vincial level. If its working had not been interrupted by 
the outbreak of war in 1939, significant patterns of decision­
making would probably have emerged in the various provincial 
assemblies. No-one regarded the elections as a charade or 
merely an attempt by the British to legitimate their rule. 
Although many Congress leaders did not stand for elections, 
others of equal prominence did. Secondly, information for 
1937 provides a basis for comparative studies of legislators 
at various periods. The third and probably the most important 
reason for the study is that it provides an indicator of the 
social background of the middle-level leadership of the inde­
pendence movement, subject to the proviso that those Congress 
leaders who did not become candidates may have formed a cate­
gory with markedly different socio-economic characteristics.
But information on the social origins of the independence 
movement is so sparse that anything is worth having.
'The words he used about Congressmen who wished to enter the 
legislatures are reminiscent of St. Paul’s justification of 
marriage as a remedy against sin: ’My views on the utility
of Legislatures are well known... But I feel that it is not 
only the right but it is the duty of every Congressman who, 
for some reason or other, does not want or cannot take part 
in civil disobedience and who has faith in entry into the 
Legislatures, to seek entry and form combinations in order 
to prosecute the programme which he or they believe to be 
in the interest of the country': Gandhi to Ansari, 5/^/3^,
quoted in Pattabhi Sitaramayya, Historyof the Indian National 
Congress, vol. i (19^ -6 ed.), p.5^.
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The data1 The universe for the study is the l,8¥f men and 
women elected or nominated to the provincial legislatures in 
January and February 193?« Of this number, 1,5^5 were members 
of the Legislative Assemblies; all were elected except for 
four. in Orissa who were nominated to represent tribal in­
terests o The remaining 239 formed the Legislative Councils 
which existed in six provinces regarded as politically sensi­
tive by the British Government. 186 were elected directly ;
39 were elected by the Assemblies in Bihar and Bengal; 3^ were 
nominated. At least one item of information has been: found 
for 930, giving a basic response rate of 30.43°/o. It is legi­
timate to deduct the numbers of Europeans and Anglo-Indians.
91 of the universe and 26 of the sample probably belonged
2
to these categories. The adjusted figures are therefore a
universe of 1,733j a sample of 90*f, and a basic response
o 3rate of 31-57 /o- The populations for each variable are of 
oourse lower still.
Can any valid conclusions in fact be drawn from such an 
incomplete and self-selecting sample? Examination of the 
sources from which the information was derived., and analysis 
of the ecological distribution of the sample, provide two
■^A list of sources from which the data were drawn is given at 
the end of the chapter.
2
k7 seats were reserved for Europeans and Anglo-Indians, and 
in addition Europeans captured the majority of the com- W  
merce and planter seats. Certain of the MLCs elected by the 
Bengal and Bihar Assemblies were also European. 91 MLAs and 
MLCs appear to have been European or Anglo-Indian, although 
it is possible that I have wrongly assigned Indian Christians 
to these categories or ignored Anglo-Indians.
3
"iAll figures used in the study are based on the adjusted totals.
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methods of reducing the margin of error, although complete 
accuracy can never be achieved when studying a historical 
situation.
The sources fall into two categories:
(l) Who’s Whos. These are 1purpose-made1, but almost 
always rely on the person concerned supplying the details.
They are sometimes structured by being based on replies to a 
formal questionnaire. Even so, a respondent would not neces­
sarily have supplied complete information, either through 
carelessness or unwillingness to reveal certain facts. Also, 
some variables used in the study demand data that is not in­
cluded in general Who's Whos. Of the ones produced in the 
1930s three proved particularly useful:
(a) The Indian Year Book, 19*f0-l. Like others of the 
period, it tends to concentrate on individuals whose main 
achievements lay outside politics. Landlords, leaders of 
commerce and modern industry, and educationalists thus pre­
dominate. Men whose support was based on traditional power 
structures and whose only Impact on the metropolitan world 
was as MLAs tend to be left out.
(b) The Legislative Directory for Bombay, 1938. Without 
this source, found in Bombay, the study could hardly have been 
carried out. Deaths prevented a complete response from all 
MLAs elected in 1937» but substantial information was obtained 
for 97. ^ /o. The directory was produced officiary and is 
quite clearly based on a questionnaire, as the entries are 
all of a uniform pattern. Concealment of information,
intentional or otherwise, remains a problem, but is much re­
duced in comparison with other sources.’1'
(c) The 1938 Haripura Congress Souvenir,- This gives 
details of many of the middle-level, middle-aged Congress 
leaders who are largely absent from other sources. As Haripura 
was in Gujarat, however, it concentrates very heavily on Bombay.
Later Who's Whos have also been used, especially those 
for the post-independence Indian Parliaments and a non-official 
guide for Pakistan. State Assembly Who's Whos were consulted 
but added little information. MLAs and MLCs who had retired, 
died, or failed, for whatever reason, to get elected to post­
independence legislative institutions are not included in these 
sources, which are therefore biased in favourcf the 'young 
hopefuls' in the 1937 Assemblies. A further limitation 
is that they often include only sketchy or undated information 
for the pre-independence period.
(2) Systematic lists. Typically, these are lists of 
members of an Assembly, produced by its secretariat, which 
give some incidental information, most commonly degrees or 
an occupational status designation such as vakil, advocate, 
or taluqdar. Provided the accuracy of the compilers can be 
relied on, these lists are exclusive - anyone who is not 
mentioned as possessing a degree or being a lawyer does not 
or is not. It is also possible to compare lists of members
A Madras directory also exists, see Kenneth McPherson, 'The 
Social Background and Politics of the Muslims of Tamil Nad, 
1901-1937’* Indian Economic and Social History Review, vol* vi 
no. k (Dec. 196>9)} p.399. Similar directories for othei pro­
vinces may also be extant.
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of other institutions with lists of MLAs and MLCs.'*’
Of the 90*f total responses 533 were from Who’s Whos 
and 371 from systematic lists; some of the former were 
supplemented from lists. A study of the various sources has 
indicated that the sample is probably biased in favour of 
the more socially prominent of the MLAs and of the young 
Congress MLAs who later became politically important. In 
Bombay, however, the sample is virtually complete.
The ecological biases in the data can also be studied. 
Only the most important will be mentioned. Signi.ficantly 
different response rates were possible for members of 
assemblies and members of Councils, but in fact the two rates 
were extremely close - for the Councils 51-57°/o and for the 
Assemblies 51.b6°/o. Secondly, the response rates for dif­
ferent provinces varied wildly from l8.5°/o in the Bihar 
Assembly to 97»&°/o in the Bombay Assembly. Full details
are given in table 4-.1* With the exception of Bengal, the
2
major provinces have response rates above the mean. The high 
rates in Assam, C.P. and N.W.F.P. must be partly discounted 
as many of the responses are derived from systematic lists 
and therefore only provide one item ofjhfcrmaticn. Lastly, 
if MLAs and MLCs are divided into Congress and non-Congress
^For example, lists of AICC members or of members of provincial 
constituency delimitation committees. Lack of uniformity in 
spelling and layout of names is a serious obstacle in such 
comparisons.
2
The low response rate m  Bengal was due partly to the re­
latively low number of Congress MLAs and partly to the ab­
sence of contemporary Who’s Whos issued from Calcutta.
categories, significantly different response rates are found: 
the Congress MLAs and MLCs have a response rate of 60.65°/o 
against 41.75°/° for non-Congress legislators. As well as 
providing basic information on the size of each legislature 
and of the sample, table 4.1 shows the provincial distribution 
of the sample and the provincial. Congress response rates.
Examination of the sources and the ecological distri­
bution of the data thus provides two approaches to dealing 
with an inadequate sample. These must now be expressed in 
operational terms. For each variable the problem is to esti­
mate the distribution of the MLAs and MLCs for whom no 
information is available, that is of the ’no-responses'. It 
could follow the distribution pattern of the population for 
that particular variable or it could be biased, in some cases 
predictably, in others not.
To utilize knowledge of the sources, one must first 
consider whether the data for a particular variable were 
drawn predominantly from Who’s Whos or from systematic lists. 
If from the latter, the no-responses may reasonably be allo­
cated to the category or categories not mentioned in the 
list. The major difficulty is that the categories used in 
the lists rarely coincide vrith.those used in the study. The 
variable must therefore be dichotomized in terms that corres­
pond with the list, and the data reworked in terms of the 
total number of MLAs in the province.'1' Equally, when working
^It is because of this difficulty that such presumed responses 
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Overall 30.33 30.97 30.43
Overall less 
Europeans and
Anglp-Indians 31.46 32.24 31-37
Congress 39-49 7^.37 60.63
Overall non-Congress 42.81 44.00 43.03
Overall non-Congress 
less Europeans and
Anglo-Indians 44.19 43.16 44.38
with the sample of positive responses, it must be accepted
that it is biased to the extent that it excludes those cate­
gories not given in the list.
Where the data are derived from Who’s Whos, no-responses 
must be divided into those for whom other information is 
available and those for whom it is not. In the latter case 
any distribution is possible,although knowledge of the bias 
built into the sample by the selection of individuals for in­
clusion in Who's Whos can be useful. In the former case one 
must also consider the nature of the variable concerned,,
The categories within the variable may be generally recogs- 
nized as forming a hierarchy of esteem. Where this is so, no­
responses will naturally be clustered at the bottom of the
scale, and if the variable is of the .zero-type will often
 1
fall into the zero category.
A zero variable is.defined as a set Pf positive conditions 
of which an individual need not satisfy any (alternatively 
one condition may be regarded as zero), and a non-zero 
variable as a set of which at least one must be satisfied. 
Both types of variable can be expressed in a dichotomous, 
non-zero form, as is done when reworking data derived from 
systematic lists.
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The fact of uneven distribution of the sanqple can be 
utilized simply by dividing it in various ways and then pre­
senting separately the data for the different sections. In 
this study, wherever it seems suitable, the sample has been 
divided into Bombay Assembly, and other responses; the 
figures for Bombay Assembly Congress responses have also been 
calculated separately. Two contradictory uses may be made of 
the results. First, comparisons may be made to establish sig­
nificant differences between the parties or provinces. Secondly, 
a section with an especially high response rate can be used as 
a control for the others. Broadly, the party classification 
can be regarded as indicating actual differences and the pro­
vince classification as indicating sampling error. Neither 
can be more than a rough guide and results obtained must be 
considered in the light of all other factors.
The variables After an initial study of the sources,nine 
variables were chosen which seemed most relevant to the themes 
of the social bases of Indian politics and of continuity and 




(4) Date of joining political party.
(3) Financial contribution to political party.
(6) Party offices held.
(7) Imprisonment for political reasons.
(8) Public offices held.
(9) General social standing. This was treated as a
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catch-all category for apparently relevant information that 
could not be included elsewhere.
When the data were assembled, it was clear that there 
were not enough responses for the fifth variable to make any 
further classification meaningful. The last variable could 
not, of course, be reduced to standardized categories. It 
was also found possihle, for Bombay only, to include details 
of place of residence and of caste. The findings for these 
four variables will be outlined at the end. The main part 
of the study is concerned with the remaining seven.
For the variables of occupation, party office held, and 
elective office held, multiple responses were frequent. The 
tables have been compiled initially on the basis of total 
respondents rather than total responses. A further difficulty 
arose in the case of respondents who had previously belonged 
to Congress but who in 1937 stood independently or for some 
other party. The variables affected were those concerned with 
party political activity. As virtually all the responses 
for these variables came from Congressmen, the data have 
not been differentiated by party. Activity within Congress 
has In all cases been treated as the primary response; 
activity within any other party has been placed in a sub-column., 
Although this may appear a little cavalier, the numbers in­
volved are very small.
The Results
In the first instance, each assembly and each council was 
taken separately, and for each variable distribution tables
were compiled according to party. The 119 tables thus produced 
were then combined to form single tables for each variable, 
classified according to province (with separate entries for 
assembly and council, where necessary).^ With these tables 
as foundations, additional figures are given in the text as 
appropriate.
Age Responses were obtained from 27.3°/o of the universe.
Age is a more or less neutral piece of information, and there 
is therefore no season to suppose that the pattern of no­
responses is influenced by anything except the natural bias 
of the sample. As virtually all the responses are from Who's 
Whos there is the possibility of substantial weighting in 
favour both of the socially prominent and of the 'young 
hopefuls', who might well cancel each other out. When the 
figures are arranged by party and province, they are seen to 
be in close agreement. The proportions of the population 
aged above and below 52 are remarkably similar between the 
Bombay Assembly and the rest of India. The median age for 
the Bombay Assembly is, however, somewhat lower. As one might 
expect, MLCs were noticeably older than their assembly counter­
parts. Many of the MLAs were thus men whose entire adult 
life had taken place since the First World War and the open­
ing of the militant phase of the independence movement. 
Education The following categories are used:
Foreign. Any period of education or training outside 
India has been counted. Almost all people receiving such
^These tables (4.5 - 4.11) are given as a group at the 
end of the chapter.
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training would ipso facto have had a degree, but there were 
a few exceptions.
University. This category includes anyone who attended 
an Indian college or university, even if he did not take a 
degree. There are practical reasons for this - many responses 
do not specify if a degree was held - but it can also be 
argued that what is important is the outlook on life acquired 
by anyone who attends a college or university.
Matriculation.
Nationalist. After the withdrawal of many students from 
schools and colleges during the non-co-operation movement, 
nationalist colleges were set up, notably the Gujarat Vidya- 
pith, the Jamia Millia, and the Kashi Vidyapith. Although their 
standard was that of other universities their degrees did not 
have any official standing, so that graduates faced difficulties 
in certain occupations.
Traditional. A few respondents had attended institutions 
that were outside both the government-run and the nationalist 
systems. To evaluate their standards, for a non-Indian at 
least, is impossible.
Private. It may be assumed that private education did 
not extend beyond the school level.
Elementary.
No-response/Lawyer. A number of respondents whose edu­
cational level is not known were lawyers, mostly vakils or 
pleaders. In some cases they would have passed pleaders’ 
examinations and all must have had some education, perhaps to
matriculation level.
The figure for university and foreign responses is 
inflated because lists exist for three provinces giving 
MLAs' and MLCs' degrees, and other lists give those who held 
the *Bar-at-Lawf qualification, obtainable only in London.
One might expect nonresponses of this type to be biased to­
wards the lower categories, but it seems possible that some 
people assumed that it would be obvious that they had been 
adequately educated. It would be hard to imagine, for in­
stance, that 27.7°/o of the Bombay Assembly in 1937 had only 
elementary education or none at all.
The lists of university degrees are for Assam, the 
Punjab, and U.P. In these provinces it is therefore possible 
to take the whole assembly or council as the population.
Table k.2
Percentages, within Certain Legislatures, of Those who had 








aAs these figures are calculated from a Who’s Who they are 
not fully comparable. The true figures may be slightly 
higher.
These figures do not include any drop-outs among the no- 
responses. If an allowance is made for them, and if the 
nationalist responses are added, almost half the legislators 
in these provinces had had a university-level education.
There is a striking difference in the size of the matri­
culation category between Bombay and the rest of India. If, 
however, the no-response/Lawyer and matriculation categories 
are added together, the combined figures are fairly similar. 
Occupation The following categories are used:
Lawyer.
Landholder.
Businessman. This clearly embraces a large range of 
income- and status-groups. An attempt was made to distinguish 
between large and small, but the limitations of the data made 
it very difficult. Broadly, those with banking and industrial 
interests can be placed in the big business category. The 
ratio between big businessmen and others in the sample is 
approximately si, but this is largely because of the bias to­
wards Bombay. If the Bombay businessmen are excluded, the ratio 
is reduced to approximately 3:1*
Teacher. This includes university teachers.
Medical practitioner^
Journalist.
Social worker. Social work within the villages was often 
combined with political organization.
Government servant.
Agriculturalist. As with businessmen, the limitations of
the data mean that the dividing line between this and the 
landholder group is blurred. Personal cultivation of land 
(with or without hired help) is supposed to mark the boundary.
Industrial worker. There was in fact no response in 
this category; it will not be used in the tables.
Miscellaneous.
Law degree-holder. This was designed as a supplement 
to the lawyer category. It includes those known to have had 
a law qualification (Ll.B or Bar-at-Law) for whom there is 
no evidence that they actually practised.
It must be stressed that these categories relate to a 
person’s occupation and not necessarily to his primary source 
of income. Also, they do not necessarily imply that he was 
actively pursuing his profession in 1936-7• Government 
servants were by definition retired, and many of the others 
were in fact full-time politicians rather than doctors or 
journalists. There is a further complication of double oc~ 
cupo.tious. l6.0°/o of the respondents mention two occupations, 
and one can be sure that many more had incomes from land, 
either individually or as members of joint families, even if 
they took no direct share in managing it. Arbitrary decisions 
had to be made in many cases as to which was a person's pri­
mary occupation."*" The degree of bias of the evidence is a
"*"0n the same problem in another context, Barrington Moore 
writes, ’In the nineteenth century, as in earlier periods, the 
lines between wealthy nobility, gentry, and the upper reaches 
of business and the professions were blurred and wavering. In 
numerous individual cases it is very difficult to decide whether 
a person belongs in one category or another. This difficulty, the 
despair of anyone undertaking a statistical analysis of English 
class structure, constitutes in itself one of the most important 
facts about this structure.’ Social Origins of Democracy and 
Dictatorship (1967), p.36.
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little difficult to assess. Each category of occupation itself 
contains a number of status-levels, although some occupations 
as a whole may have ranked higher than others. No-responses 
may in fact be concentrated towards the lower end of the scale 
in each category rather than in one or two particular ones.
It would of course be highly desirable to distinguish between 
status-levels, alsoincome-levels, but the data are not ade­
quate. One can, however, suggest a bias among the responses 
towards the law, in that systematic lists often gave legal 
titles, and the profession itself was generally recognized.
A law degree was a fitting culmination to the education of 
many who had no intention of becoming pleaders or advocates. 
Equally, landed interests may have been understated, for in 
many cases a private income from ancestral property hardly 
impinged on a man’s way of life. The lower-level district 
politician who is probably underrepresented in the total 
sample would very often have been a landlord and/or a busi­
nessman with agricultural interests.
Even with the above reservations, it is remarkable how 
far the truism that Indian politics in this period were domi­
nated by lawyers is borne out. 319 respondents had the law 
as a primary occupation and 18 were at least qualified, if 
not practising lawyers. In addition, 89 had a law degree.
Thus b-26 or 33*8°/o of the respondents had some legal train­
ing. For certain provinces it is possible, using the systematic 
lists, to take all the MLAs as the population. The results 
are given in table 4.3. Around a third of all MLAs and MLCs 
had probably had legal training. The percentage of Congressmen
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with legal training was higher, but not dramatically so. 
Other professions comprised about 10°/o of the population.
Table 4.3
Percentages of Lawyers and Holders of Law Degrees Within 





Bombay Assembly 30.7 32.6
Bombay Council 37.9 30.0
C.P. 33.8 40.0
N.W.F.P. 36.0 21.1
U.P. Assembly 30.8 31.3
U.P. Council 22.4 37.3
Among the other categories, the number of landholders 
is high, although the percentage within the total universe 
was almost certainly higher. The number of MLAs who were 
landholders is significant iiftthat questions of land tenure 
and agricultural conditions occupied much of the time of the 
new legislatures. The businessman category is also large, 
but businessmen did not form a clearly defined group in 
the legislatures, as their interests were often disparate or 
irrelevant to provincial politics. The number of social 
workers among the Bombay Congress MLAs is striking. Most 
of them would not of course have received any salary.^-
■^B.R.Ambedkar in V/hat Congress and Gandhi Have Done to the 
Untouchables (2nd ed. 19^6), p.217, provides some figures for 
Congress MLAs in Assam, Bengal, Bihar, C.P,, Madras and Orissa, 
although no source is given. In this calculation (which does 
not provide for secondary occupations), 33.8°/o are described 
as landlords, and 26.4°/o as lawyers.
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Date of .joining political party Unequal time-periods have 
been used, based on a periodization of the development of 
the nationalist movement:
Before 1916. The period before the Lucknow pact, 
when Congress was still largely dedicated to gradual con­
stitutional development.
19l6-l8. The Home Rule Leagues period.
1919-22. The nDn-co-operation movement. Many students 
were drawn into Congress by the new tactics of agitation.
1923-28. The lull when a section of the Congress first 
attempted to enter the legislatures.
1929-3 *^ The civil disobedience period.
1933-7- The immediate pre-election period.
Unspecific. In this category have been placed those 
respondents who mentioned having belonged to Congress 'for 
a long time’ or having joined 'very early1.
As mentioned earlier, all primary responses are assumed 
to refer to Congressmen and to Congress membership. There is 
therefore a 28.1°/o response rate from the Congress MLAs and 
MLCs. The information is drawn entirely from Who's Whos. The 
possibility of a bias in the no-responses towards later dates 
of joining is very clear; there was political as well as 
social significance in having joined early. Thus, although it 
is clear that in some areas numbers of Congress candidates 
joined the party shortly before the elections, this does not 
show up in the figures. It is, however, noticeable that the 
two short periods of active opposition to the government 
were the most important in the recruitment of future MLAs
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and MLCs.
Party offices held As with the previous variable, Congress 
responses only are being considered.**- The population is in 
fact virtually the same. The categories used correspond with 
the levels of authority within Congress:
Member of Working Committee.
Member of AICC.
Holder of provincial office.
Member of PCC.
Holder of district office.
These categories are largely, but not entirely, cumulative.
They relate to the holding of office or membership at any 
period, not necessarily in 1936. before, the no-response 
distribution pattern is almost certainly biased towards the 
lower levels, and many of the no-responses are probably in the 
zero category, especially if the MLA or MLC had joined Con­
gress shortly before the elections.
The high percentage of respondents who had been members 
of the AICC is noticeable, although less marked in the 
Bombay figures. This may, however, reflect the fact that be­
fore the revision of the Congress constitution in 193^» the 
AICC had been a body of 330- Membership of the AICC carried 
with it automatic membership of the appropriate PCC. Many 
respondents who had been AICC members also mentioned having 
held office at the provincial level. Over half the population -
^In Bombay, seven Muslim League MLAs, five Independent Labour 
Party MLAs, and three Non-Brahman MLAs had held office in 
their respective parties.
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63.3°/o overall, 3^.0°/o in the Bombay section- had either 
been members of the ^ICC or had held provincial office. Oddly, 
none of them mentioned having held district office, although a 
considerable number of other respondents did so. This may in­
dicate that district office was not highly regarded by those 
who had reached higher levels. It would be unlikely that 
the provincial-level leaders were all recruited directly.
Not only had many MLAs reached the higher levels of authority 
within the party, in Bombay at least it is striking how few 
had not held office at all. 86°/o of all Congress MLAs in 
Bombay mentioned having held some elective office. Those 
figures tend to disprove the theory that many Congress MLAs 
in 1937 were newcomers, although rapid promotion would have 
been possible for those who were especially influential. 
Imprisonment for Political Reasons The following categories 
are used:
Imprisoned at least qnoe during the non-co-operation 
and civil disobedience movements.
Imprisoned several times during the non-co-operation 
and civil disobedience movements.
Imprisoned during the non-co-operation or civil dis­
obedience movements and at other times.
Imprisoned only at times other than the non-co-operation 
and civil disobedience movements.
Of the 178 responses, 20 were from non-Congress MLAs 
and MLCs who had earlier participated in Congress or quasi- 
Congress (particularly Khilafatist) activities.'1’ In discussing 
the possible distribution of the 617 Congress no-responses,
^In the Bombay Assembly, two were from independents, three from 
members of the DSP, two from members of the ILP, and one from a 
labour member.
the peculiar status of the political prisoner must be con­
sidered. Although most Congressmen would be inclined to boast 
of it, some Who's Whos might not include the information. 
Congress no-responses would therefore tend to fall
almost entirely into the zero category, with a few exceptions 
largely depending on the source of the response. In the 
Bombay Assembly there were 31 no-responses of this type com­
pared to positive responses. As all responses were drawn 
from the same source, the no-responses would almost all have 
fallen into the zero category. It could therefore be said 
that about 62.8°/o of the Congress members of the Bombay 
Assembly had been to prison for their political activity.
In C.P., however, only 3S.6°/o of Congress MLAs had been 
imprisoned during the civil disobedience movement.'*' In
N.W.F.P., a special case, 63«2°/o had been to jail in the
2
course of the Red Shirt movement.
Public offices or positions held The categories used relate 
to local, provincial, and central institutions of government. 
The term 'office' relates only to public office and not to 
office within a party grouping, e.g. Chief Whip. The data 
were principally obtained from Who's Whos, but some systematic 
lists mentioned previous membership of a 'Montford' Council, 
so that the responses are biased towards this category.
Unlike the responses for parly office, it is noticeable 




district level on local boards. In Bombay 89 (33*6°/°) of 
all MLCs did so. The percentage is not so high among the 
rest of the population, but this is probably because of 
biases within the sample. It is also striking that kk 
of the population had been members of the Central Legislative 
Assembly and had returned to the provincial level of politics. 
Degree of non-residence Data are only available for Bombay. 
Out of the 180 respnndents from the assembly and Council only 
23 gave an address outside the district in which their con­
stituency was situated.^- Of these, 16 gave a Bombay city 
address which may well have been temporary. Most of the 
other seven lived in districts near their constituency.
Usually a district contained several general constituencies, 
but even so the preference for local men is evident.
Financial contributions to political parties Only eight posi­
tive responses were obtained, but clearly many more MLAs and 
MLCs must have been contributors to party funds, even if 
not on a large scale. Four of the eight were from Congress
members of the Bombay Council. This, together with the evi-
 2..........................dence for Bengal mentioned earlier, supports the view that
seats in the Councils were given to Congressmen who were
wealthy and well established rather than especially devoted
and long-standing members.
General social standing Although responses for this variable 
cannot be reduced to standard categories, certain sorts of in­
formation frequently recur. Very many respondents claimed to
Some MLAs and MLCs sat for non-territorial constituencies.
2p. 258.
have been active in various forms of social welfare and de­
velopment activity. One independent ML*-, in C.P. claimed to 
have been 'associated with most of the important social, 
philanthropic, religious and educational institutions in 
Madhya Pradesh ^ .e. C.P^'. Where a respondent was more 
specific, hari.jan uplift and co-operative banking appear to 
have been the most frequent activities mentioned, 25 of the 
85 Congress respondents in the Bombay assembly claimed to 
have been active in hari.jan work. Some responses also re­
ferred to cultural activities often associated with regional 
aspirations. Others mentioned work for caste associations.
The following examples illustrate the range of activities:
(1) Anandannappa Jnanappa Doddamati; Bombay assembly; 
Congress. A Lingayat, he had been active in the Karnataka 
Unification Movement. . He had been concerned with hari.jan 
work and was president cf a local Harijan Sevak Sangh. He 
was also a khadi propagandist. In his own words, he was 
'the driving force of all political and social movements in 
Karnatak'.
(2) Ram Prasad Tamta; U.P. Assembly; NAP* He had 
opened libraries for the Scheduled Castes and had generally 
fought for their rights. He had taken an active part in co­
operative banks.
(3) Muhammad Shamnad; Madras Assembly; Justice Party. 
He was an Honorary Magistrate. He had been a pioneer of 
moplah education, and had founded the Azizia Muslim Education 
Association and the Moplah Amelioration Committee.
The major difficulty with this kind of evidence is that
there is no means of checking its reliability*
Caste The caste is known of 122 of the 155 Bombay Hindu 
MLAs and MLCs, giving a response rate of 78«.7°/o.^  Reasons
for non-response were presumably dislike of the concept of
caste-identification, found equally among high-caste social 
reformers and radical followers of Dr. A-mbedkar. The results
are set out in table b.b. Brahmans formed only ^.9°/o of
o 2the Hindu population but 32.8 /c of the respondents. The
lower percentage of Brahmans among non-Congress MLAs is
largely due to the bloc of 10 Mahars from the Independent
Labour Party.
Table b,b
Caste Composition of Bombay MLAs and MLCs
Assembly Council
Total Congress Non-Congress Congress Non-Congress
Brahman bo 28 3 3 4
Kshatriya 3 3 0 0 0
Brahma
Kshatriya 3 3 0 0 0
Bania 9 6 2 1 0
Lingayat 13 7 3 1 0
Maratha 13 9 b 1 1
Patidar 3 3 0 0 0
”4?arsis are included because they were eligible for general
constituencies.
2This may be compared to Ambedkar’s figure of 28„8°/o for 
Brahmans among the Congress MLAs in Assam, Bengal, Bihar, 













Parsi 7 2 3 0
Mahar 10 0 10 0
Chamar 2 2 0 0
Others 9 5a 3b i°







Agarwal, Bhadagi, Mali, Nagir (perhaps Nagar Brahman), 
and Prabhu.
')Bhandari, Gavit, and Prabhu.
'Maheshwari.
In- view of the limitations of the sample, it is not 
possible to come to any final conclusions. MLAs in 1937 
seem to have been men with some previous political experience 
and with strong roots in their constituency or district, al­
though they would not necessarily have been recognized as 
’natural leaders’. The study has not revealed any major ob­
jective difference between Congress and other MLAs. At the 
same time, many Congress MLAs had a substantial record of 
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Table k.lQ (cont.)
Imprisoned at least once during the non-co-operation and 
civil disobedience movements.
Imprisoned several times during the non-co-operation and 
civil disobedience movements.
Imprisoned during the non-co-operation or civil disobedience 
movements and at other times.
Imprisoned only at times other than the non-co-operation 


























Public Offices or Positions Held














9 9.3 1 2 3 2 1
29 13.1 1+ 1+ Ik 3 2
16 11.0 3 1 10 1 1
103 62.0 1+ 3 Ik 30 32
26 23.9 1+ 6 3 9 2
**5 22.0 6 2 13 13 11
Ik 28.0 2 0 11 1 0
5 8.3 0 0 2 2 1
29. 16.8 8 1+ 12 k 1
11 19.0 l 0 k 3 2
k?* 21.0 7 3 11 12 12
33^ 22.1 i+o 27 99 102 66
0 - 0 0 0 0 0
8 1^-3 1 2 2 3 0
6 21.1+ 0 0 5 1 0
20 69.0 1 0 8 8 3
17 31-3 2 2 7 1+ 2
i+ 6.9 0 1 2 0 1
33 22.1+ 1+ '3 2l+ 16 6
589 22.2 1+1+ 32 123 118 72
Table 4.11 (cont.)
Total Column 1 as MLA Holder of MLC Holder Member
























10.1 38.1 23.8 14.0
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Chapter Five
THE ELECTION RESULTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN POLITICS
An adequate analysis of the election results of 1937 has to over­
come two major difficulties. The first is the inadequacy of the 
data. Details of election results are given in official and non­
official sources. The primary official source is the published re­
turn of election results, but this is needlessly incomplete.^ Al­
though their party affiliations are printed, the names of the 
successful candidates are not given. Only the number of votes 
secured by the successful candidates and their nearest rivals sire
given. Further figures, varying in completeness from province to
2
province, are available in Reforms Office files. Summary state­
ments of party positions are also included in these files and in 
official reports. In most cases discrepancies exist between 
the various sources. Non-official statements of the results are 
to be found in the newspapers, for certain provinces in second­
ary sources, and in a Congress report that was partly based on
4
newspaper reports and partly on special knowledge. Except for
^Return Showing the Results of Elections in India, 1937« Cmd.
55&9 (1937). There is a serious internal inconsistency in the 
measurement of turnout rates. In the summary of results, the 
relevant column is beaded 'No. of Votes Polled1 and an explanatory 
note states that the existence of plural-member constituencies 
distorts the turnout figures given. In the detailed statement 
of results, however, the corresponding column is headed 'Total 
Number of Electors who Voted*. Except in U.P., the latter is 
the correct description of the figures given.
2R0 20/III/36-F.
3Ibid., RO 20/36-F, PR, and FR.
4
IAR 1937 I1 between pp. 168 and 169.
3^7.
a few of the newspaper reports, all* non-official sources give 
only summary statements. The categories used are often different 
from those in the official sources and usually ignore minor 
groupings. The second difficulty to be overcome is the some­
times hazy nature of party affiliations. Although this is it­
self a fact of great significance, it means that there can be no 
one 'correct' set of elections results.
In this chapter an attempt will be made to reconstruct 
as accurately as possible the state of the parties immediately 
after the elections. Summary totals and a breakdown of the re­
sults by class of constituency are given. In each province dis­
crepancies exist between the various sources. Some can easily 
by reconciled by knowledge of the political situation in the 
province or by a rearrangement of some of the categories 
(especially those relating to various types of independent).
In other cases, however, intuitive or arbitrary allocations 
have had to be made. Other things being equal, official 
sources have been preferred. Although officials may have been 
ignorant of some of the nuances of party groupings, they were 
less likely than newspapers to have relied on hearsay accounts 
of party affiliations and post-election manoeuvres. It cannot 
be assumed that two superficially similar sets of summary 
figures drawn from different sources necessarily include the 
same people in each category, although the various official 
figures are presumably based on the same original source.
The detailed analysis of the party position in each province 
is drawn, with modifications, from official sources. For each 
province, as far as possible, the changes that took place in the
3^8.
months after the elections are listed. After the statement of 
party positions, the distribution, of the vote is examined. 
Because the information on votes cast is in most provinces 
incomplete, however, only a limited number of calculations 
are possible.
The following abbreviations are used in the tables: 
General Urban, GU; General Rural, GR; Muhammadan Urban, MU; 
Muhammadan Rural, MR; Women (General Urban etc.), W (GU etc.) 
Indian Christian, IC; Anglo-Indian, AI; European, E; Com­
merce, C; Landholders, LH; Labour, LB; University, U; Sikh 
Urban, SU; Sikh Rural, SR; Backward Tribes, BT; General,
G; Muhammadan, M; Sikh, S; S heduled Caste, SC; Indepen­
dent Hindu, IH; Independent Muslim, IM. In official reports 
and elsewhere, the terms ’independent*, 'no party', and 
'others' are used interchangeably and inconsistently. The 
practice here will be to describe as independent all MLAs and 
MLCs without specific party affiliation, except those elected 
from Indian Christian, Anglo-Indian, and European consti­
tuencies, together with Europeans elected from Commerce 
constituencies, who will be described as 'others'.^
MLAs in these latter categories of constituency sometimes be­
longed to one of the parties and are so treated. In general, 
the support of the European bloc was given to non-Congress 
ministries or groupings but no formal links were established.
3^ 9.
Assam
Assembly Total G (SC) M BTa
Congress 33 33 (2)
Muslim League 10 10
Muslim Party 2k 2k
IH 21 Ik (3)
Other Independents 9 9
Others 11
Totals 108 k? (7) 3k 9
Includes Backward Areas.
^Includes Planters seats.
Council Total G M E
Muslim Party 6 6
IH 10 10
Others 2. 2
Totals 18 10 6 2
1 1 1 8
In several sources the Congress strength in the Assembly 
is given as 33* This figure may include MLAs from Labour or 
Backward Tribes and Areas constituencies who decided to join 
the Congress group in the legislature. In one of the later 
official summaries and in a Times of India report,^  the Mus­
lim Party group in the Assembly is divided as follows: Assam
Valley Muslim Party, 3» Surma Valley Muslim Party,55 United 
Peoples Party, 3? Proja Party, 1; IM, 10. The first three
^Times of India, 27/2/37*
350.
probably existed before the elections, perhaps centred on 
associations that were formally above politics5^  the Proja 
Party was either an offshoot of the Bengali party,or more 
probably a title chosen by an opportunist independent.
Neither the Muslim Party nor the other Muslim groupings could 
have had more than a shadowy existence.
Bengal
Total GU GR (SC) MU MR V/GU WMU IC AI E C LH LB U
Assembly




Nationalist 2 1 1
Hindu Sabha 2 2 (2)
Muslim League ifO 6 30 2 . ‘' 1 1
Proja Party 36 36
TKKa 5 5
IH 37 26 (21) b if 2 1
IM k2 ifO 2
Others 31 2 b 11 14
Total 250 12 66 (30) 6 111 2 2 . 2 ^ 11 19 5 8 2
SiTipperah Krishak Samiti
FR Assam, September 1936 I refers in passing to the United 
Peoples Party, and FR Assam, November 1936 II to the Assam 
Valley Muslim Party.
351.
Total GU GR MU MR E Elected by
Assembly
Council





Hindu Sabha 1 1
Muslim League lif 1 9 if
Proja Party 8 6 2
IH 12 1 ^ 7
IM 5 1 if
Others 6 3 3
Total 37 2 8 1 16 3 27
The exact proportions of the Muslim League, Proja Party, and 
independent Muslim groups are doubtful. Two reports gave 
the Proja Party ifO by including the Tipperah Krishak Samiti, 
which in fact eventually gave its support to Congress. Like­
wise the status of one member of the Hindu Nationalist 
group and of two members of the Congress group seems to 
have been uncertain. The independent Congressmen were 




Total GU GR (SC) MU MR WGU VMJ IC AI E C LH LB U
Assembly
Congress 92 5 79 (11) 4 3
DCLa 3 3 (3)
Independent
Party 16 2 14
United Party 6 l 5
Ahrar Party 3 3
IH 15 6 (1)
IM 11 2 8 1
Others 6 1
Totals 152 5 88 (15) 5 34 3 1 1
depressed Classes League





Party 3 1 2
United Party 3 2 1
IH 11 9 2
IM 2 1 1
Others 1 1
Totals 28 9 4 1 14
2 4 2 1
 1 2  2
3 1
The DCL very soon merged completely with Congress. Congress 
claimed in its own report to have the support of three more 




Total GU GR (SC) MU MR WGU WGR V/MU ICU ICR AI E C LH LB
Assembly
Congress 85 13 61 (*f) b 1 1 2 2
ILP 13 1 12 (10)








League 18 b 13 1
IH 18 14 (1) 1 3
IM 13 2 10 1
Others 12 t 2 2 3 ^
Totals 175 14- 101 (13) 6 23 b 1 1 1 2 2 3 7 2 7









Totals 26 20 5 1
35^.
Largely as a result of its relatively poor showing in the 
general constituencies in the Marathi-speaking areas, Congress 
was three short of an absolute majority in the Assembly. Two 
previously independent MLAs joined the legislative party 
after the elections. The first, B. B. Chakranarayan, who sat 
for an Indian Christian constituency, did so almost immediately. 
The second, M. Y. Nurie, who had had previous links with Con­
gress, joined as part of the deal whereby he became the 
Muslim member of the ministry in July 1937- At least two of 
the members from the Labour constituencies, S. H. Jhabwala 
and H. ... Khedgikar, had Congress sympathies. The two non­
reserved seats gained by the ILP were both in Ratnagiri 
district, and were won largely as a result of the ILP es­
pousal. of the cause of the tenants against the Khots.
C.P.
Total GU GR (SC) MU MR W AI E BT C LH LB U
Assembly
Congress 70 9 5^ (7) 3 i 2 1
a






Hindu Sabha 1 1
NRPb 1 1 (1)
ML(SC)° 3 3
MPB(RSG)d 8 2 6
IH 16 12 (8) 1 1 1 1
IM 1 1
Others 3 1 2
Totals 113 10 7*+ (20) 2 12 3 1 2 M  2 3 2
5LIndependent Labour Party 
National Raja Party 
CMuslim League (Shareef Group)
Muslim Parliamentary Board (Rauf Shah Group)
The NRP MLi* was G.A.Gavai, a well-known Scheduled Caste 
leader, who may simply have adopted the label for the purposes 
of his individual campaign.
Madras
Total GR GR (SC) MU MR WGU VGR WMU WICU IC
Assembly * 1 * -
Congress 159 14 123 (26) k 3 3 1 3
Justice




League 9 1 8
MPPa 1 1
IH 7 k (2)
IM 7 1 5 1
Others 10 1
Totals 215 15 131 (30) 2 26 3 3 1 1 8
Continuation
E BT C LH LB U
Congress 1 6 1




Totals 3 1 6 6 6 1
aMuslim Progressive Party
356.











Others 3 2 1
Totals 35 7 3 1
The only major discrepancy between the sources concerns 
the figures for the Justice Party and the Muslim League in the 
Assembly. In the Congress report the Justice Party is stated 
to have had 17 seats and the League 11.
N.W.F.P.
Total GU GR MU MR S LH
Assembly
Congress 19 1 3 15
'No Party' 21 1 18 2
HSNPa 7 1 3 3
IM 2 2
IH 1 1
Totals 50 3 6 3 33 3 2
^indu-Sikh Nationalist Party
According to an official report, one of the HSNP MLAs in fact
joined the party immediately after the elections. In the 
Congress report, two of the ’No Party1 Muslims are said to form 
the Muslim Independent Party,
Orissa
Total G (SC) M W IC C LH LB Nominated
Assembly
Congress 36 33 W 2
United Party 6 3 (1) 1 2 1
National Party k 3 (1)




Totals 60 (6) k 2 1 1 2
4
1
The United Party lost one of its members shortly after the 
elections when Rajendra Narayan Bhanj Deo, who sat for a 
Landholders constituency, left the legislature. There is 
some doubt about the allegiance of the Muslim members of the 
United Party, Latifur Rahaman, who in one official report is 
stated to belong to the National Party.
Punjab
Total GU GR (SC) MU MR SU SR WGU WMU WS
Assembly
Unionist
Party 9*f 13 GO 2 70
Muslim League 2 1 1
Ahrar Party 2 2
Ittihad-i
Millat .2 2








Party 1^ 2 11
PLBa 1
Socialist 1 1
IM 5 2 2
IH 11 9 GO
IS 3 3
Totals 175 8 3^ (8) 9 75 2 29
Continuation
IC AI E C LH







Totals 2 1 1 1 3
Parliamentary Labour Board
although the Unionist Party was clearly identifiable at the 
provincial level, membership at the local level was very vague. 
Immediately after the elections, for which the party did not 
select specific candidates, some six nominally independent 
Muslims joined the Unionist bloc in the legislature, but it 
is impossible to say whether they were any less ’Unionist1 than 




Total Total GU GR MU MR WGU WMU E C LH LB
Assembly
Congress 7 7 2 3 1 1
Hindu Sabha 12 12 1 10 1
United Party 18 17 1 16
GHHPa 16 1 13 1
Azad Muslim 
Party 3 1 1
Muslim Party
IH 3 3 2 1
IM 10 1 1
Others 3 3 2 1
Totals 60 6o 3 13 2 31 1 1 2  2 2
Sir Ghulam Husain Hidayatullah’s Party
The landlord parties were nowhere as fluid and insubstantial as 
in Sind. GHHP was constructed entirely as a legislative group­
ing among elected MLAc. It is known that the United Party had
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been split into three groups immediately before the elections, 
and it is very possible that the Muslim Party represents one 
of these. It is probable that GHHP was largely made up of 
the independent Muslim MLAs, the Muslim Party, two of the 
Azad Muslim Party, and one of the United Party, but the possi­
bility of a more complicated pattern must not be ruled out.
The breakdown of results by class of constituency refers to 
the period after the reshuffling of the Muslim groups. Early 
reports credited Congress with an additional seat, probably 
at the expense of the Hindu Sabha.
U.P.
Total GU GR (SC) MU MR WGU WGR WMU WMR IC AI E C LH LB U
Assembly
Congress 133 17 108 (15) 1 3
NAP 22 7 W 9 2 k
Liberal 1 1
Muslim
League 27 7 20
IH 10 8 (r) 1 1
IM 30 6 22 1 1
Others 5 2 1 2
Totals 228 17 123 (20) 13 51 1 3 1 1 2 1 2 3 6 3 1
^See above, p.213.
3&.
Total GU GR MU MR
Council
Congress 8 3 3
NAP k 3 1
Liberal 1 1
IH 22 2 20
IM 16 3 11
Others 1
Totals 32 3 29 3 12
As with other provinces, the allocation of MLAs between the 
independent and other vaguely defined categories is difficult, 
P, D, Reeves's work on the U.P, election results has produced 
figures which broadly agree with those in the table but differ 
in certain particulars,^ The table describes two of the MLAs 
which Reeves allocates to the NAP group as independent Hindus, 
and three Muslim League MLAs and one NAP MLA as independent 
Muslims. This may simply reflect the tendency of MLAs to attach 
themselves to party groups after the elections. It should also 
be noted that Congress acquired two Muslim seats shortly after 
the elections, the first when Rafi Ahmad Kidwai succeeded a 
Muslim Leaguer, and the second when Hafiz Muhammad Ibrahim was 
re-elected as a Congressman. The Muslim League gained one seat 
when its candidate, Rafiuddin, succeeded an independent in the 
Jhansi by-election.
'Changing Patterns of Political Alignment in the General 
Elections to the United Provinces Legislative Assembly, 1937 
and 19^6' , Modern Asian Studies, vol. v no. 2 (April 19*^ 1) >
pp. 111-^2.
Congress was able to secure absolute majorities in only 
five of the eleven provinces, and gained Vf.6°/o of the total 
number of seats in the Legislative Assemblies. Mere detailed 
analysis of the distribution of seats and votes shows, however, 
that except in Muslim constituencies the position of Congress was 
very strong. Table 5«1 sets out the percentage of seats secured 
by Congress in various categories of constituency. It demon­
strates that General constituencies, except in Punjab, Sind, . 
and N.W.F.P. where Hindus felt oppressed by Muslim majorities, 
overwhelmingly preferred Congress candidates. The main gap in 
Congress support was in Maharashtra. Congress success in seats 
reserved for Scheduled Castes was more localized. Except in 
Maharashtra, however, it usually lost to isolated independents. 
It is also important to note that although General seats 
(including seats reserved for S heduled Castes) formed only 
33*3°/o of the total, they included 67.3°/o of the electorate. 
7^.3°/o of those who actually voted did so in general con­
stituencies.
As full voting figures by party are not available, it is 
not possible to say finally whether Congress gained a greater 
or less proportion of seats than of votes. In U.P. and Madras 
official calculations were made, in U.P. by class of consti­
tuency and in Madras for the aggregate totals.^ The Congress 
report gives percentages of the aggregate vote for certain 
provinces, but no actual figures are given. Figures based on




Percentage of Seats Won by Congress in
Selected Classes of Constituency




Assam 30.6 70.2 77.3 28.6
Bengal 21.6 61.5 91.7 85.4 23.3
Bihar 60.5 90.3 100 93.6 73.3
Bombay J+8.6 64.3 92.9 70.0 2 6.7
C.P. 62.5 75.0 90.0 87.3 33.0
Madras 74.0 93.8 93.3 93.7 86.7
N.W.F.P. 38.0 ¥f.*f 33.3
Orissa 60.0 73.3 74.4 66.7
Punjab 10.3 23.8 87.3 29.4 0.0
Sind 3-1.7 27.8 66.7
U.P. 58.8 89.3 100 91.7 73.0
Totals kk.6 72.9 90.8 83.1 30.3
Source: calculated from tables of provincial results.
aggregate totals are, however, misleading, in that the electorate 
per seat was higher in the general constituencies, from which 
Congress drew its support. To avoid this problem and to pro­
vide additional figures, calculations have been made for the 
general constituencies ii Orissa and Bengal. The figures from 
these various sources are presented in Table 5.2^ It is clear
^Other calculations were also made, but all of them appear to 
have been based on inaccurate data. See B. R. Ambedkar,
What Congress and Gandhi Have Done to the Untouchables 
(2nd ed. 1946), p. l46, P.R.Society Pamphlet 8l, and AICC 
E 23(i)/l937, reports of election results.
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that Congress sometimes gained and sometimes lost. Which hap­
pened was related not so much to the size of Congress's share 
of the vote as to local circumstances such as the number of 
candidates.
Table 5*2
Comparative Percentages of Votes and 






Aggregate votes and seats in 
general constituencies
GU GR
Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats







u.p. 79 100 67 88
Source: IAR, loc.cit. (column 1 except Madras); official
reports in RO 20/III/36-F (Madras and U.P.)5 cal­
culations from election results in ibid. (Bengal 
column 2 and Orissa). The figures for Bengal and 
Orissa are only approximate.
Another point of interest in the voting figures is the 
extent of the difference in votes secured by Congress candidates 
in the aame constituency. In each province multi-member con­
stituencies existed for the Scheduled Castes, but these were
special cases, and almost always caste Hindu candidates se­
cured many more votes than their Scheduled Caste running mates.. 
In Bombay, however, multi-member constituencies were used more 
generally. Table 3*3 shows the votes secured by successful 
Congress candidates, expressed as ratios, in constituencies 
where all the successful candidates were Congressmen, and in 
four-member constituencies where the top three were Congressmen 
(the fourth usually being a Scheduled Caste candidate). Although
Table 3-3
Comparative Votes Secured by Successful Congress 
Candidates in Selected Bombay Constituencies
Constituency Number First Second Third
of seats Candidate Candidate Candidate
Bombay City
(Fort ...) 3 100 91.2 85.4
Ahmedabad City 2 100 78.4
Panch Mahals West 2 100 93.0
Broach 2 100 86.2
Dharwar South 2 100 96.4
Kanara 3 100 83.0 81.7
Kaira 4 100 68.4 60.0
Surat 4 100 81.9 81.8
Ahmednagar North 4 100 93.6 88.1
East Khandesh West 4 100 88.8 78.3
Nasik West 4 100 97.2 90.4
Belgaura North 4 100 97.5 88.0
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the degree of difference is more noticeable than in some other 
political systems, the votes gained by Congress candidates were 
given to them both as Congressmen and as individuals. Bombay 
operated the cumulative system of voting, so that the discipline 
of the voters is the more significant.
As soon as the elections were over, the political system 
began to adjust to the situation created by the Congress suc­
cesses. It soon became clear that Congress would not accept 
office without receiving assurance that the governors would not 
make use of their special powers under the 1933 Act. To break 
the immediate deadlock the government decided that the summoning 
of the assemblies should be delayed, and it invited prominent 
politicians from the non-Congress groups to form minority 
ministries. After a period in which each side maintained its 
formal position, mounting pressure from the Congress grassroots 
and concern on the government side that the whole constitution 
might collapse led to the evolution of a formula that both sides 
felt able to accept. In July 1937 Congress ministries took 
office in Madras, Bombay, U.P., C.P., Bihar, and Orissa. Shortly 
afterwards a Congress ministry was formed in N.W.F.P. and at a 
later stage Congress formed a coalition ministry in Assam. Al­
though much work remains to be done on it, the period of the 
first Congress ministries has often been seen as of great import­
ance for the development of Indian democratic traditions.1
The eclipse of the minority ministries and the success 
of their Congress replacements round off two of the major themes 
of this study. Congress took another step in its evolution from
1W. H. Morris-Jones, Parliament in India (1937), pp. 63-73-
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agitational movement to dominant ruling party. It became an
articulated party whose leadership was able to maintain control
over a wide range of activities. Despite comments by several
governors that some MLAs had only stood on the Congress ticket
to get elected and might well defectthe cohesion of Congress
assembly parties was striking. The delayed decision to accept
office produced grumbling rather than defections. few non-
Congressmen joined the assembly parties after the elections,
sometimes as part of specific bargains to get Muslim ministers,
but until the incidents in C.P. and Bengal, party discipline 
2
remained strong. During the 1930s the ideological bases of 
nationalism were being explored, while from 1937 to 1939 the 
Congress ministers began to learn the art of the possible. There 
were, of course, features of the post-independence situation 
which had not yet emerged. Centre-state conflict was pre­
figured by occasional disputes with the provincial governors, 
especially over the question of restraining radical agitators 
or preachers of violence. The overall authority of the Working 
Committee masked the incipient divergence between the organiza­
tional and governmental wings of the party. Congress had widened 
the basis of its support in this period and the process had 
already begun whereby it was regarded as a vehicle for group 
mobility. At the same time pressure from newly recruited groups 
to share in power at the district and provincial levels was still 
manageable by the existing elite.
"SpR Orissa, 30/3/37, GR U.P., April 1937 I.
2
The Nariman episode in Bombay involved only one individual
For many of those who took part in the minority ministries 
however, the 1937 election marked the end of the period of 
their political influence. The numerous local parties that were 
formed were not genuine adaptations to the changing environment 
but desperate attempts to shore up the politics of collaboration 
The personal standing of politicians continued to be of vital 
importance in their chances of electoral success; but as the 
electorate had changed, so had the criteria of personal position 
widened. Work within the national movement itself provided a 
means of establishing a reputation.
Other parties also managed to extend their support and 
activities during the oid-1930s. The most important was the 
Muslim League. Although it only secured 105 of the ordinary 
Muslim seats (and 3 women's and 2 special seats), it neverthe­
less became the larges;t Muslim party and except in Bengal and 
the Punjab the only one with any real organization and 
structure. Above all, Jinnah was able to assert his authority 
at the all-India level. The beginnings of organized Scheduled 
Caste activity are to be found in the ILP in Maharashtra. Out­
side the Muslim community, however, Congress as the expression 
of the nationalist movement was more powerful than Congress as 
a sectional movement. It was only after independence that the 
party system developed to reflect more adequately the numerous 
cleavages within Indian society.
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